Moody v. Great W. Cas. Co.
| Decision Date | 09 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:16-CV-276,4:16-CV-276 |
| Parties | THOMAS VIRGIL MOODY and VALERIE MICHELLE MOODY, as the Surviving Parents of VIRGIL STEPHEN MOODY, Deceased, Plaintiffs, v. GREAT WEST CASUALTY CO.; GEORGIA FREIGHTWAYS CORP.; CMA-CGM (AMERICA), LLC; SOUTH ATLANTIC CONSOLIDATED CHASSIS POOL, LLC; CONSOLIDATED CHASSIS MANAGEMENT, LLC; INTERPOOL, INC. d/b/a TRAC INTERMODAL; DIRECT CHASSISLINK, INC.; and DAVID J. GIBBONS; Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
Before the Court is Plaintiffs Thomas Virgil Moody's and Valerie Michelle Moody's Motion for Remand and Attorney Fees, dkt. no. 5. Remand will be GRANTED; attorneys' fees, DENIED.
BACKGROUND
In determining whether it has federal-question jurisdiction over this case, the Court looks only to "the face of the plaintiff's complaint." City of Huntsville v. City of Madison, 24 F.3d 169, 172 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994). On May 22, 2015, Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death suit in Georgia state court against Defendants Great West Casualty Co.; Georgia Freightways Corp.; CMA-CGM (America), LLC; South Atlantic Consolidated Chassis Pool, LLC; Consolidated Chassis Management, LLC; Interpool, Inc. d/b/a Trac Intermodal; Direct Chassislink, Inc.; and David J. Gibbons. See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 1-1 at 14-30. The suit arises out of a highway wreck between the decedent Virgil Stephen Moody and a tractor-trailer. Dkt. No. 1-1 at 17.
The tractor-trailer was carrying a container being sent under a bill of lading issued by CMA-CGM (America), LLC ("CMA-CGM"). Id. at 25. CMA-CGM's agency liability and vicarious liability are alleged based on 46 U.S.C. § 40102(6)(A) ("Shipping Act"), 49 C.F.R. § 390.5 (Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, hereinafter "FMCSR"), "principles of agency, [and] respondeat superior." Id. at 24-26. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that CMA-CGM "is accountable for independent negligence because of its nondelegable duty in that [it] assumes responsibility . . . as an ocean common carrier by virtue of [the Shipping Act]" and "is vicariously liable" due to "statutory employment under [FMCSR]." Id. at 25-26.
On October 19, 2016, Defendants removed the case to this Court, claiming the existence of federal questions relating toagency and vicarious liability under the Shipping Act and FMCSR. Dkt. No. 1 at 3; Dkt. No. 9 at 2-3. Plaintiffs moved for remand and attorneys' fees on October 25, 2016. Dkt. No. 5. The parties fully briefed the Motion. Dkt. Nos. 9, 11, 19, 27. The Motion is now ripe for disposition.
LEGAL STANDARD
Civil actions in state court, "of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by . . . the defendants." 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Upon the plaintiff's challenge to removal, the defendant "bears the burden of proving that federal jurisdiction exists." Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001).
"[R]emoval statutes are construed narrowly; where plaintiff and defendant clash about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in favor of remand." Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). This is partly out of "due respect for state sovereignty and the independence of state courts." McCaslin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 779 F. Supp. 1312, 1314 (N.D. Ala. 1991). After all, "any state court is generally presumed competent to interpret and apply federal law . . . ." Walker v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 771 F.3d 748, 755 (11th Cir. 2014).
Removal is also construed narrowly because "the plaintiff [is] the. master of the claim; he or she may avoid federaljurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law." Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
DISCUSSION
This case will be remanded, but attorneys' fees will be denied.
This case must be remanded to Georgia state court because it does not arise under federal law. Removal is only allowed "when plaintiff's claim could have been filed in federal court originally." Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095. Federal courts have original jurisdiction over cases "arising under" federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case does not arise under federal law, because Plaintiffs do not raise a federal claim, and no substantial federal question is embedded in their state claim.
Plaintiffs do not raise a federal claim. Their complaint's sole cause of action is a state claim: wrongful death. See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 14-30; Dkt. No. 11; City of Dallas v. Explorer Pipeline Co., No. 3:02-CV-1465, 2003 WL 193444, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2003) ().
Nevertheless, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs "are invoking a legal theory that would not exist or otherwise beavailable to them but for . . . federal law." Dkt. No. 9 at 16. But there is a large difference between a federally based theory and a federal claim. Even when it is an element, "the mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action" does not make it into a federal one. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813-14 (1986); see also Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983)). For example, in Petigny v. Toledo, No. 6:12-CV-497, 2012 WL 3291765, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2012), the plaintiff brought a state wrongful-death claim (just like Plaintiffs here). She alleged that the defendant owed a non-delegable duty as a motor carrier under FMCSR (an allegation similar to Plaintiffs' here that CMA-CGM is vicariously liable because of statutory employment under FMCSR). Id. But the Petigny court did not so much as hint that the plaintiff was subtly raising a federal claim. See generally id.; see also Jairath v. Dyer, 154 F.3d 1280, 1281-82 (11th Cir. 1998) (). Nor are Plaintiffs masking a federal claim here.
Defendants rely on two cases, Schramm v. Foster, 341 F. Supp. 2d 536, 540 (D. Md. 2004) and Benefiel v. Exxon Corp.,959 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1992). In Schramm, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 540, the district court found that the plaintiffs had alleged a federal FMCSR claim. Here, though, the Court does not suggest that such a thing is impossible—only that Plaintiffs did not do it. In Benefiel, 959 F.2d at 807, the plaintiffs "den[ied] any intention to pursue a claim pursuant to [a federal statute]," but their complaint alleged that the statute imposed strict liability and defendants were liable "in accordance with the [statute's] provisions." Without further discussion, the Ninth Circuit held that the complaint set forth a federal claim. Id. The Benefiel opinion does not give any context as to the rest of the complaint. See generally id. Neither does the district court opinion. See generally Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., No. CV 90 2184, 1990 WL 180503 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 1990). Benefiel's very brief analysis simply is not enough to overcome Merrell Dow, Jairath, and Petigny. As "master of the claim[ ] [Plaintiffs had the right to] avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law." Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 392. At least as far as choosing their causes of action goes, they did. There is no federal-question jurisdiction here based on a federal claim.
Thus, the Court must consider whether "a substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of [Plaintiffs'] state cause of action." Jairath, 154 F.3d at 1282. No such question lurks behind Plaintiffs' state claim. Four elements have to be met for a federal question embedded in a state claim to extend federal-question jurisdiction: A federal question must be "(1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress." Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013). At the very least, the third element is unmet here.
Substantiality does not depend on the importance of a question to the suit at hand, as every issue that is necessarily raised is surely important to the parties. Id. at 1066. Substantiality depends instead on "the importance of the issue to the federal system as a whole." Id. Analyzing this is no simple task. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court recently compared relevant precedent to a work of Jackson Pollock. Id. at 1065. Still, four paint splotches—that is, types of systemically important cases—can be discerned from the cases, and three factors sketch out the law's remainder. They all show a lack of jurisdiction here.
This case does not share canvas space with any discrete area of law affording per se federal-question jurisdiction:
1. Cases involving challenges to the validity of a federal law. Coker v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1370 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 5, 2002);
2. Those impacting federal-government operations. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 315 (2005); Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F.3d 799 (4th Cir. 1996); Waitz v. Yoon, No. 1:14-CV-2875, 2015 WL 11511577, at *3 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2015);
3. Those involving contracts incorporating federal law. Tamiami Partners, Ltd. by & through Tamiami Dev. Corp. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 63 F.3d 1030, 1047 (11th Cir. 1995); Shelley v. AmSouth Bank, No. Civ.A. 97-1170, 2000 WL 1121770, at *7 (S.D. Ala. July 24, 2000); and
4. Those requiring construal of federal criminal law. Ayres v. Gen. Motors Corp., 234 F.3d 514, 519 (11th Cir. 2000); but see Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1300-03 (11th Cir. 2008) (limiting Ayres).
Beyond these genres, a case can only be substantial given three factors: (1) whether the...
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