Moody v. State's Prison

• Decision Date: 12 March 1901
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: MOODY . v. STATE'S PRISON.

38 S.E. 131

128 N.C. 12

MOODY .

v.STATE'S PRISON.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 12, 1901.

STATE—TORT OP AGENT—PUBLIC POLICY—ACTIONS—STATE'S PRISON.

1. Where a prison guard was injured by falling from a defective ladder, he cannot maintain an action against the state's prison for the damages, since the state's prison is a mere agency of the state, and Acts 1891), c. 24, incorporating the prison, does not confer the authority to sue and be sued, and Code, § 663, conferring general authority on corporations to sue and be sued, refers only to private and quasi public corporations, and not to merely governmental agencies, as to which the authority must be expressly conferred.

2. Where a prison guard was injured by falling from a defective ladder, he cannot maintain an action for damages against the state's prison, since such action would be, in effect, an action against the state to recover for a tort of its agents, and on grounds of public policy such an action cannot be permitted.

Appeal from superior court, Wake county; Robinson, Judge.

Action by J. R. Moody against the state's prison. From a judgment for defendant plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Douglass & Simms, for appellant.

Busbee & Busbee and Argo & Snow, for defendant.

CLARK, J. The plaintiff brings this action against the state's prison for damages sustained by him while a prison guard by the breaking of a ladder under him, which he alleges was in a dilapidated condition, and which he says he was compelled to use, though its defective condition had been repeatedly called to the attention of the officers. The defendant demurred that the complaint did not state a cause of action, because: (1) This is an action against the state, as such; the state's prison being merely an agency of the state to secure certain public and general services. (2) For the above reason, and even if it were a corporation, the state's prison is not liable to an action for tort

The court properly sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action. Being an agency of the state, the state's prison could only be sued when expressly authorized to be sued. County Board of Education v. State Board of Education, 106 N. C. 81, 10 S. E. 1002. The statute incorporating the defendant (Acts 1899, c. 24) does not contain the authority "to sue and be sued." The general authority to that purport conferred on corporations by Code, § 663, has reference only to private and quasi public corporations, and not to corporations like the present which are merely governmental agencies. As to those latter, the authority to be sued must be expressly given. College v. Willis, 6 Okl. 593, 52 Pac 921, 40 L. R. A. 67T, and cases there cited. But even if such authority was given, it would cover only actions ordinarily incidental in its operation, and would not extend to causes of action like the present. There is a distinct difference between conferring suability as to "debts and other liabilities for which the state's prison is now liable, " and extending liability for causes not heretofore recognized. Murdock Parlor-Grate Co. v. Com., 152 Mass. 28, 24 N. E. 854, 8 L. R. A. 399. "The exemption of the state from paying damages for accidents of this nature does not depend upon its immunity from being sued without its consent, but rests upon grounds of public policy which deny its liability for such damages." Bourn v. Hart, 93 Cal. 321, 28 Pac. 951, 15 L. R. A. 431. This is substantially a suit against the state. The defendant is a mere agent of the state In the administration of its government. The management and control of the state's prison is essentially a governmental function, being an indispensable part of the administration of the criminal laws of the state. The matter is so fully and completely settled that nothing is left us, beyond the citation of authority. In Clodfelter v. State, 86 N. C. 51, it was held that even an action instituted before this court under Const, art. 4, § 9, would not lie where a convict had lost his eyesight by the gross negligence of the supervising manager of the penitentiary, because, says Smith, C. J., "the state, in administering the functions of government through its appointed agents and officers, is not legally liable to a claim in compensatory damages for an injury resulting from their misconduct or negligence. That the doctrine of respondeat superior, applicable to the relations of principal and agent created between other persons, does not prevail against the sovereign In the necessary employment of public agents, is too well settled, upon authority and practice, to admit of controversy." If judgment upon such liability could be awarded against the defendant, it would be in effect a judgment against the state, to be enforced by execution against the state's property placed In the hands of its agency to be used for governmental purposes, —the operation of the state's prison. In the note to Clodfelter v. State, 41 Am. Rep. 442, among cases cited to same purport are Alamango v. Supervisors, 25 Hun, 551, which held that a convict injured by the negligent and illegal operation of a sawmill could not maintain an action therefor; Lorillard v. Town of Monroe, 11 N. Y. 392; Brown v. People, 75 N. Y. 441. The editor adds: "It is not necessary to discuss the reason of the rule, for there is no break In the long line of authorities by which it is established. Russell v. Men of Devon Co., 2 Term R. 667; Hill v. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 344; Hollenbeck v. Winnebago Co., 95 111. 148; Kincaid v. Hardin Co., 53 Iowa, 430, 5 N. W. 589; Woods v. Colfax Co., 10 Neb. 552, 7 N. W. 269; French v. Cityof Boston...