Moody v. Tedder

• Decision Date: 11 March 1882
• Docket Number: CASE No. 1165.
• Parties: MOODY v. TEDDER.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

16 S.C. 557

MOODY

v.TEDDER.

CASE No. 1165.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Mar. 11th, 1882.

1. Testator by his will devised and bequeathed to his wife “during the term of her natural life only, all my property both real and personal, authorizing and empowering her to use and dispose of so much thereof as may be necessary for her comfortable support and maintenance in such style and manner as she may see fit and proper;” and after her death, he gave “whatever portion may be remaining of my said property to J., her heirs and assigns forever.” Held, that the widow, as life-tenant, having an absolute power of disposal, could not be held accountable as trustee to the remainderman, for three slaves sold to pay the debts of the widow, to run the plantation and to support herself and agent.

2. The widow, in consideration that T., the husband of J., assumed the payment of her debts and covenanted to support and maintain her through life, conveyed to T. all her interest and life-estate in this property, and he it was who sold the slaves for the purposes mentioned. Held, that the deed carried to T. not only the life-estate, but also the power of disposal, and must be referred to her power whether it purported to be an execution or not; and T. was not accountable to the remaindermen, children of J., after the widow's death, for the purchase-money of the slaves so sold.

3. The deed, accompanied by the widow's acquiescence for fourteen years, could, at least, be construed as a power of attorney, authorizing T. to make the sale.

4. But, under this will, the remaindermen had no right to the slaves so sold, as neither they nor the purchase-money were property of the widow remaining at the time of her death. 1. Because they were sold for purposes within the scope of the power and their price so expended; and, 2. Because the slaves were emancipated before the widow's death.

SIMPSON, C. J., concurred only upon the last ground stated.

Before WALLACE, J., Darlington, October, 1881.

The case is fully stated in the opinion of this court. The will is very short and contains only what is copied into the opinion.

Messrs. Boyd & Nettles, for appellants.

Mr. G. W. Dargan, contra.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

MCGOWAN, A. J.

William Griggs, late of Darlington county, died in the year 1850, leaving a widow, Mary, but no children. At the time of his death he was seized and possessed of his homestead tract of land, containing five or six hundred acres, twenty-seven negro slaves, horses, hogs and other personal property. He left a will by which he devised and bequeathed to his “widow, Mary, during the term of her natural life only, all his property, both real and personal, authorizing and empowering her to use and dispose of so much thereof as may be necessary for her comfortable support and maintenance in such style and manner as she may see fit;” and, secondly, after the death of his said wife, Mary Griggs, he gave “whatever portion may be remaining of his said property to Jemima Tedder (wife of William Tedder), to her, her heirs and assigns forever.”

Mrs. Griggs qualified as sole executrix of the will, and continued to reside on the homestead and manage the property. She became embarrassed, and in order to pay the debts and prevent the sale of a negro, which had been levied upon by the sheriff, and doubtless to place the property under the control of one who could manage it, on April 22d, 1856, she executed to William Tedder, the husband of the devisee in remainder, the following deed: “Whereas, William Tedder having this day executed to me an obligation, in writing, to pay all my just debts, as well as the debts, if any, against the estate of William Griggs, deceased, and to give me a respectable maintenance and support for and during my natural life; now, I, the said Mary Griggs, for and in consideration of the obligation above named, and of the sum of one dollar to me paid, have granted, bargained, transferred and delivered, and by these presents do grant, bargain, transfer and deliver unto the said William Tedder all my interest and life-estate in and to all and singular the lands, negroes, horses, cattle, hogs and other property left to me for life by the last will and testament of William Griggs, deceased, together with all the debts due me or the estate of William Griggs aforesaid for negro hire, &c., together with all and singular the rights, members, hereditaments and appurtenances to the said land or other property belonging or in any wise incident or appertaining; to have and to hold all and singular the land or other property named unto the said William Tedder, his heirs and assigns forever. And I do hereby quit claim to the same in behalf of myself and my heirs forever,” &c.

Under this deed, William Tedder took possession of the property, leaving Mrs. Griggs in possession of the dwelling-house and household and kitchen furniture. The property at that time was in bad condition. There was a lack of provisions and the work animals consisted of four worn-out horses, two of them blind. The debts amounted to $1,500, and it was necessary to restock the farm. Tedder managed the property skillfully, made good crops and improved the place up to the end of the war, when the slaves were emancipated. In 1859 he sold three negroes (one of them being unmanageable) for $2,700 and used the money in paying off the debts which he had assumed ($1,500), to run the plantation and to support his aunt, Mrs. Griggs, himself and family. When the slaves were emancipated they had increased to thirty-two, exclusive of the three sold. After the war the property depreciated mainly through theft, and at the death of Mrs. Griggs some of the personal property remained, which had been delivered to Tedder.

In 1864, Jemima Tedder died, and her interest in the estate descended to her heirs-her husband, William, to the extent of one-third, and the remainder in equal shares to her seven children, of whom the plaintiff, Mahalie Moody, is one. Mrs. Mary Griggs was supported until she died in 1873, after which time all the children were allowed to cultivate the land, Tedder cultivating about one-third. As they grew up they continued to hire out the place, planting such of the land as they wished. Plaintiff, Mahalie Moody, and husband, went on the land in 1875, and instituted this proceeding against her father and brothers and sisters in May, 1879, for partition of the land and for an account of the rents and profits, and personal property which went into the possession of William Tedder, under the deed of April, 1856. Before trial it was conceded that the heirs of Jemima were entitled to partition of the land, and the plaintiffs abandoned all claim for account, except for the value of the three negro slaves sold by William Tedder in 1859. That point was referred to J. J. Wood, Esq., as special referee, who held that William Tedder was not liable to account for the $2,700, the price of the slaves sold. The case came up, on exceptions to this report, before Judge Wallace, who held that William Tedder was liable for the value of the negroes sold. From this judgment William Tedder appeals to this court upon the following exceptions:

“1. That the deed of Mary Griggs invested William Tedder with the right to dispose absolutely of the negroes, or at least to dispose of them in the interest of the plantation and for the maintenance of Mary Griggs.

2. That under the will of William Griggs the plaintiff or remainderman had title only to such of the property as might remain at the death of Mrs. Griggs, and as the three negroes sold did not exist as property at that time they have no right to account for their value.

3. The circumstances under which and the purposes for which the negroes were sold and the purchase-money applied, justified the sale, and relieved William Tedder from liability for the purchase-money.

4. The sale being in the interest and for the benefit of the life-estate, William Tedder is not liable for the same.”

This case, like that of Finley v. Hunter, 3 Strobh. Eq. 84, must be determined upon the strong phraseology of the testator's will and a manifest intention appearing from the terms he has employed in the gift to his wife for life and the limitation over. It seems that the testator was childless, and naturally his wife was the first object of his bounty. He desired to make her comfortable for the remainder of her days if it took the whole of his estate to do it, as is shown by the gift to her of the whole property for life, “ authorizing and empowering her to use and dispose of so much thereof as may be necessary for her comfortable support and maintenance in such style and manner as she may see fit and proper.” This was practically an absolute power of disposal, for while it is true that the will indicates the purpose for which it was given and for which alone the power could be exercised, yet in...