Moody v. United States
| Decision Date | 13 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:17-cv-00611 |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER MOODY, Movant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is movant Christopher Moody's Amended Motion (Doc. No. 13) under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to set aside, vacate and correct an allegedly illegal sentence and Judgment imposed by another judge of this court. See United States v. Conyers et al., No. 3:09-cr-00240 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 20, 2014) (Judgment, Doc. No. 2563). (References to the criminal case record will hereafter be designated as "Crim. Doc. No. ___.") For the reasons set forth herein, the court will deny the motion and dismiss this action.
Moody was originally charged in December 2010, in a Sixth Superseding Indictment,1 on counts of conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute five or more grams of a mixture containing a detectable amount of cocaine and crack cocaine and knowingly possessing with the intent to distribute five or more grams of cocaine and crack cocaine within 1000 feet of a public housing development. (Crim. Doc. No. 295.) In the Eleventh (and final) Superseding Indictment issued in November 2013, Moody was charged with eight counts related to drug trafficking andfirearms. Specifically, he was charged with (1) using a place within 1000 feet of a school to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 856, and 860 (Counts 5 and 12); manufacturing and possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute, within 1000 feet of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 860 (Count 6); possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 7); conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 8); possession with intent to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine near a public housing facility, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 860 (Count 9); and being a previously convicted felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (Counts 10 and 11). (Crim. Doc. No. 2468.)
A five-day jury trial was conducted beginning November 19, 2013 before the Honorable William J. Haynes, Jr., retired, after which the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. (Redacted Verdict Form, Crim. Doc. No. 2504.) At the sentencing hearing conducted on February 14, 2014, Moody was sentenced to life imprisonment on Counts 5, 6, 9, and 12; 360 months on Count 8, to run concurrently with the life sentence; 360 months on Counts 10 and 11, to run concurrently with the life sentence; and 60 months on Count 7, to run consecutively to the life sentence. (Judgment, Crim. Doc. No. 2563.) The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct review. United States v. Moody, 631 F. App'x 392 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, Moody v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1689 (April 18, 2016).
Moody filed his original Motion to Vacate in this court on March 20, 2017. (Doc. No. 1.) The court thereafter appointed counsel, who filed the Amended Motion to Vacate on April 17, 2017. (Doc. No. 13.) After numerous extensions of the deadline, the United States filed its Response in opposition to the motion on June 15, 2018. (Doc. No. 34.) Moody filed a Reply on October 1, 2018. (Doc. No. 39.)
The court construes the Amended Motion filed by counsel as entirely superseding the original pro se motion. The Amended Motion asserts the following claims:
(1) That the trial court erred in instructing the jury that, as to Counts 5, 6, 7, and 10 of the Eleventh Superseding Indictment, the movant could be convicted if "[t]he government . . . convince[s] you beyond a reasonable doubt that the crimes charged happened on or before November 13, 2008" (Doc. No. 13, at 1 (quoting Crim. Doc. No. 2663, at 191), because this meant the jury was instructed that it could convict Moody based on events that fell outside the statute of limitations;
(2) That the jury verdicts on Counts 5, 6, 7, and 10 violated Moody's right to due process insofar as he was convicted based on events that took place outside the statute of limitations;
(3) That the jury verdicts on Counts 5, 6, 9, and 12 violate Moody's right to due process under the Fifth Amendment, because the jury was not instructed to find that he had any culpable mental state regarding knowledge of being, or intent to be, within 1000 feet of a school or public housing facility;
(4) That the "enhanced sentence of life imprisonment" on Counts 5, 6, 9 and 12, which was premised on prior convictions for felony drug offenses, violates Moody's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution, because the fact of these prior convictions was not charged in the indictment or found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt;
(5) That the enhanced sentence on Counts 5, 6, 9, and 12 under 21 U.S.C. § 860, based on prior state court felony drug convictions, violated 21 U.S.C. § 860(b), which permits enhancement based only on federal felony drug convictions under § 860 itself;
(6) That Moody's life sentence on Counts 5, 6, 9, and 12 constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, insofar as it was based on "prior minor felony drug offenses which were then used to ratchet [Moody's] current offenses to a life sentence without parole" (Doc. No. 13, at 6), and insofar as life sentences for drug offenses are exceedingly rare, this sentence was imposed disparately based on Moody's race, is disproportionate to the offenses of conviction, is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, and is not justified by any valid penological theory;
(7) That the government's use of 21 U.S.C. § 851 to seek a life sentence violates Moody's right to equal protection, because this statute is "used disproportionately and unfairly and in the government's unlimited discretion to target [Moody], an African-Americans [sic], for a life sentence" (Doc. No. 13, at 7);
(8) That Moody's right to due process was violated by the court's instructing the jury that it could convict him on possession of controlled substances or a firearm based on "constructive possession," even though the governing statutes require actual possession;
(9) That Moody's convictions on Counts 5 and 12 are invalid and in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, because Moody was indicted merely for using a location to manufacture or to possess with intent to distribute "controlled substances," but the Eleventh Superseding Indictment did not identify what controlled substances were involved, and the jury was never instructed as to the definition of "controlled substance" or to find the existence of a controlled substance beyond a reasonable doubt (Doc. No. 13, at 8);
(10) That Moody's convictions violate Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015);
(11) That Moody's convictions violate Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and the Fifth Amendment, because potential jurors were removed in part or in substantial part because of race;
(12) That Moody was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial, in violation of the Sixth Amendment;
(13) That Moody was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal; and
(14) That the cumulative effect of all of the errors at trial deprived Moody of the right to a fair trial, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). "To succeed on a § 2255 motion, a prisoner in custody must show '(1) an error of constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the statutory limits; or (3) an error of fact or law that was so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding invalid.'" McPhearson v. United States, 675 F.3d 553, 558-59 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mallett v. United States, 334 F.3d 491, 496-97 (6th Cir. 2003)). In § 2255 proceedings, it is the movant's burden to show his entitlement to relief. Potter v. United States, 887 F.3d 785, 787-88 (6th Cir. 2018).
"A § 2255 motion may not be used to relitigate an issue that was raised on appeal absent highly exceptional circumstances," such as a change in the law. Dupont v. United States, 76 F.3d 108, 110-11 (6th Cir. 1996). At the same time, because a § 2255 motion is not a substitute for a direct appeal, any claims not raised on direct review are procedurally defaulted and may not be raised on collateral review unless the movant shows "(1) 'cause' excusing [the] procedural default, and (2) 'actual prejudice' resulting from the errors," United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982) (citations omitted), or demonstrates that he is "actually innocent." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998) (citations omitted).2
Ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel can constitute cause excusing procedural default. See Sullivan v. United States, 587 F. App'x 935, 948 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622). Where a movant claims that a procedural default occurred due to the ineffective assistance of counsel, "relief under § 2255 [is] available subject to the standard of Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668 (1984)]." Grant v. United States, 72 F.3d 503, 506 (6th Cir. 1996). Ineffective assistance of counsel, under the Strickland standard, can also serve as an independent ground for § 2255 relief. See, e.g., Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d...
To continue reading
Request your trial