Moon v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 10 January 1881
• Docket Number: CASE No. 964.
• Citation: 14 S.C. 434
• Parties: MOON v. JOHNSON.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

14 S.C. 434

MOON

v.JOHNSON.

CASE No. 964.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Jan. 10th, 1881.

1. In an action to recover the possession of real estate, an order refusing plaintiff leave to file a supplemental complaint, setting up a title deed to the land in question, is appealable.

2. Plaintiff can recover only upon the cause of action existing when suit was commenced; and therefore in an action for the recovery of real property, he cannot, by supplemental complaint, set up a legal title acquired after suit brought. Bank v. Manufacturing Company, 3 Strob. 190, recognized and followed.

Before THOMSON, J., Greenville, April, 1880.

The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Messrs. Garlington & Moore, for appellant.

Messrs. Earle, Wells & Westmoreland, contra.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SIMPSON, C. J.

This was an action by appellant to recover possession of real estate. The title deed set up by the appellant was a deed from the Probate judge in partition. After the cause was on the calendar the decision in Davenport v. Caldwell, 10 S. C. 317, was announced. The appellant then commenced proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas to confirm the partition of the Probate Court. Under these proceedings this partition was confirmed, and by order of the court the master executed titles to the appellant of the land in question. The respondent was not a party to the confirmation proceedings.

The appellant then made a motion to the Circuit Court for leave to file a supplemental complaint so as to set up the deed of the master.

This motion was refused by the Circuit judge “on the ground that a cause of action, under a different deed, is set out in the alleged complaint, and the same relief sought as in the first complaint.”

The appellant appealed on the grounds:

1. Because the plaintiff was entitled to a supplemental complaint as a matter of course.

2. Because the code allows the plaintiff to file a supplemental complaint, alleging facts material to his case occurring after the former complaint, and of which he was ignorant at the time.

3. Because, under the code, the plaintiff is entitled to file a supplemental complaint to set up a judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction rendered since the commencement of the action.

The leave of the court is necessary, in all cases, to file a supplemental complaint, and although this leave will be generally granted, yet it is by no means a matter of course order to which a party is entitled whenever he may choose to apply for it. On the contrary, the motion must be made in due time, in good faith, and upon facts warranting the favorable action of the court, and, when thus made, it rests in the discretion of the court whether it shall be refused or granted, and even after granted it may be withdrawn when proper. Whitaker's Pr. 213.

In this case the motion was refused. The respondent makes the point that an order granting or denying a supplemental complaint is within the discretion of the court, and therefore not appealable.

This is the first question involved, and we find it at the threshhold of the case. Under the code, Section 11, any intermediate judgment, order or decree, involving the merits of the action, is the subject of appeal. Does this order involve the merits of the action? The action is one to recover the possession of real estate. In the judgment of the appellant his recovery depends upon setting up the deed which he desires to bring before the court by means of the supplemental complaint. The order of the judge has denied him this privilege. This order, then, strikes at the very foundation of the appellant's action, and clearly involves its merits. Whitaker's Pr., vol. II., p. 216, § 193.

Mr. Whitaker says, “An order granting or refusing leave to plead supplementarily, involves the merits and is appealable.” Harrington v. Slade, 22 Barb. 161;St. John et al. v. Croel, 10 How. Pr. 253;Brown et al. v. Irish Presbyterian Congregation, 6 Bosw. 259.

In the case of Edwards v. Edwards, 14 S.C. 11, in this state, though the question was not directly involved, yet this court reviewed the order of the court below, allowing a supplemental complaint.

In our judgment the order in this case is appealable.

In the second and third grounds of appeal the appellant states correctly the facts and circumstances under which a party is generally entitled to a supplemental complaint; but we do not see that the Circuit judge, in refusing the appellant...