Moon v. Simpson (fauquier Nat. Bank Of Warrenton

• Citation: 87 S.E. 118,170 N.C. 335
• Decision Date: 08 December 1915
• Docket Number: (No. 372.)
• Parties: MOON et al. v. SIMPSON (FAUQUIER NAT. BANK OF WARRENTON, VA., Intervener).
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

87 S.E. 118

170 N.C. 335

MOON et al.

v.SIMPSON (FAUQUIER NAT. BANK OF WARRENTON, VA., Intervener).

(No. 372.)

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 8, 1915.

Appeal from Superior Court, Guilford County; Lyon, Judge. '

Action by J. S. Moon and others, copartners trading as the Moon-Taylor Company, against Samuel W. Simpson, in which the Fauquier National Bank of Warrenton, Va., intervened. From a judgment for plaintiffs, the intervener appeals. New trial granted.

This action was brought to recover damages sustained upon the sale of a carload of wheat by the defendant, Simpson, to the plaintiffs. On the day the action was commenced the plaintiffs procured a warrant of attachment and had the same levied on the sum of $1,-086.27, paid by the plaintiffs to the American Exchange National Bank, to cover a certain draft to which was attached a bill of lading for the purchase price of another carload of wheat. Thereafter the Fauquier National Bank of Warrenton, Va., filed an affidavit claiming the $1,086.27 as its property, and an order was made allowing it to intervene and set up its claim to the money. The draft was indorsed: "Pay to the order of Fauquier National Bank, Warrenton, Virginia. [Signed] Samuel W. Simpson"—and the bill of lading was attached thereto.

The jury returned the following verdict: "Is the Fauquier National Bank of Warrenton, Virginia, intervener, the owner of the money attached in this proceeding? Answer: No."

Judgment was entered upon the verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, and the intervener appealed.

King & Kimball, of Greensboro, for appellant.

Brooks, Sapp & Williams, of Greensboro, for appellees.

ALLEN, J. The burden is upon the holder of a negotiable instrument payable to order, which has been indorsed, to prove the indorsement (Tyson v. Joyner, 139 N. C. 69, 51 S. E. 803), and when he does so he is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course (Revisal, § 2208); that is, he is deemed prima facie to be a purchaser in good faith, for value, before maturity, and without notice of any infirmity in the instrument or of any defect in the title of the person negotiating it (Revisal, § 2201). He is not required to prove that he paid value for the instrument, as the statute furnishes this evidence for him. The following authorities and others sustain this position: Manufacturing Co. v. Tierney, 133 N. C. 630, 45 S. E. 1026; Evans v. Freeman, 142 N. C. 61, 54 S. E. 847; Trust Co. v. Bank, 167 N. C. 261, 83 S. E. 474; Bank v. Roberts, 168 N. C. 475, 84 S. E. 706. The court said in the Tierney Case of a bank holding a draft with bill of lading attached:

"When, however, it introduced the draft with the bill of lading attached, and showed by the evidence of the cashier that it was in the possession of the bank, with an unrestricted indorsement, the presumption arose that it was a purchaser for value without notice of any defenses or equities of the drawee or consignee."

And in the Trust Company Case:

"Our Negotiable Instruments Law is simply the codification of the common law, and under both the statute and the common law the possession of a negotiable instrument by the indorsee, or by a transferee where indorsement is not necessary,...