Moon v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 45518
| Decision Date | 06 September 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 45518,45518 |
| Citation | 658 S.W.2d 57 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Gussie & Elijah MOON, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TOWER GROVE BANK & TRUST CO., Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff, v. Paul A. HENNERICH III, Third Party Defendant, Defendants-Respondents. |
Charles J. McMullin, St. Louis, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Joseph H. Mueller, St. Louis, for Tower Grove Bank.
Homer N. Mastorakos, Chesterfield, for Paul A. Hennerich, III.
Plaintiffs-Appellants Moon brought a libel action against defendant/third party plaintiff-respondent Tower Grove Bank and Trust Company and third party defendant-respondent Paul A. Hennerich, III. On appeal, appellants argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their petition on the basis of the collateral estoppel effect of two prior court orders. We reverse.
Respondent, Tower Grove Bank, originally sued appellants Gussie and Elizah Moore in St. Louis County Magistrate Court under a promissory note allegedly co-signed for Gussie's daughter. On April 21, 1976, a default judgment was entered by the magistrate judge against appellants, Gussie Moor and Elizah Moor. At respondent's request, the default judgment was set aside and the last names of appellants were amended from "Moor" to "Moon" and reset for trial.
Postcard notices of the new setting date were then sent to Gussie Moon and Elizah Moon. Thereafter, on May 12, 1976, a second "Judgment in Default" was entered against appellants who had not appeared for the court hearing. Pursuant thereto, the bank's attorney, Paul A. Hennerich, III, requested and was granted an execution and garnishment against appellants.
On September 14, 1977, appellants brought suit against the St. Louis County Sheriff, his deputy and the bonding company for the return of the garnishment alleging that the sheriff's service was defective. On November 2, 1977, the sheriff filed a motion to dismiss appellant's petition. The Magistrate Court sustained the sheriff's motion but without giving reasons for the judgment. No further action was taken against those parties.
Subsequently, in 1979, appellants filed suit against respondent Tower Grove Bank and Trust Company. Tower Grove filed a third-party petition, as third-party plaintiff, against Paul A. Hennerich, III as third-party defendant (which parties, Tower Grove Bank and Trust Company and Paul A. Hennerich, III, are hereinafter referred to jointly as respondents). The cause of action was assigned to the circuit court in St. Louis. On January 11, 1982, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that appellant's suit was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Thereafter, on February 24, 1982, the trial court entered its order sustaining the motion to dismiss on grounds of collateral estoppel.
Appellants allege several reasons why this court should set aside respondent's motion to dismiss on the grounds of collateral estoppel. We need only address one--whether the magistrate court, due to improper service of process, both in the original action of Tower Grove against Gussie and Elizah Moon and also for the trial resetting, lacked jurisdiction over appellants so that the second default judgment was null and void resulting in no finding on the merits of respondent's cause of action.
Respondents acknowledge the procedural defects in the original summons delivered to the residence of Gussie and Elizah Moor. In addition to the error in the name, appellants allege that the service of process was defective in that the summons was left with a niece under the age of fifteen years in violation of Rule 54.13. Furthermore, an issue had arisen regarding a violation of the required ten day statutory period, 516.080 RSMo 1979, in that the sheriff failed to serve appellants at least ten days before the original trial date. As a result of the procedural defects, respondents, at their own request, petitioned the trial court to set aside the default judgment against appellants and reset the cause for a new trial to which the trial court acceded. Upon receiving the new trial date, respondent had postcard notices sent to the Moons' residence but misnamed Elijah Moon as "Elizah." Regardless of the misnames, this service was also improper.
We have no doubt of the power of the court to entertain the action and enter its second default judgment if it had...
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...defendant is deemed proper and starts the clock on removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Id. (citing Moon v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co. , 658 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Mo. App. 1983) ). Misidentification occurs when a plaintiff "made a mistake in selecting the proper party to sue," and must add and ......
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Groh v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
...the wrong name. Id. The effect of a misnomer is that service on the original defendant is deemed proper. Moon v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 658 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); see Sommervold v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 709 F.3d 1234, 1236 (8th Cir. 2013) (using state law to determine whether s......
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Moon v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co.
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