Mooney v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
| Decision Date | 24 July 1925 |
| Docket Number | 24,434 |
| Citation | 202 N.W. 341,162 Minn. 127 |
| Parties | CORA E. MOONEY v. BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
February 20, 1925.
Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $1,800. The case was tried before Bardwell, J., and a jury which returned a verdict for $1,600 with interest. Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding was denied. From the judgment, defendant appealed. Reversed on reargument.
Unreasonable amendment to constitution of fraternal order void -- case followed.
1. Even though the insured in a fraternal insurance order has agreed that amendments to the constitution made subsequent to the issuance of the insurance certificate shall apply to it, an amendment, adopted after the issuing of the certificate sued on, that disappearance of the insured shall not ripen into a claim for the insurance, is unreasonable and void as to such certificate. Boynton v. Modern Woodmen of America, 148 Minn. 150, 181 N.W. 327, is adhered to.
Construction of language of certificate.
2. The insured agreed that the certificate was to be deemed an Illinois contract and subject to its laws. This language is construed to refer to the statute law of that state and not to decisions of the court rendered after the death of the insured, refusing to apply the common law rule of presumption of death from disappearance where the constitution of the order was amended as stated.
When judgment of sister state is not entitled to full faith in Minnesota court.
3. A judgment rendered in a sister state is not one which must be given full faith and credit in this state under the Federal Constitution -- unless it was rendered between the same parties or their privies who are parties to the action wherein such judgment is sought to be made use of.
July 24, 1925.
Validity of by-law determined by Illinois law.
On reargument it is held, following Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 45 S.Ct. 389, 69 L.Ed. 506, that the validity of the by-law in question must be determined by the law of Illinois.
* Headnote 1. See Mutual Benefit Insurance, 29 Cyc. p. 81.
Headnote 2. See Mutual Benefit Insurance, 29 Cyc. p. 86.
Headnote 3. See Judgment, 34 C.J. p. 1135, § 1610.
George R. Smith, Edward J. Callahan, H. Stanley Hanson, William B Movery and William J. Hughes, Jr., for appellant.
H. Z Mendow, E. J. Culhane and L. E. Solomon, for respondent.
On February 20, 1925, the following opinion was filed:
Defendant, a fraternal insurance company, appeals from a judgment obtained upon its benefit insurance certificate issued to Ed. F. Mooney, payable to plaintiff, his wife, upon his death.
In his application for a certificate of insurance, Ed. F. Mooney agreed that "any beneficiary certificate based upon this application shall be held be a contract made in the State of Illinois and subject to its laws." A certificate was issued on March 4, 1899, upon the express condition "that the said Ed. F. Mooney shall comply with the constitution, by-laws, rules and regulations, now in force or which may hereafter be adopted" by defendant. In November, 1908, plaintiff received her last letter from her husband. He then disappeared, and has since not been heard from. Defendant concedes the evidence such as to warrant the jury's finding that Mooney was dead. In 1901 the constitution was amended so that certificates were to be deemed made under and to be construed in accordance with the laws of the state in which the Grand Lodge has its headquarters. In 1913 the constitution was again amended by adding this provision:
Defendant contends that the insurance contract is governed by the laws of Ohio, to which state it claimed the Grand Lodge has been moved. We find no evidence in the record that such is the fact. But that is not important under defendant's theory of the case, for the Illinois courts follow those of Ohio holding valid and applicable to pre-existing contracts of insurance the above quoted amendment to the constitution of defendant, adopted in 1913. Steen v. Modern Woodmen, 296 Ill. 104, 129 N.E. 546, 17 A.L.R. 406; McGovern v. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 85 Oh. St. 460, 98 N.E. 1128, affirmed on authority of Tisch v. The Protected Home Circle, 72 Oh. St. 233, 74 N.E. 188.
However, we are unable to differentiate this case from Boynton v. Modern Woodmen, 148 Minn. 150, 181 N.W. 327, 17 A.L.R. 401. Both involve a fraternal insurance company. In one a subsequent amendment of the constitution and in the other of the by-laws provide that proof of death and claim to the insurance cannot be based upon disappearance of the insured, whether the insurance was effected prior or subsequent to such change. It is immaterial whether the amendment is to the by-laws or the constitution, for the amendment of the by-laws of the company is as effective upon the contract of insurance as would be the amendment of its constitution. The only matters in the instant case not found in that of Boynton are that Mooney, in the application, agreed that the insurance contract should be deemed made in Illinois and subject to its laws, and the amendment of 1901 providing it shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the state where the Grand Lodge has its headquarters. But we think this affords no good reason for not applying the principle of the Boynton case. When Mooney was insured, there was no decision in Illinois nor until after he was dead (if we assume that the jury found he died August 1, 1916, on account of the amount of the verdict and the interest allowance from that date), from which it could be inferred that an amendment like that of 1913 would be reasonable as applied to holders of preexisting certificates. No statute of Illinois was proved touching the question, and decisions of the courts of Illinois subsequent to the death of the insured should not be allowed to bar a recovery in a case where under the law of the forum a good cause of action exists. Moreover, we construe the words "subject to its laws" to mean the statutes of Illinois and not to decisions of its courts thereafter to be promulgated. We adhere to the opinion expressed in the Boynton case that the 1913 amendment of defendant's constitution is unreasonable and nugatory as to insurance contracts entered prior to the amendment. It is deemed unnecessary to discuss the proposition here, the authorities being cited pro and con in that case.
But defendant contends the refusal...
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