Moore ex rel. Moore v. Bi-State Dev. Agency
| Decision Date | 16 July 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 79994.,ED 79994. |
| Citation | 87 S.W.3d 279 |
| Parties | Bryant MOORE, Jr., by his next friend and father, Ryant MOORE, Sr., Plaintiff/Respondent, v. BI-STATE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, Defendant/Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
James E. Whaley, Thomas Michael Ward, Law office of Brown & James, St. Louis, for Appellant.
John D. Warner, Jr., Law firm of Gault & Warner, St. Louis, for Respondent.
Bi-State Development Agency (Bi-State) appeals from a jury verdict and trial court judgment entered in favor of Bryant Moore, Jr. (Moore), by and through his next friend and father Bryant Moore, Sr., on his petition for damages for personal injuries alleging that Bi-State failed to discharge Moore from its bus in a safe place. We affirm the trial court judgment and dismiss Moore's cross-appeal.
In preparation for our analysis of Bi-State's points on appeal, we present the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to Moore. Fourteen-year-old Moore was a high school freshman at Collinsville High School in Collinsville, Illinois. To attend an early college preparatory class at school, Moore rode a Bi-State bus to the school at around 6:15 a.m., and he was usually the only passenger on the bus at that time. Typically, Moore requested the bus driver to drop him off across from a service road leading to the school's rear entrance.1 Bi-State had a company policy instructing its bus drivers to make such requested stops for the convenience of its passengers if the bus driver determined he could safely do so. On the northeast corner at the end of the school service road, which made a "T" intersection with Caseyville Road, a two-lane road with a speed limit of forty-five miles per hour, a light standard lit Caseyville Road from east to west.
On January 25, 1999, it remained dark until about 6:30 a.m. At about 6:20 a.m., upon approach to Collinsville High School in the southbound lane of Caseyville Road, Moore requested the Bi-State bus driver, who was familiar with Moore and his typical requested stop, to stop the bus across from the service road leading to the school's rear entrance. The driver stopped the bus about forty-five to fifty feet south of the "T" intersection with the school service road and the light standard at a place with minimal road shoulder, composed of loose pebbles and grass, and no sidewalk, crosswalk or intersection.2 Also at this place, woods and ditches were along the side of Caseyville Road.
Moore exited the bus and walked along the right side of the bus toward the rear of the bus. As he did so, Moore noticed a van waiting about thirty feet behind the bus. Once he had cleared the length of the bus, Moore crossed behind the bus and headed east across Caseyville Road. Simultaneously, a pickup truck was headed northbound on Caseyville Road. The record on appeal does not reveal whether the truck had its headlights on. The van's driver did not observe Moore look to the south for oncoming traffic. Moore took about one and one half steps into the northbound traffic lane when the truck struck him. Moore sustained serious injuries, including brain damage, from the accident.
Moore, by and through his next friend and father Bryant Moore, Sr., filed a petition for damages for personal injuries alleging that Bi-State failed to discharge Moore from its bus in a safe place. In April 2001, after a jury trial, the jury found in favor of Moore, assessing 51% fault to Bi-State and 49% fault to Moore and finding the total damages of Moore to be $7,750,000. Accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Moore and against Bi-State in the amount of $3,952,500. Subsequently, the trial court granted Bi-State's motion for a set-off from the judgment, which reduced the amount of the judgment to $3,890,000. Bi-State filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, For New Trial or Remittitur. Moore also filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. The trial court denied both motions.
Bi-State raises four points on appeal. Preliminarily, we must first consider choice of law principles. A forum state will always apply forum procedure. Reis v. Peabody Coal Co., 997 S.W.2d 49, 58 (Mo.App. E.D.1999). Thus, Missouri procedural law applies to the issues raised on appeal. The standard of review is a procedural issue, and therefore Missouri law governs the standard of review for the issues raised on appeal. See Id. at 59.
A forum state will choose the applicable substantive law according to its own conflict of law doctrines. Id. at 58. For tort claims, Missouri applies the test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Section 145 (1971). Id. Section 145 provides:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in section 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of section 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
Moore's injury occurred in Illinois, the conduct causing Moore's injury occurred in Illinois, and Moore's domicile and residence are in Illinois. Thus, applying the test set forth in Section 145, we conclude, and the parties concur in their briefs, that Illinois substantive law applies to the issues raised on appeal.
In its first two points on appeal, Bi-State argues that the trial court erred in denying its Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict because Moore failed to make a submissible case against Bi-State.
The standard of review for a trial court's denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is whether the plaintiff made a submissible case. Coggins v. Laclede Gas Co., 37 S.W.3d 335, 338 (Mo.App. E.D.2000). To make a submissible case, a plaintiff must present substantial evidence for every fact essential to liability. Id. Substantial evidence is that which, if true, has probative force upon the issues, and from which the trier of fact can reasonably decide a case. Id. We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 339. We presume that the plaintiff's evidence is true. Id. We disregard any of the defendant's evidence that does not support the plaintiffs case. Id. However, we do not supply missing evidence or give the plaintiff the benefit of unreasonable, speculative or forced inferences. Id. Whether the evidence in a case is substantial and whether the inferences drawn from the evidence are reasonable are questions of law. Id.
If the plaintiff fails to make a submissible case, then entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant is proper. Reis, 997 S.W.2d at 59. Granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is a drastic action that should be done only when reasonable persons could not differ on a correct disposition of the case. Coggins, 37 S.W.3d at 339. We will not overturn a jury verdict unless there is a complete absence of probative facts to support it. Id. Where reasonable minds can differ on the question before the jury, a court may not disturb the jury's verdict. Id.
More specifically in its first point on appeal, Bi-State argues that Moore failed to make a submissible case against Bi-State because Bi-State owed Moore no duty at the time of the accident because the carrier-passenger relationship terminated once Moore safely exited the Bi-State bus.
Under Illinois substantive law, the existence of a duty is a question of law to be decided by the court. Crutchfield v. Yellow Cab Co., 189 Ill.App.3d 1091, 137 Ill.Dec. 200, 545 N.E.2d 961, 963 (1 Dist. 1989). A common carrier owes its passengers the highest degree of care while they are leaving a bus, and that duty continues until passengers have a reasonable opportunity to reach a place of safety. Id. The passenger to whom the carrier owes this duty is one who is in the act of boarding, is upon, or is in the act of alighting from, the carrier's vehicle, and the passenger need not, of necessity, be in actual contact with the vehicle. Katamay v. Chicago Transit Auth., 53 Ill.2d 27, 289 N.E.2d 623, 625 (1972). Once a passenger has a reasonable opportunity to reach a place of safety, the carrier only has a duty of ordinary care. Id. Proof establishing a failure to provide a safe place to alight constitutes negligence. Miskunas v. Chicago Transit Auth., 42 Ill.App.3d 202, 355 N.E.2d 738, 740 (1 Dist. 1976).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Moore, the evidence at trial revealed that, upon approach to Collinsville High School in the southbound lane of Caseyville Road, Moore requested the Bi-State bus driver, who was familiar with Moore and his typical requested stop, to stop the bus across from the service road leading to the school's rear entrance. The bus driver, under circumstances within his control, discharged Moore about forty-five to fifty feet south of the "T" intersection with the school service road and the light standard at a location with minimal road shoulder, composed of loose pebbles and...
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