Moore-Jensen v. The Hous. Auth. of the City of Newark
| Decision Date | 05 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | A-0788-20 |
| Parties | LILOWTIE MOORE-JENSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF NEWARK, THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF NEWARK, VICTOR CIRILO, EMANUEL FOSTER, SAMUEL MOOLAYIL, KEITH KINARD, ESQ., DEFENDANT X, to be named, hired as HEAD OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ON JAN. 15, 2009, JANET ABRAHAMS, SIBYL BYRANT, ESQ., JASON GENO, MICHAEL MOORE, MINA PATEL, HAROLD LUCAS, ESQ., DEBRA TOOTHMAN, and JOSEPH MENNELLA, jointly, severally and in the alternative, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Submitted October 3, 2022
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Essex County, Docket No. L-3916-19.
Law Offices of Steven D. Janel, attorneys for appellant (Steven D. Janel, on the briefs).
Preston & Wilkins, LLC, attorneys for respondents (Gregory R. Preston, on the brief).
Before Judges Whipple and Smith.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's order dismissing her complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e). For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Plaintiff Lilowtie Moore-Jensen was terminated from her employment at the Newark Housing Authority (NHA) on January 12, 2009. At the time of her firing, she had been employed by the NHA for twenty-three years. In January 2010 plaintiff filed a nine-count complaint suing the NHA. She asserted multiple claims, which included: Breach of contract; breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing; common law wrongful discharge; and violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 (CEPA). Her complaint alleged she was terminated "for raising defendant['s] . . . failure to properly comply with Public Employees Retirement System [PERS] reporting requirements to her superiors ...."[1]
NHA answered and moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion with the exception of the CEPA claim. Following more than a year of pre-trial litigation, the parties agreed to mediation. They eventually settled. Plaintiff and the NHA executed a Settlement Agreement and General Release (Settlement Agreement) in June 2013. The Settlement Agreement contained language affirming that plaintiff consulted with her counsel, and that she read and understood the settlement terms before signing the agreement. Pursuant to the settlement, NHA paid plaintiff a lump sum of $75,000 and she released any further claims against the NHA in June 2013.
In May 2019, nearly six years later, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against the NHA, the Board of Commissioners of the Housing Authority of the City of Newark (Board), and multiple individual defendants.[2] Plaintiff sought to void the Settlement Agreement, articulating theories of fraud and duress.
In December 2019 plaintiff obtained new counsel, but never amended her complaint. Six months later, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e).[3] After argument the trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice as to defendants Newark Housing Authority, the Board, Victor Cirilo, Emmanuel Foster, Keith Kinard, Esq., and Samuel Moolayil.
The trial court found plaintiff did not plead with sufficient particularity her claims of fraud in the inducement, equitable fraud, or duress. Additionally, the trial court made findings on laches, concluding that plaintiff's "delay of six years without explanation must preclude plaintiff's complaint."
Plaintiff appealed, raising the following points:
We review Rule 4:6-2(e) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted de novo. Baskin v. P.C. Richard &Son, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021) (citing Dimitrakoupolos v. Borrus Goldin, 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019)). "We 'assume the facts as asserted by plaintiff are true[,]' and we give the plaintiff 'the benefit of all inferences that may be drawn [.]'" J-M Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Phillips &Cohen, LLP, 443 N.J.Super. 447, 453 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 166 (2005)).
"Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim require the complaint be searched in depth and with liberality to determine if there is any 'cause of action [] "suggested" by the facts.'" N.J. Comm'r of Transp. v. Cherry Hill Mitsubishi, 439 N.J.Super. 462, 467 (App. Div. 2015) () (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)). This standard still applies to obscure statements. Banco, 184 N.J. at 165 (quoting Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746). "The inquiry is limited to 'examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint.'" Cherry Hill Mitsubishi, 439 N.J.Super. at 467 (quoting Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746).
Only in the "rare instance" where a cause of action is not even "suggested" by the pleadings is a R. 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss granted. Flinn v. Amboy Nat'l Bank, 436 N.J.Super. 274, 286 (App. Div. 2014) (citations omitted). "However, we have also cautioned that legal sufficiency requires allegation of all the facts that the cause of action requires." Cornett v. Johnson &Johnson, 414 N.J.Super. 365, 385 (App. Div. 2010), aff'd as modified, 211 N.J. 362 (2012). In the absence of such allegations, the claim must be dismissed. Ibid. (citing Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J.Super. 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005)).
We first consider plaintiff's claim of fraud in the inducement. She alleges she was induced to sign the settlement agreement through defendants' misrepresentations about a possible wage settlement. "To establish commonlaw fraud, a plaintiff must prove: '(1) a material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting damages.'" Banco, 184 N.J. at 172-73 (quoting Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 610 (1997)).
Our review of plaintiff's complaint revealed the following relevant paragraphs relevant to the question:
The first element of fraud requires "a material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact." Banco, 184 N.J. at 172-73. Plaintiff states in paragraphs twenty-three, forty-one and forty-three of the complaint that defendant NHA made material misrepresentations by telling her that a settlement including a payout structured as employment wages was impermissible. Plaintiff does not specify in the complaint what defendant said to persuade her to reach that conclusion, nor did she identify in her pleadings any support, such as statutes, regulations, or prior practice, for the proposition that a form of settlement which included a wage payout was permissible.
A reading of plaintiff's complaint shows she understood precisely what settlement terms she wanted concerning her pension. It does not suggest she relied in any way on defendants' alleged misrepresentations during negotiations. In fact, her complaint alleges she repeatedly requested defendants structure the 2013 settlement so as to increase her retirement pension. Accepting as true plaintiff's allegation that defendants told her that they weren't allowed to offer her a "wage settlement," such a claim falls far short of misrepresentation. The record shows defendants, rather than mislead plaintiff, simply refused her pension demands. We cannot find allegations in the four corners of the complaint which taken as true, support any of the first four elements of...
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