Moore v. Brown, A-195

• Decision Date: 05 September 1980
• Docket Number: No. A-195,A-195
• Citation: 101 S.Ct. 16,65 L.Ed.2d 1158,448 U.S. 1335
• Parties: John L. MOORE et al., Applicants, v. Leila G. BROWN et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

448 U.S. 1335

101 S.Ct. 16

65 L.Ed.2d 1158

John L. MOORE et al., Applicants,

v Leila G. BROWN et al.

No. A-195.

Sept. 5, 1980.

¢s1335¢s Mr. Justice POWELL, Circuit Justice.

The applicants, the Mobile County School Board and its Commissioners, request that I stay a preliminary injunction entered by the District Court in another phase of the litigation over the composition of the Board. The injunction ordered Alabama election officials to conduct district rather than at-large voting to fill School Board vacancies.

This Term, in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980), this Court considered a constitutional challenge to Mobile's system of at-large elections for City Commissioners. Mr. Justice Stewart wrote for a plurality of four Justices and concluded that the plaintiffs were required to prove a racially discriminatory purpose to show that Mobile's at-large voting system violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court, by contrast, had thought it sufficient to show that the existing election system had the effect of impeding the election of blacks. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir- cuit had affirmed.¹ Because we disagreed with the analysis of the District Court and Court of Appeals, we reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Bolden's companion case, Williams v. Brown, 446 U.S. 236, 100 S.Ct. 1519, 64 L.Ed.2d 181 (1980) (Brown I ), involved at-large elections for the School Board. In that case as well, the District Court and Fifth Circuit had held unconstitutional a system of at-large elections, relying on analysis similar to that used by them in Bolden. We therefore vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings in light of Bolden. Approximately 11 weeks later, the Court of Appeals in turn vacated the decision of the District Court and remanded the case to it.

I

The Alabama Legislature created the Mobile County Board of School Commissioners in 1826. Commissioners then were elected at large. That practice has continued to the present day.² Under current law, the Board is composed of five persons who serve staggered 6-year terms. The at-large election system contains no obstacle to ballot access by blacks. In Brown I, however, the District Court nevertheless concluded that the system of at-large elections "diluted" the effectiveness of black votes. The court ordered a phased-in system of district elections to increase the likelihood that blacks would be elected to the Board. Under the District Court's plan, Mobile County was divided into five districts. Two of the district seats were filled in elections in 1978.³ Another dis- trict seat was scheduled to be filled in an election this fall. The two remaining district seats were to be filled in 1982.

Under the District Court's original plan, however, the introduction of district seats did not necessarily correspond to the expiration of incumbents' terms of office. Only one at-large seat expired in 1978, but two new district seats were added that year.⁴ Thus, since 1978 the Board has operated with six members rather than five. The District Court therefore ordered one of the at-large Commissioners whose term is to expire in 1980 to act as the nonvoting "chairman" of the Board during the remainder of his term.⁵

In sum, at the time we vacated the District Court's original plan, the Board contained six members, two of whom had been elected from districts pursuant to the plan. Two at-large seats were due to expire this fall, and one new district member would be elected. Thus, the coming election would have resulted in a return to a five-member Board, three of whom would have been elected from districts.

II

Controversy has followed our decision vacating the District Court's original district election plan. At least some of the at-large Commissioners thought that our decision in effect invalidated the election of the two district Commissioners chosen in 1978. Accordingly, some persons refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the votes of the district members. Under these circumstances, the Board is reported to have been paralyzed since April.

The District Court reassumed jurisdiction over the case on July 11, 1980. Two primary issues confronted the court. First, as I have noted, substantial dispute had arisen over the legitimacy of the two 1978 district elections. Board members disagreed with one another, not only substantively, but also on the threshold question of whether two of their number were even official Board members at all. In sum, the Board could not function. The District Court resolved the deadlock by holding that the 1978 winners remained the official Board members.

The second issue concerned future elections. Under the District Court's original plan, one district election was to have been held in 1980, and two at-large seats were to expire. The district primary was scheduled for Tuesday, September 2, and the general election for November 4. Without taking evidence or making findings of fact, the District Court on July 25 entered a preliminary injunction that would, as the court characterized it, "preserv[e] the status quo pending a decision on remand." The injunction reinstated the district election plan that we had vacated in April. The injunction was appropriate, according to the District Court, because plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed if the at-large election were held. Holding the district election, by contrast, would not impose significant harm on defendants or on the public interest. Finally, the court thought that the plaintiffs had "a substantial likelihood" of eventually prevailing on the merits.

Defendants-applicants here-sought a stay of the injunction pending appeal. Specifically, they asked that the District Court enjoin the district election scheduled for this fall, and permit the two at-large members now on the Board to continue to serve past the normal expiration of their terms. The District Court denied the requested stay on August 19. Defendants next asked the Fifth Circuit to stay the preliminary injunction. On August 26, that court denied the stay without opinion. Late Thursday, August 28, defendants applied to me to stay the preliminary injunction.

III

I have serious concerns about the process and reasoning underlying the District Court's entry of a preliminary injunction. The District Court and the Court of Appeals in Brown I had invalidated the at-large election law and imposed a system of district elections. We vacated their judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the District Court purportedly acted to preserve the status quo pendente lite, but did so by reinstating its own election plan that we had vacated. After our remand, I would have thought that the slate was wiped clean until there had been further evidence, or at least fresh findings of fact. Until then, the status quo was the presumptively valid election system provided by Alabama law-not the judge-made election plan that we had vacated.

I also was troubled by two additional elements of the District Court's analysis. First, it concluded that the balance of harms heavily favored entering the preliminary injunction. The court seemed to perceive little or no harm to the defendants, and to the public interest, resulting from reinstatement of the judge-created election plan. The court's injunction, however, imposes on Mobile County a method of selecting its School Board members that had not been enacted by state or local elected representatives. While the preliminary injunction is in effect, district elections will be held. These elections may produce-indeed, the District Court intended that they produce-Commissioners who would not have been elected under the longstanding system of at-large elections. As Mr. Justice STEVENS observed, "the responsibility for drawing political boundaries is generally committed to the legislative process." City of...