Moore v. City of Statesboro, A16A1791
| Decision Date | 06 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | A16A1791 |
| Citation | 796 S.E.2d 10,340 Ga.App. 45 |
| Parties | MOORE v. CITY OF STATESBORO et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Alvin Lavon Moore, pro se.
Mary Mendel Katz, Chambless, Higdon, Richardson, Katz & Griggs, Macon, Joseph Alvin Leaphart IV, Wright & Edwards, for Appellees.
Alvin Lavon Moore, proceeding pro se , appeals from the trial court's denial of his request to proceed in forma pauperis , as well as from its denial of the filing of his complaint under OCGA § 9-15-2 (d). Moore originally filed this appeal in the Supreme Court of Georgia, which then transferred the case to this Court.1 The arguments in Moore's pro se appellate brief are somewhat difficult to decipher, but generously construing the allegations, he contends that the trial court erred in (1) summarily denying his request to proceed as a pauper and (2) denying the filing of his pleading under OCGA § 9-15-2 (d). Moore also complains about defects in the appellate record, which does not include his complaint/petition for relief. Because the trial court's order and the state of the record do not permit us to conduct meaningful appellate review, we vacate the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The record before us consists of three documents: (1) an order transferring the case to this Court from the Supreme Court of Georgia, (2) Moore's notice of appeal, and (3) the order denying Moore's pauper's affidavit and the filing of his petition. The record transmitted from the trial court is otherwise bereft of material for this Court's review. Moore attributes this defect to the trial court clerk, who he asserts returned the complaint/petition to him and advised that the court would only consider his request to proceed as a pauper. And indeed, the order from which Moore appeals contains this handwritten notation: "[r]eturned [p]etition to Plt. 12/03/2015."
The appealed order otherwise states in its entirety as follows:
Thus, the trial court denied the filing of Moore's petition under OCGA § 9-15-2 (d) and also summarily denied his request to proceed as a pauper.
Importantly, OCGA § 9-15-2 (d) also provides that "[a]n order denying filing shall be appealable in the same manner as an order dismissing an action."
On appeal from a denial under OCGA § 9-15-2 (d), we construe the complaint "in the light most favorable to the losing party,"2 keeping in mind that "pro se complaints are not held to the stringent standards of formal pleadings."3 Nor should they be. Indeed, here in Georgia, we "hold sacred the right of access to the courts by the rich and the poor alike for the resolution of legal disputes."4 This is why we have previously (and rightly) emphasized that "[t]rial courts should exercise their authority under OCGA § 9-15-2 (d) cautiously and sparingly."5 But here, we are unable to review the trial court's determination made under OCGA § 9-15-2 (d) because the record does not contain a copy of the pleading for our review.6 Suffice it to say, in order for this Court to conduct meaningful appellate review, as contemplated by OCGA 9-15-2 (d), a copy of the "denied complaint" must be preserved as part of the record. And because this was not done, we have no choice but to vacate the trial court's order as to its findings under OCGA § 9-15-2 (d), remand to the trial court, and direct it to supplement the record with the relevant pleading, so that this Court may review same as permitted by that statute.7
2. Next, Moore contends that the trial court erred in denying his request to proceed as a pauper. While it is generally true that "[t]he ruling of the trial court on all issues of fact concerning the ability of a party to pay costs or give bond is final under the provisions of this law and is not subject to review,"8 the trial court here summarily denied Moore's request to proceed as a pauper when concluding that his petition for relief failed to state a cause of action. And, once again, the record before us does not contain the request/affidavit or any traverse affidavit (although Moore claims that his request was untraversed).9 Upon remand, the record should be supplemented with the request to proceed in forma pauperis , which should likewise be considered on the merits.10
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.11
Judgment vacated and case remanded.
1 The Supreme Court of Georgia determined that Moore's request for a declaratory judgment did not support the exercise of its jurisdiction because a declaratory judgment is neither an extraordinary remedy nor an action implicating that Court's equitable jurisdiction. See Supreme Court Order in Case No. S16A1004 (April 26, 2016). Our Supreme Court further determined that because there was no ruling below on Moore's request for injunctive relief, there was no substantive issue on appeal involving the legality or propriety of equitable relief. Id. Finally, the Court determined that its jurisdiction was not implicated on the basis of mandamus because Moore did not request such relief from the trial court. Id. Thus, because Moore's asserted bases for jurisdiction were unsupported by the record, the Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court. Id.
2 Collier v. Kroger Co., 299 Ga.App. 660, 660 (1), 683 S.E.2d 625 (2009) ; accord Grant v. Byrd, 265 Ga. 684, 685 (1), 461 S.E.2d 871 (1995).
3 Collier, 299 Ga.App. at 660 (1), 683 S.E.2d 625 (punctuation omitted); accord Moore v. First Family Financial Svcs., 246 Ga.App. 89, 89, 539 S.E.2d 598 (2000).
4 Verdi v. Wilkinson Cnty., 288 Ga.App. 856, 858–59, 655 S.E.2d 642 (2007) ; see GA. CONST. art. I, § I, ¶ IX ().
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