MOORE V. CITY Of MIDDLETOWN

• Decision Date: 28 June 2010
• Docket Number: Case No. CV2008-09-4191,CASE NO. CA2009-08-205
• Citation: 2010 Ohio 2962
• Parties: MATTHEW E. MOORE, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF MIDDLETOWN, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

2010 Ohio 2962

MATTHEW E. MOORE, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.CITY OF MIDDLETOWN, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

CASE NO. CA2009-08-205

Case No. CV2008-09-4191

Court Of Appeals

Twelfth Appellate District Of Ohio

Butler County

June 28, 2010

Jay C. Bennett, for plaintiffs-appellants, Matthew E. and Lori A. Moore

Leslie S. Landen, Middletown City Law Director, Sara E. Mills, One Donham Plaza, Middletown, for defendant-appellee, city of Middletown

OPINION

CIVIL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

BRESSLER, P.J.

{¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Lori and Matthew Moore, Carol and Robert Cowman, and Bette Anne Metzcar, collectively Landowners, appeal from the decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas dismissing their complaint against the city of Middletown in a lawsuit involving a zoning dispute. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm.

{¶2} Landowners own real property located within the city of Monroe that runs

adjacent and contiguous to property known as the Martin-Bake Property located within the city of Middletown. Landowners are not residents of Middletown.

{¶3} On August 19, 2008, Middletown passed Ordinance No. 02008-64 that rezoned 157 acres of the Martin-Bake property from a D-1 residential zone (Low Density Dwelling) to an I-2 industrial zone (General Industrial). Middletown also passed Ordinance No. 02008-63 that revised a set back provision for industrial activities found within its zoning code from 600 feet to zero feet. Together, these ordinances cleared the way for the construction of a coke plant operated by SunCoke Energy for the benefit of AK Steel, one of Middletown's more prominent employers.

{¶4} Following these enactments, Landowners filed an action for declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of the two ordinances and petitioned for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel Middletown "to institute appropriation proceedings pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Title 163." Middletown filed a motion to dismiss arguing that Landowners complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). After accepting briefs and hearing oral arguments, the trial court granted Middletown's motion.

{¶5} Landowners timely appealed from the trial court's decision to dismiss their complaint, raising one assignment of error. However, after hearing oral arguments, this court asked the parties to provide supplemental briefs addressing the issue of whether Landowners had standing to pursue their claim against Middletown. Therefore, since this court specifically asked the parties to brief the issue of whether Landowners lacked standing to bring their claim, we find an initial review of whether Landowners have standing is appropriate.¹

{¶6} Generally, before an Ohio court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the person or entity seeking relief must establish standing to sue. Ohio Contrs. Assn. v. Bicking, 71 Ohio St.3d 318, 320, 1994-Ohio-183; State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 77, 1998-Ohio-275. "Standing" is defined as a "'party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.'" State ex rel. Butler Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 124 Ohio St.3d 390, 2010-Ohio-169, ¶19, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 1442. "[T]he question of standing depends upon whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy * * * as to ensure that the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution." (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, ¶27; Brinkman v. Miami Univ., Butler App. No. CA2006-12-313, 2007-Ohio-4372, ¶30. To decide whether one has standing to pursue a claim, "courts must look to the substantive law creating the right being sued upon to see if the action has been instituted by the party possessing the substantive right to relief." Shealy v. Campbell (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 23, 25. Whether undisputed facts confer standing to assert a claim involves a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. State of Ohio, 112 Ohio St.3d 59, 2006-Ohio-6499, ¶23.

{¶7} In its "Decision and Entry Granting Motion to Dismiss of Defendant," the trial court determined that R.C. 2721.03 "confers standing on 'any person... whose rights, statutes, or other legal relations are affected...by... a municipal ordinance' to file a declaratory action challenging the validity of the ordinance."² (Emphasis added.)

However, in Holcomb v. Schlichter (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 161, 164, this court found R.C. 2721.03 merely "represented] [a] legislative [grant] of jurisdiction to Ohio courts under certain circumstances to hear and decide declaratory judgment actions. That declaratory relief is an available remedy is a separate question from one's standing to file such an action." See, e.g., Wilmington City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (2000), 141 Ohio App.3d 232, 238; see, also, Aarti Hospitality, LLC v. City of Grover City (S.D.Ohio 2007), 486 F.Supp.2d 696, 700 (R.C. 2721.03 is "simply a mechanism through which an appropriate plaintiff may proceed, but the statute does not create the appropriate plaintiff"). In turn, based on our review of the applicable case law, we find it clear that this court does not interpret R.C. 2721.03 as conferring standing upon Landowners, but instead, treats the statute as simply a "legislative [grant] of jurisdiction to Ohio courts under certain circumstances to hear and decide declaratory judgment actions." Holcomb at 164. Therefore, we find the trial court's decision finding standing was conferred upon Landowners by R.C. 2721.03 was in error.

{¶8} Recently, in Clifton v. Village of Blanchester, Butler App. No. CA2009-07-009, 2010-Ohio-2309 (Clifton II), this court addressed the similar issue of whether a "nonresident contiguous property owner has standing to bring an action against an adjacent political subdivision seeking compensation for rezoning property located solely within its jurisdictional boundaries." Id. at ¶15. In finding that the nonresident contiguous property owner did not have standing to pursue his claim against the neighboring political subdivision, this court stated the following:

{¶9} "It is undisputed that Blanchester's decision to rezone the J & M property did not constitute a physical invasion of Clifton's property, nor did it interfere with the useof his property. In fact, by merely rezoning property within its own jurisdictional boundaries, Blanchester did not place any limitation on Clifton's ability to continue farming the property or to sell it for residential purposes. Therefore, because Blanchester's decision to rezone the J & M property did not hinder Clifton's use of his own property in any way, we find that Clifton did not allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy that would entitle him to further pursue his claim against Blanchester." (Emphasis sic.) Clifton II, 2010-Ohio-2309 at ¶27.

{¶10} This court continued by stating, in pertinent part, the following:

{¶11} "Furthermore, within his cause of action, Clifton merely claims that he should be compensated by Blanchester for its partial regulatory taking via inverse condemnation. However, as the Ohio Supreme Court has previously stated, 'the powers of local self-government, granted to a municipality by Section 3 of Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, do not include the power of eminent domain beyond the geographical limits of the municipality.' * * * In turn, because his property is located completely outside Blanchester's jurisdictional boundaries, the remedy Clifton seeks, which is essentially a claim for money damages due to an alleged appropriation of his property by inverse condemnation, is unavailable as a matter of law. Therefore, since Clifton has no substantive right to the relief he seeks from Blanchester, he has no standing to sue." (Internal citations and footnote omitted.) Id. at ¶28.

{¶12} After a thorough review of the record, we find our recent decision in Clifton II to be equally applicable to the case at bar. Just as in Clifton II, Middletown's decision to rezone the Martin-Bake property did not constitute a physical invasion of Landowners' property, nor did it interfere in any way with their ability to use their property. Id. at ¶27.

In turn, because Landowners' property is located wholly outside of Middletown's jurisdictional boundaries, the remedy they seek, which is essentially a claim for money damages due to an alleged appropriation of their property by inverse condemnation, is unavailable as a matter of law. Id. at ¶28. Therefore, just as this court found in Clifton II, we find Landowners' do not have standing to pursue their claim against Middletown. Id. at ¶27, 28, 31.

{¶13} Having already determined Landowners lacked standing to pursue their claim against Middletown, we would ordinarily not address any remaining arguments. However, under the unique facts and circumstances of this case, we find further discussion of Landowners' assignment of error to be necessary.

{¶14} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING [LANDOWNERS'] COMPLAINT AS A MATTER OF LAW PURSUANT TO OHIO CIVIL RULE 12(B)(6)."

{¶15} In their sole assignment of error, Landowners assert that the trial court erred by dismissing their complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) because, according to them, each of their three causes of action state a claim for which relief can be granted. We disagree.

{¶16} Civ.R. 12(B)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if it "fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Smith v. Village of Waynesville, Warren App. No. CA2007-03-039, 2008-Ohio-522, ¶6. In order to prevail on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, "it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling relief." DeMell...