Moore v. CITY OF DESLOGE

• Citation: 692 F. Supp.2d 1122
• Decision Date: 08 March 2010
• Docket Number: No. 4:08CV1200-DJS.,4:08CV1200-DJS.
• Parties: Ricky E. MOORE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF DESLOGE, Missouri, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

692 F. Supp.2d 1122

Ricky E. MOORE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF DESLOGE, Missouri, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:08CV1200-DJS.

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

March 8, 2010.

Arthur G. Muegler, Jr., St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiff.

ORDER

DONALD J. STOHR, District Judge.

Now before the Court are plaintiff Ricky Moore's motion for summary judgment Doc. #41; defendants City of Desloge and James Bullock's motion for summary judgment Doc. # 43; and defendant Aaron Malady's motion for summary judgment Doc. #45. These matters have been fully briefed and are ready for disposition.

On August 18, 2008, plaintiff filed the instant complaint, wherein plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all three defendants. Plaintiff alleges that it was falsely reported to defendant Malady that plaintiff was illegally possessing and distributing a large quantity of oxycotin from his apartment. Plaintiff also alleges that, pursuant to this report, defendant Malady went to plaintiff's apartment, and forcibly entered the apartment without an arrest or search warrant, plaintiff's consent, or probable cause. Plaintiff alleges that two other officers were then called to the scene, and the three officers searched plaintiff's apartment and seized numerous items. Further, plaintiff alleges that defendant Malady started to interrogate plaintiff, whereupon plaintiff asked for but was denied an attorney. Plaintiff also alleges that he was never read his Miranda rights.

Plaintiff was arrested, incarcerated, and ultimately charged with possession of a controlled substance in the Circuit Court of St. Francois County, Missouri. However, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion to suppress all evidence seized, and the criminal case was eventually dismissed.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant City of Desloge had established policies and practices to: (1) stop, detain, seize, and interrogate citizens without constitutional justification; (2) conduct custodial interrogations without giving Miranda warnings; (3) continue custodial interrogations after a citizen requested the assistance of an attorney; (4) use excessive force when conducting investigations; (5) seize property without constitutional justification; (6) improperly train or educate officers; and (7) improperly supervise officers. Further, plaintiff alleges that defendants City of Desloge and Bullock inadequately trained and supervised defendant Malady, and that such failure resulted in a violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. In ¶ 67 of his complaint, plaintiff states that defendants deprived him of the following clearly established constitutional rights: (1) the Fourth and Fifth Amendments' right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures of his property; (2) the Fourth and Fifth Amendments' right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures of his person; (3) the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments' right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures without due process; (4) the Fifth Amendment's right to be read Miranda rights when arrested; (5) the Fifth Amendment's right to counsel; (6) the Fourteenth Amendment's right to equal protection; (7) the Fourteenth Amendment's right to equal privileges and immunities under the law; (8) the Fourteenth Amendment's right to be free from unreasonable seizures of his person; and the Fourteenth Amendment's right to be free from seizure of his person without due process.

I. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff states in his motion for summary judgment that there is no issue regarding liability for Count I of his complaint, "violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Doc. # 41, p. 1. Plaintiff's motion is based on his contention that "defendants are collaterally estopped from denying plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated by defendants," and he advances a collateral estoppel argument based on the state court's granting of a motion to suppress evidence in the underlying criminal case. Plaintiff "contends, as a result of the final Order/Judgment in Prior Case, that Defendants Malady, Bullock and City are each collaterally estopped in the case sub judice from relitigating whether plaintiff's U.S. Constitution Fourth Amendment Right and U.S. Const. Fourteenth Amendment Right against `unreasonable seizure' of plaintiff's person and property were violated October 9-10, 2004." Doc. # 42, pp. 3-4 (emphasis in original).

When presented with a collateral estoppel argument, the Court considers whether Missouri rules of collateral estoppel would bar relitigation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim in a subsequent civil proceeding. If they do bar relitigation, then the federal full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires that the Court give preclusive effect to the state court judgment.

The factors to be considered in determining whether collateral estoppel is appropriate include: (1) was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical to the issue in the present action; (2) did the prior adjudication result in a judgment on the merits; (3) was the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) did the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit.

Duncan v. Clements, 744 F.2d 48, 51 (8th Cir.1984).

The Eighth Circuit's decision in Duncan is instructive. In that case, criminal proceedings were initially brought against the plaintiff for carrying a concealed weapon. However, the criminal proceedings were subsequent to a contested arrest and search. The state court eventually ruled in the plaintiff's favor on his motion to suppress evidence, and the prosecuting attorney entered a memorandum of nolle prosequi in the criminal case because the essential evidence had been suppressed. Plaintiff then brought a civil rights action against the arresting officer, and sought to foreclose the officer's ability to relitigate the constitutionality of the arrest and search.

The court in Duncan noted that the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be applied in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to preclude relitigation of a federal constitutional issue decided in state criminal proceedings, but further noted that the doctrine is typically used defensively to preclude a plaintiff from relitigating Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues decided in state criminal proceedings. After considering plaintiff's collateral estoppel argument, the court ruled that the state court's finding that the plaintiff's arrest and search were unconstitutional could not be used offensively against the arresting officer in the subsequent civil rights suit. In so ruling, the court found that the interests of the state in a criminal proceeding are not identical to the personal interests of an individual officer and, thus, the officer was not in privity with the state, and did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate at the suppression hearing, as he had no control over the state's presentation of its case. Id. at 51-52; see also Coleman v. Rieck, 154 Fed.Appx. 546, 548 (8th Cir.2005) ("The district court correctly found that the instant illegal-search claim was not controlled by the ruling of the Nebraska Court of Appeals.. . in which the court reversed plaintiff's conviction for possession of crack cocaine because it found that the pat-down search of plaintiff was illegal. The Nebraska Court of Appeals did not address whether defendant was entitled to qualified immunity, and defendant was not in privity with the state and did not have the opportunity to litigate qualified immunity." (internal citation omitted)); Turpin v. County of Rock, 262 F.3d 779, 782-83 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Collateral estoppel bars re-litigation of issues decided in a prior action if the party against whom the rule is applied was either a party or in privity with a party to the prior action and where there was an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issue in the prior action. Collateral estoppel cannot be used against the officers in our case, as the officers were neither parties nor in privity with the State in the criminal action and did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the criminal action." (internal citation omitted)).

Plaintiff argues that all four requirements for the application of collateral estoppel are present in this case, and therefore maintains that the prior disposition of his motion to suppress conclusively establishes that his constitutional rights were violated by defendants Malady and Bullock. However, plaintiff's argument is contrary to the above cited Eighth Circuit case law. Specifically, the third element, that these defendants were a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication, and the fourth element, that these defendants had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit, are not demonstrated. Further, to the extent plaintiff seeks summary judgment against defendant City of Desloge on a failure-to-train theory or a municipal custom or policy theory based on defendants Malady or Bullock's actions, such a claim necessarily fails in light of plaintiff's failure to demonstrate the individual liability of defendants Malady or Bullock. See McCoy v. City of Monticello, 411 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2005) ("This circuit has consistently recognized a general rule that, in order for municipal liability to attach, individual liability first must be found on an underlying substantive claim."). Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the basis of which is that the prior state decision granting his motion to suppress conclusively establishes that his constitutional rights were violated by defendants for purposes of the instant civil proceeding, is without merit and therefore will be denied.

II. Defendant Malady's Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Standard of Review

In...