Moore v. Collins

Decision Date07 October 2014
Docket NumberNo. 3:14-cv-2197-G-BN,3:14-cv-2197-G-BN
PartiesMINISTER ELBERT MOORE, Plaintiff, v. JOHN WILLIE COLLINS, ET AL., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. The undersigned issues the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and, even if the Court has jurisdiction over any of Plaintiff's federal-law claims, the Court should dismiss those claims and should decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims.

Background

This is the most recent of several judicial proceedings concerning the ownership of a church's real property. Plaintiff Elbert Moore, who is proceeding pro se, is the former minister of New Testament Church of Christ, Inc., formerly Sunnyvale Church of Christ, Inc., in Dallas, Texas. Seeking to represent both New Testament Church of Christ, Inc. and himself individually, Plaintiff sued Defendants John Willie Collins,Superior Dynamics, Inc., Sunnyvale Limited Partnership, Inc., William Scott Wyatt, Vinson & Elkins Law Firm, Joel Ross, Melodee Armstrong, Judge Tonya Parker, Mark Mosley, Lonnie Woods, William Mahomes, First American Title Insurance Company, Seth Dockery, Valerie A. Hicks, Republic Title Insurance Company, Jill Lydic, Prosperity Bank, William Carter, Donald Hicks, J. McDonald Williams, and Jane E. Brown, for "fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, forgery, organized crime, and illegal taking of church real estate property." Plaintiff also sought damages for negligence. See Dkt. No. 3. Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint raising the same claims but removing New Testament Church of Christ, Inc. as a party. See Dkt. No. 11.

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the church bond program was in default. Plaintiff entered into an agreement with Defendant Collins in which Collins agreed to make a loan payment to bring the bond payment current. Two companies allegedly owned or controlled by Collins - Sunnyvale Limited Partnership, Inc. and Superior Dynamics, Inc. - subsequently claimed to be the legal owners of the church property through (1) a church bond assumption agreement dated March 23, 2000, (2) purchase of the church property from Sunnyvale Church of Christ, Inc. on April 24, 2000, and (3) a foreclosure sale purchase of the church property on August 7, 2001. Plaintiff alleges that Collins, Sunnyvale Limited Partnership, Inc. and Superior Dynamics, Inc. never had a legal deed or held legal title to the church's real property because they worked together to acquire the property through fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and forgery. Plaintiff makes no specific allegations concerning the other defendants in his amended complaint. See id.

Plaintiff lists five related lawsuits in his amended complaint. See id. at 4-5. The undersigned takes judicial notice of the opinion of the state appellate court in one of those lawsuits, Moore v. Sunnyvale Ltd. P'ship, No. 05-12-00602-CV, 2013 WL 3554233, at *1 (Tex. App. - Dallas July 11, 2013, pet. denied), for purposes of considering the nature of the courts' findings and rulings in that matter. According to that opinion, Sunnyvale Limited Partnership, Inc. purchased real property from Sunnyvale Church of Christ, Inc. (the "church"). According to the opinion of the Dallas Court of Appeals, the church transferred the property to Sunnyvale Limited Partnership, Inc. by a special warranty deed on April 13, 2000. According to the opinion of the Dallas Court of Appeals, Plaintiff was president and minister of the church, and his signature was on the special warranty deed transferring the property. According to the opinion of the Dallas Court of Appeals, at or near the time of the conveyance, Sunnyvale Limited Partnership, Inc. executed an assumption agreement to assume payment of the balance owed on bonds by the church to Colonial Trust Company, but Sunnyvale Limited Partnership, Inc. defaulted on the assumption agreement, and Colonial Trust Company initiated foreclosure proceedings and a lawsuit, which was settled and Final Judgment was entered on January 7, 2002. According to the opinion of the Dallas Court of Appeals, meanwhile, after the church conveyed the property to Sunnyvale Limited Partnership, Inc., Plaintiff began filing documents in the county clerk's office that purported to create encumbrances upon or interests in and cloud title to the property. See id.

Another lawsuit referenced in Plaintiff's amended complaint was brought insmall claims court in 2010. See Dkt. No. 11 at 4. Defendant Collins sued Plaintiff for unlawfully removing commercial signs, destroying and changing locks on doors, and entering the property without authorization. See Dkt. No. 32-1 at 91. Plaintiff's answer to the lawsuit was that the church was not for sale. See id. at 92. Collins subsequently non-suited the small claims lawsuit. See id. at 93.

Sunnyvale Limited Partnership, Inc., Superior Dynamics, Inc., and John W. Collins brought suit in the 116th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas against Plaintiff to quiet title, enjoin trespass to real property, and for private nuisance. See Moore, 2013 WL 3554233, at *1; see also Dkt. No. 32 at 10-23 (Petition). The trial court concluded that Plaintiff's actions improperly clouded title to the property because neither Plaintiff nor the church was the proper owner of the property. The trial court also enjoined Plaintiff from taking certain actions, including filing any documents in the public record that encumbered, contested, or interfered with Sunnyvale Limited Partnership, Inc., Superior Dynamics, Inc., and John W. Collins' ownership of the property. See Moore, 2013 WL 3554233, at *1; see also Dkt. No. 32 at 24-26 (Judgment); Dkt. No. 32 at 33-35 (incomplete copy of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). The trial court's judgment was affirmed on appeal. See Moore, 2013 WL 3554233, at *5.

The undersigned sua sponte questioned whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims because there did not appear to be either a federal question or diversity of citizenship and ordered Plaintiff to file a brief explaining the basis for the Court's subject matter jurisdiction and to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Dkt. No. 10. In his responseto the show cause order, Plaintiff argues that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction because there was an unconstitutional taking of the church's real property and because he was denied due process and equal protection. See Dkt. No. 12 at 7-11; see also Dkt. Nos. 13, 24, 31, 38. Plaintiff also asserts that there is diversity jurisdiction. See Dkt. No. 12 at 8; see also Dkt. Nos. 13 & 24.

Defendant Judge Tonya Parker filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See Dkt. No. 19. Judge Parker asserts that Plaintiff's claims against her should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because she is entitled to judicial immunity and sovereign immunity and under 12(b)(1) because Plaintiff's suit is a collateral attack on a state-court determination, which is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

On October 6, 2014, Plaintiff filed an application for a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction to enjoin a substitute trustee's sale of the property on October 7, 2014. See Dkt. No. 46 at 1-8, 27-29.

Legal Standards

Federal courts have an independent duty to examine their own subject matter jurisdiction. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-84 (1999); McDonal v. Abbott Labs., 408 F.3d 177, 182 n.5 (5th Cir. 2005) ("[A]ny federal court may raise subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte."). Federal courts "are empowered to hear only those cases that are within the constitutional grant of judicial power, and that have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant enacted by Congress." Sarmiento v. Texas Bd. of Veterinary Med. Examiners By & Through Avery, 939 F.2d 1242, 1245 (5thCir. 1991). A federal court's jurisdiction is limited, id., and, unless otherwise provided by statute, federal courts generally may hear a case of this nature only (1) if it involves federal questions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States or (2) where diversity of citizenship exists between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.

As to federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, "'[f]ederal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are 'so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.'" Highland Park Presbyterian Church, Inc. v. Grace Presbytery, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-3813-B, 2013 WL 5538716, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2013) (citing Martin v. Wilkes-Barre Pub. Co., 567 F.Supp. 304, 308 (M.D. Pa. 1983), and quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904)). In determining substantiality, a court must ask "whether there is any legal substance to the position the plaintiff is presenting." Southpark Square Ltd. v. City of Jackson, 565 F.2d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 1977). The Court is authorized to consider evidence beyond the complaint and to make appropriate factual determinations when ruling on its subject matter jurisdiction. See Clark v. Tarrant Co., Tex., 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1986).

The party seeking to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction must prove that jurisdiction is proper, see Boudreau v. United States, 53 F.3d 81, 82 (5th Cir. 1995), and, "[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must...

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