Moore v. Exec. Office of the Trial Court

• Decision Date: 08 July 2021
• Docket Number: SJC-12966
• Parties: Daphne MOORE v. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE TRIAL COURT.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

487 Mass. 839

170 N.E.3d 680

Daphne MOORE

v.EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE TRIAL COURT.

SJC-12966

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued December 7, 2020.

Decided July 8, 2021.

John M. Thompson (Linda J. Thompson also present) Springfield, for the plaintiff.

Denise Tsai, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Wendlandt, JJ.

BUDD, C.J.

The plaintiff, Daphne Moore, was suspended without pay from her position as an assistant clerk-magistrate in the Superior Court in Hampden County following her indictment on felony charges. Moore sought relief from a single justice of this court arguing that the Executive Office of the Trial Court (Trial Court) exceeded its statutory authority by acting pursuant to a provision of its personnel manual that mandated suspension without pay of employees charged with felonies; she was deprived of due process; and application of the Trial Court's suspension policy violated her right to equal protection of the laws. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the denial of Moore's petition for relief.

Background. Moore is an assistant clerk-magistrate in the Superior Court. On December 20, 2018, a Federal grand jury indicted her on charges of conspiracy to possess and distribute narcotics, narcotics possession and distribution, money laundering conspiracy and money laundering, and making false statements to Federal officers. See United States v. Moore-Bush, U.S Dist. Ct., No. 3:18-cr-30001-WGY-6 (D. Mass. Dec. 20, 2018). She was arrested the next day, and thereafter arraigned and released on her own recognizance pending further proceedings in the Federal court.

Shortly thereafter, Moore was suspended without pay pursuant to § 16.600(B) of the Trial Court Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual (Manual), which provides in relevant part that a Trial Court employee who is the subject of a criminal complaint or indictment for a felony, including a felony not involving misconduct in office, "shall be suspended without pay until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings."

Moore requested and received a hearing, at which she was represented by counsel, before the clerk of the Superior Court in Hampden County and the Trial Court's deputy labor counsel. See Manual, §§ 16.401(B)(2) & 16.600(B). Following the hearing, Moore submitted material relating to the underlying merits of and delays in the Federal criminal case against her. The Trial Court affirmed Moore's suspension without pay pursuant to § 16.600(B) of the Manual, concluding that she had offered no evidence to rebut the determination that she had been indicted for a felony not involving misconduct in office.

Moore sought reconsideration of the decision, citing this court's order suspending a District Court judge with pay following the judge's indictment on Federal charges of obstruction of justice, the suspension of a Superior Court judge with pay following her arrest on charges of domestic violence, and the delays in Moore's own criminal trial as reasons favoring her reinstatement with pay. The Trial Court again affirmed her suspension without pay. Moore thereafter filed a petition for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court. A single justice denied relief without a hearing, and Moore appealed to the full court.

Discussion. 1. Statutory authority to promulgate suspension rule. Moore contends that her suspension without pay was unauthorized because the bright-line rule in the Manual mandating this outcome¹ improperly strips the Court Administrator of the Trial Court (Court Administrator) of his or her discretionary decision-making authority conferred by statute. We disagree.

As the "administrative head of the trial court," the Court Administrator is "responsible for the management of court personnel, facilities, administration, security, and court business." G. L. c. 211B, § 9A, second & third pars. Among other things, the Court Administrator is responsible for "establish[ing] and promulgat[ing] standards for the appointment, performance, promotion, continuing education and removal of all personnel within the trial court, except judges, clerks and registers of probate."² G. L. c. 211B, § 8. See G. L. c. 211B, § 9A (iii) (Court Administrator shall "provide personnel management, including ... establishment of system wide personnel policies"). In addition, the Court Administrator is authorized, "when necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice, ... [to] impose discipline on such officers and employees, including dismissal and suspension with or without pay." G. L. c. 211B, § 9A (xii).

Read together,³ these statutory provisions confer upon the Court Administrator the power to establish standards for employee discipline, including standards for removal and suspension,⁴ as well as the power to implement and apply those standards to Trial Court employees, including assistant clerk-magistrates like Moore. See Malloch v. Hanover, 472 Mass. 783, 791, 37 N.E.3d 1027 (2015) ("We interpret separate sections of statutes as a whole, to produce internal consistency and to give a rational and workable effect" [quotations and citations omitted]).

Moore argues that the suspension mandate found in § 16.600(B) of the Manual is invalid because the inclusion in G. L. c. 211B, § 9A (xii), of the phrases "when necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice" and "with or without pay" limits the Court Administrator's rulemaking authority and requires an individualized, case-by-case assessment before an employee may be suspended without pay. However, nothing in the plain language of G. L. c. 211B, § 8 or § 9A (xii), prohibits the Court Administrator from making a categorical judgment, as he implicitly did here, that the proper administration of justice requires the suspension of Trial Court employees without pay when they have been indicted for a felony, both felonies involving and those not involving misconduct in office. See, e.g., American Hosp. Ass'n v. National Labor Relations Bd., 499 U.S. 606, 612, 111 S.Ct. 1539, 113 L.Ed.2d 675 (1991) ("even if a statutory scheme requires individualized determinations, the decisionmaker has the authority to rely on rulemaking to resolve certain issues of general applicability unless [the Legislature] clearly expresses an intent to withhold that authority"); Massachusetts Fine Wines & Spirits, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 482 Mass. 683, 692, 126 N.E.3d 970 (2019) ("agency has discretion to design rules that can be broadly applied, sacrificing some measure of ‘fit’ for administrability" [citation omitted]). Cf. Borden, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 388 Mass. 707, 716, 448 N.E.2d 367, cert. denied sub nom. Formaldehyde Inst., Inc. v. Frechette, 464 U.S. 936, 104 S.Ct. 345, 78 L.Ed.2d 312 (1983) (administrative agency has discretion to act by rulemaking or individual adjudication).

The adoption of a mandatory policy requiring suspension without pay in the case of any felony indictment thus does not reflect an abdication, but rather the exercise, of the discretion granted to the Court Administrator by G. L. c. 211B, § 9A (xii), to suspend a Trial Court employee without pay "when necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice."⁵ This is a reasonable rule of general applicability that is consistent with the statutory scheme and that ensures predictability and consistency in the imposition of Trial Court discipline when an employee faces serious charges of misconduct. See Massachusetts Fine Wines & Spirits, LLC, 482 Mass. at 692, 126 N.E.3d 970 ("uniform, bright-line rule" guiding agency enforcement of regulation avoids uncertainties). See also Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 115, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977) ("When a governmental official is given the power to make discretionary decisions under a broad statutory standard, case-by-case decisionmaking may not be the best way to assure fairness.... The decision to use objective rules ... provides [employees] with more precise notice of what conduct will be sanctioned and promotes equality of treatment among similarly situated [employees]"). Promulgation of § 16.600(B) of the Manual constitutes a permissible exercise of the Court Administrator's authority under G. L. c. 211B, §§ 8 and 9A (xii), and Moore's suspension without pay upon the issuance of a Federal felony indictment was consistent with and mandated by its terms. See Citizens for Responsible Envtl. Mgt. v. Attleboro Mall, Inc., 400 Mass. 658, 669, 511 N.E.2d 562 (1987) (actions taken pursuant to broad authority to effectuate statutory purposes command judicial deference). See also Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Board of Educ., 436 Mass. 763, 776-777, 767 N.E.2d 549 (2002) ("Where statutory language clearly authorizes actions taken by an agency, the actions are wholly lawful, and we need not look behind them to determine the agency's motives").

2. Due process claim. Moore also argues that the mandatory suspension-without-pay provision of § 16.600(B) of the Manual is invalid because it violates her constitutional right to due process. She asserts that, as a Trial Court employee, she has a property interest in her employment that prohibits her suspension absent an individualized determination that it is necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice. In her view, the bright-line rule set forth by § 16.600(B) supplanted the constitutionally-required standard for suspensions from Trial Court employment and thereby "nullified" her procedural due process right to appropriate notice and opportunity to be heard. We conclude that the single justice did not abuse his discretion or commit an error of law in finding that Moore was afforded constitutionally adequate procedures.

The "threshold issue" in considering Moore's procedural due process claim is whether there is "a constitutionally protected property interest at stake." Perullo v. Advisory Comm. on Personnel...