Moore v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation

• Decision Date: 06 January 1930
• Docket Number: 28283
• Citation: 155 Miss. 818,125 So. 411
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: MOORE v. GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION

125 So. 411

155 Miss. 818

MOORE v. GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION

No. 28283

Supreme Court of Mississippi

January 6, 1930

Division B

1. APPEAL AND ERROR. Where circuit court affirmed county court and thereby held with county court that case was equity case supreme court could not reverse because case was one of law (Constitution 1890, section 147).

Where circuit court affirmed county court and thereby held with county court that case was an equity case, supreme court could not reverse judgment on appeal, under Constitution 1890, section 147, on ground that case was one of law and not of equity.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Purpose in construing constitutional provision is to ascertain and give effect to intent of those who adopted it.

Fundamental purpose in construing constitutional provision is to ascertain and give effect to intent of those who adopted it to keep in mind object desired to be accomplished and evils sought to be prevented or remedied.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. In construing Constitution, court need not give to words used only meanings known to framers at time of promulgation.

In construing constitutional provision, court is not to be constrained by technical or literal meaning of words used and is not required to give only meanings of words as known to framers of Constitution at time of promulgation, particularly as regards provisions intended to prevent or remedy definite evils.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Cardinal principle in construing Constitution is that of consistency and uniformity.

Cardinal principal to be observed in construction of Constitution is that of consistency and uniformity, so that in given situation its provisions shall be made to have same effect or operation as in another situation when the two are alike in substance.

5. APPEAL AND ERROR. Constitutional provision prohibiting reversal of judgment or decree on ground of mistake as to whether cause was one in equity or in law applies to county court (Constitution 1890, sections 147, 172).

Constitution 1890, section 147, prohibiting reversal of judgment or decree on ground of mistake as to whether cause in which it was rendered was of equity or common-law jurisdiction, held to apply to county courts established under authority of section 172.

HON. W. A. ALCORN, JB., Judge.

APPEAL from circuit court of Quitman county HON. W. A. ALCORN, JR., Judge.

Action commenced in the county court between Jake Moore and the General Motors Acceptance Corporation. The decree rendered was affirmed on appeal to the circuit court, and the former appeals. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

M. E. Denton, of Marks, for appellant.

Purchase money liens on personalty, authorized and regulated by statutes providing special proceedings to enforce them, have no equitable character and do not come within the scope of equity jurisdiction.

3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, section 1269; 21 C. J. 118, section 96.

It is true under section 147 of the Mississippi Constitution no judgment or decree of any chancery or circuit court in a civil cause shall be reversed for any error as to the jurisdiction, etc.; but this provision will not be extended so as to permit county courts to try simple suits at law without a jury.

E. C. Black, of Marks, for appellee.

Appellant contends that the lien which appellee was undertaking to enforce was a statutory lien and not a lien created by the parties, and that it must be enforced as provided by sections 2437 and 2438 of Hemingway's Code 1917, but that question is settled in the case of Ross-Meehan Brake Shoe Foundry Company v. Pascagoula Ice Company et al., 72 Miss. 608, 18 So. 364.

Moody et al. v. Citizens Saving & Investment Company, 99 So. 817.

Appellant was not entitled to a jury because the cause was an equity matter, and too, he did not ask for a jury within the time provided by law.

OPINION

Griffith, J.

The right result was reached in this case in the county court, or at least it is not made manifest that there was any error on the merits, and, the decree having been affirmed on appeal to the circuit court, there must be an affirmance here unless otherwise required by the procedural error now to be mentioned.

The case was tried and adjudicated in the county court as an equity case, over the objection of appellant that it is a law case; appellant having at the proper time along with his objection aforesaid demanded a jury trial, as is allowed in law cases in the county court. We are of opinion that the contention of appellant that the case is one of law and not of equity was well founded and should have been sustained, although it is only fair to state that the contention of appellee that it is an equity case has some plausibility and is not wholly without reason.

The point is therefore squarely presented whether section 147 of the Constitution applies to county courts. That section is as follows: "No judgment or decree in any chancery or circuit court rendered in a civil case, shall be reversed or annulled on the ground of want of jurisdiction to render said judgment or decree, from any error or mistake as to whether the cause in which it was rendered was of equity or common law jurisdiction. . . ."

Supported by several able members, there was a strong minority sentiment in the Constitutional Convention in favor of the combining of the jurisdiction in law and equity into one court; and the most potent argument in favor of that proposal was the evil that often, after arduous and expensive litigation, a judgment or decree correct on the merits would be reversed solely on the point that the case had been instituted and prosecuted in the wrong court. The proposal mentioned had, however, no considerable support for the further proposition that the right of trial by jury should be extended to all cases, including those that were equity; and, strange to say, the argument mentioned overlooked its own weakness, in that the conferring of the combined jurisdiction on one court would not avoid the evil mentioned, for the question sought to be avoided would immediately rise again, as it has arisen in the case at bar, on the matter of the right to a trial by jury.

But the Convention was well determined to preserve our separate court of chancery, and to meet the argument aforesaid and to cure the evil which was the chief basis of that argument, section 147 was devised and inserted in the Constitution. All original jurisdiction, except in petty law cases, was by the Constitution conferred upon the circuit and chancery courts but at the same time and in the same article there was...