Moore v. Hurtt

• Decision Date: 21 February 1899
• Citation: 32 S.E. 317,124 N.C. 27
• Parties: MOORE et ux. v. HURTT.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

32 S.E. 317

124 N.C. 27

MOORE et ux. v. HURTT.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

February 21, 1899

Appeal from superior court, Craven county; Norwood, Judge.

Action by James W. Moore and wife against Stephen F. Hurtt. There was a judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal. Reversed.

Where, in an action by a mortgagee for the possession of the mortgaged chattels, the mortgagor denies the mortgagee's right of possession, and sets up a verbal agreement that he was to retain possession, the necessity of demand before suit brought is obviated, since a demand would have been futile.

Simmons, Pou & Ward and L. J. Moore, for appellants.

CLARK, J.

This is an action to obtain possession of personal property embraced in a mortgage executed by the defendant to the plaintiff. The action was begun before maturity of the debt secured by the mortgage. The answer denied the plaintiff's right to have possession. The court below, being of opinion that failure to prove a demand before action brought was fatal, sustained a demurrer to the evidence and dismissed the action. In this there was error. In the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary, the mortgagee is entitled to take possession of the mortgaged property at any time before or after maturity of the debt or breach of condition. Hinson v. Smith 118 N.C. 503, 24 S.E. 541. Here there was no stipulation in the mortgage that the mortgagor should retain possession, and, though a verbal agreement to that effect was set up in the answer, there was no evidence to sustain it. The sole purpose in requiring a demand before action is that the defendant shall not be taxed with costs when the plaintiff could have obtained the object of his action by simply making demand. When, therefore, the defendant sets up a defense to the action, it appearing that a demand would have been futile, the courts do not hold that the omission to make demand is fatal. In this case the answer averred that the plaintiff was not entitled to possession of the property by reason of an alleged verbal agreement to the contrary. The omission to make the demand (which, when made and acceded to, would avoid costs) was therefore immaterial. Woolen Co. v. McKinnon, 114 N.C. 661, 19 S.E. 761; Buffkins v. Eason, 112 N.C. 162, 16 S.E. 916; Rich v. Hobson, 112 N.C. 79, 16 S.E. 931; Heath v. Morgan, 117 N.C. 504, 23 S.E. 489; McQueen v. Smith, 118 N.C. 569, 24 S.E. 412. New trial.