Moore v. Kujath

• Decision Date: 28 November 1947
• Docket Number: No. 34460.,34460.
• Citation: 225 Minn. 107,29 N.W.2d 883
• Parties: MOORE et al. v. KUJATH.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

29 N.W.2d 883

225 Minn. 107

MOORE et al. v. KUJATH.

No. 34460.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

November 28, 1947.

Appeal from District Court, Dodge County; Axel B. Anderson, Judge.

Actions by Alva B. Moore and others against Paul F. Kujath for damages arising out of an automobile collision, wherein defendant counterclaimed against the named defendant for damages. Verdicts were returned in favor of defendant. From an order denying joint motion of plaintiffs for new trial, plaintiffs appeal.

Reversed.

Baudler & Baudler, of Austin, for appellants.

Plunkett & Plunkett, of Austin, for respondent.

LORING, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from an order denying the joint motion of plaintiffs for a new trial in an action arising out of a motor vehicle collision which occurred October 19, 1945, at about 5 p. m., at the intersection of trunk highways Nos. 30 and 56 in Dodge county, when a pickup truck operated by defendant collided with a sedan operated by plaintiff Alva B. Moore. Actions against defendant were instituted by the driver of the sedan, his three passengers, and the husband of one of the passengers. Defendant counterclaimed, as to Alva B. Moore only, for damage to his truck and for medical expenses incurred for injuries suffered by his four children, who were riding with him. There were identical verdicts in all five cases finding defendant not guilty of negligence and assessing his damages at $350, despite the fact that the only counterclaim interposed was in the case of Alva B. Moore. Plaintiffs combined in moving for a new trial and together appealed from the order denying their motion.

The principal question for consideration is whether the jury was justified in reaching the conclusion that the negligence of Alva B. Moore was the sole and proximate cause of the collision. Therefore, the question presented is whether as a matter of law defendant was guilty of negligence which contributed to his loss. In reviewing the record, we are obliged to give the verdicts the benefit of every reasonable inference in their support. Merritt v. Stuve, 215 Minn. 44, 57, 9 N.W.2d 329, 335; Bloomquist v. Thomas, 215 Minn. 35, 39, 9 N.W.2d 337, 340.

For the most part, the evidence is without conflict. All the witnesses agreed that trunk highway No. 30, running east and west, and trunk highway No. 56, running north and south, form an unobstructed intersection, and that on the day of the accident the weather was clear, the roads dry, and the sun shining in the southwest. Both roads were tarvia surfaced, except highway No. 30 west of the intersection, which was graveled for some distance. North of the intersection on highway No. 56 is a hill or knoll, the crest of which is about 800 feet from the intersection. There were no stop signs at the intersection against either highway on the day of the accident. Defendant testified that he was driving west on highway No. 30. When he was about 600 or 700 feet from the intersection, he looked to his right and saw a car (later identified as one owned by George Haseltine) approaching on highway No. 56 from the north. He stated that upon seeing this vehicle he took his foot off the accelerator and reduced his speed to between 10 and 15 miles an hour so as to permit the Haseltine car to pass in front of him. Defendant testified that after this car had passed he was about 60 feet from the traveled part of the intersection and that he then again looked to his right "at the hill," but did not see the Moore car although it was then about 100 feet behind the Haseltine car and therefore in plain sight. He stepped on the accelerator, increasing his speed to between 25 and 30 miles an hour as he entered the traveled part of the intersection. He said, "I was across the intersection quite a little. * * * In the corner," when the right front fender and wheel of defendant's truck collided with the front end of the Moore car. Defendant said that he did not see the Moore car until the instant of impact.

"Q. Now, you have told us, Mr. Kujath, that you gave a good look, but as you told us, you didn't see the Moore car in any of that distance from the top of the hill down to the point where the cars came together in the intersection, until just the instant they came together; is that true? A. Yes, sir."

Defendant's truck came to a stop facing south about 100 feet south of the Moore car, which had stopped near the point of impact on the west side of highway No. 56, also facing south. Moore testified that he was going south on highway No. 56 following the Haseltine car, which was about 100 feet ahead of him, when "just over the knoll" he saw defendant's truck approaching the intersection on highway No. 30. Moore noticed the Kujath truck slow down for the Haseltine car and assumed that Kujath would permit both cars to pass. Moore therefore continued to the intersection at the speed he had been traveling, which he asserts was about 35 to 40 miles an hour. Just a moment before the collision, he set his brakes, as was shown by skid marks about 20 to 30 feet long. He hit the truck near the center of the west lane of highway No. 56 before he could stop. The evidence tended to prove that the Moore car struck the Kujath car on the right side near the front fender.

It is evident that the jury concluded that Moore was negligent, but if the verdict as against him on Kujath's counterclaim is to be sustained the evidence must also sustain the conclusion that defendant was not negligent or that his negligence did not contribute to the accident. However, if defendant is to be held negligent as a matter of law, it must be because, under the circumstances surrounding the situation, his failure to see the Moore car when he looked to the right after permitting the Haseltine car to pass was conclusively negligent and that he should have yielded the right of way to Moore.

Defendant contends that he entered the intersection first, although a review of the facts most favorable to him would reasonably justify an inference that if he did so it was by only one or two seconds, as he did not see the Moore car until "the instant they came together." Moore testified that he approached the intersection at about 35 or 40 miles an hour and applied his brakes just before the impact. Haseltine, who crossed the intersection while driving south, when defendant slowed down for him, said that he was driving about 35 or 40 miles an hour as he approached the intersection and that he noticed through his mirror that Moore was traveling a "few car lengths behind" him. Moore estimated the distance at about 100 feet and, according to his statement to the witness Buckingham, he was following the Haseltine car "pretty close and we were driving quite fast." Moore, on the other hand, having seen defendant slow down to permit the Haseltine car to pass, might well have assumed that under the circumstances defendant intended to wait until he passed through the intersection behind Haseltine.

1. M.S.A. § 169.20, subd. 1, relates to the right of way upon approaching an intersection. The first sentence provides:

"The driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right of way to a vehicle which has entered the intersection from a different highway."

This sentence must be interpreted in the light of all the other provisions of the statute, and particularly in the light of the following sentence, which provides:

"When two vehicles enter an intersection from different highways at approximately the same time the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right."

Obviously, both of the foregoing sentences were placed in the statute by the legislature in an endeavor to promote safety on the highways, and they should be so interpreted. As we view the two sentences, the second one so modifies the first as to require the driver on the left, even though he may reach the intersection first, to yield the right of way to the driver on the right in a situation where the two vehicles would collide were each to continue its course and maintain its rate of speed. To otherwise interpret the law and to arbitrarily give to him who first enters the intersection the right of way over another vehicle approaching at approximately the same time from the right would be to increase rather than diminish the hazards of driving. By approximately, the legislature must have meant the approach to an intersection of two vehicles so nearly at the same time that there would be imminent hazard of a collision if both continued the same course at the same speed. In that case, he on the left should yield to him on the right. While the driver on the left is not required to come to a dead stop, as at a through highway stop sign, unless it is necessary to avoid a collision, he nevertheless must approach the intersection with his car so under control that he can yield the right of way to a vehicle within the danger zone on the right. Such must have been the legislative intent. Other states having the same statutory provisions have supported this interpretation. Perhaps, the case most directly in support of our interpretation is Zettle v. Lutovsky, 72 N.D. 331, 335, 7 N. W.2d 180, 182, where the court said:

"* * * They cite subdivision (a) of section 18 of Chapter 162, Laws of 1927, which is as follows: `When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at approximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle...