Moore v. Leverett, 12366.
Decision Date | 25 October 1930 |
Docket Number | No. 12366.,12366. |
Citation | 33 S.W.2d 838 |
Parties | MOORE v. LEVERETT et al.<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL> |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Cooke County; B. W. Boyd, Judge.
Suit by W. S. Moore against W. W. Leverett and another. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
McDonald & Anderson and B. Y. Cummings, all of Wichita Falls, and W. S. Moore, of Gainesville for appellant.
Adams & Jones and W. O. Davis, all of Gainesville, for appellees.
This suit was filed on the 6th day of July, 1927, by appellant, W. S. Moore, against W. W. Leverett and A. E. Hermann, charging the publication of a libel. Defendants were duly served, and presented both general and special exceptions to the petition. Leave, however, was granted to amend, and appellant filed his first amended original petition on the 19th day of September, 1929, which, omitting formal parts, reads as follows:
It was further alleged that the defendants were acquainted with the plaintiff's good name, character, and reputation, but that "conspiring and maliciously intending to injure the plaintiff and deprive him of his good name, reputation and with the intent to injure his character among the people of said 16th judicial district and of the State of Texas generally who knew him and had confidence in his honesty and integrity, * * * and for the purpose of causing plaintiff injury and damage among those people in said district and the State of Texas generally who did not know the plaintiff did as aforesaid on or about the 16th day of July, 1926, publish and cause to be published and circulated throughout said district and the State of Texas and generally said false, untrue, defamatory and libelous article and statements as aforesaid."
It was further charged, in substance, that on account of and by means of the publication of said false and defamatory words and language, plaintiff had been injured and damaged in his good name and reputation, and that many people throughout the said judicial district and the state of Texas generally, unfamiliar with the facts, were led to believe, as was intended, that the plaintiff had been guilty of dishonest and corrupt practices and of defrauding his clients as a lawyer, and of defrauding other persons, and was generally guilty of improper and fraudulent conduct; that as a result he had been caused to suffer loss and damage in his profession as a lawyer, and had caused him the humiliation of defeat of the office of district judge of said judicial district and of the emoluments of said office; that the language and words quoted were not only false, but that they were willfully and maliciously and knowingly published by the defendants with intent to injure him and deprive him of his good name and reputation and lose the esteem of his friends, neighbors, and acquaintances and the public generally; that the defendants, without investigating the truth of the statements therein, well knew at said time that W. O. Davis was a bitter personal and political enemy of plaintiff, and had been so for many years; that the defendant W. W. Leverett was also a bitter personal enemy of the plaintiff.
It was further alleged that said newspaper had a large circulation in Cooke and Denton counties, and was also circulated and read in many other counties of Texas, as was intended they should be; that defendants well knew when they published said language concerning plaintiff and R. R. Bell that said Bell had ceased to be county attorney of Cooke county long before the plaintiff ever formed his acquaintance; that plaintiff at no time was connected with Bell when he was county attorney, but later they became law partners.
The prayer was that plaintiff might recover by reason of the premises $20,000 actual damages and $15,000 exemplary damages.
The trial court sustained appellee's general and special demurrers to the petition, and, appellant having declined to further amend, judgment was entered dismissing the suit, and from this judgment an appeal has been duly prosecuted.
Much has been written in the text-books and decisions of other jurisdictions in the effort to maintain the proper equilibrium between the right of free speech and of a free press on the one hand, and due protection of the individual from defamatory words and printing that tends to injure one's reputation and damage him on the other hand. In the disposition of this case, however, we shall content ourselves with references, for the most part, to our own statutory and judicial treatment of the subject.
Article 5430, Rev. Civ. Statutes of 1925, thus defines "libel":
"A libel is a defamation expressed in printing or writing, or by signs and pictures, or drawings tending to blacken the memory of the dead, or tending to injure the reputation of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or financial injury, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, or virtue, or reputation of any one, or to publish the natural defects of any one and thereby expose such person to public hatred, ridicule, or financial injury."
Article 5432 provides that the publication of certain matters shall be deemed privileged, and shall not be made the...
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Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 2018.
...p. 1224, § 171; Id., p. 1230, § 189; Id., p. 1246, § 215; Patterson & Wallace v. Frazer, Tex.Civ. App., 79 S.W. 1077; Moore v. Leverett, Tex.Civ.App., 33 S.W.2d 838. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the trial court erred in overruling the plea of privilege; that the judgment should be......