Moore v. Maricopa County

Decision Date12 March 1970
Docket NumberCA-CIV,No. 1,1
Citation11 Ariz.App. 505,466 P.2d 56
PartiesDelmar MOORE, by his Guardian and Litem, Viola Goodmon, Appellant, v. MARICOPA COUNTY, Arizona, a political sub-division, and the City of Tolleson, Arizona, a municipal corporation, Joe Camacho and John Doe, Appellees. 922.
CourtArizona Court of Appeals

Mackenzie, Bolze & Hirsch, by Albert H. Mackenzie, Wilson, McConnell & Moroney, by William T. Moroney, Phoenix, for appellant.

Moore, Romley, Kaplan, Robbins & Green, by Craig R. Kepner, Phoenix, for appellees City of Tolleson and Joe Camacho.

O'Connor, Cavanagh, Anderson, Westover, Killingsworth & Beshears, by Ralph E. Mahowald, Jr., Phoenix, for appellee Maricopa County.

EUBANK, Presiding Judge.

The issue before us is whether summary judgments were properly granted to each of the defendant-appellees in the plaintiff-appellant's suit for personal injuries.

On July 2, 1965, the plaintiff Delmar Moore was arrested by a Maricopa County Deputy Sheriff near but not within the City of Tolleson, and charged with four statutory misdemeanors involving drinking and/or driving. On July 3, 1965, plaintiff was taken before Vernon Sessions, Justice of the Peace for the Tolleson Precinct of Maricopa County, who also occupied the office of City Magistrate of the City of Tolleson. Plaintiff entered pleas of guilty to all four charges, and was sentenced by Justice (as he was then acting) Sessions to pay a total fine of $400 or serve a sentence of 60 days in jail. Plaintiff was sentenced to serve his 60-day sentence in the Tolleson jail 1 when he did not pay the indicated fine. There is no suggestion by plaintiff here that this was not a lawful place of confinement.

In the Tolleson jail the plaintiff had the opportunity of accelerating service of his sentence by participating in a voluntary work program, under which he could serve his sentence 'two-for-one', meaning that each day worked counted for two days on the 60-day sentence. See A.R.S. Section 31--144. Plaintiff elected--or at least did not refuse--to participate, and after working briefly on one or two other municipal projects, commenced working as a collector for the City of Tolleson's municipal garbage collection service.

The City's single garbage truck was driven by Joe Camacho, a municipal employee. The receptacle portion of the truck was equipped with a blade which worked on a cycle, the operating part of which consisted of a vertical descent to a line about an inch from the rear of the truck, and then a horizontal 'scooping' of the garbage from the platform at the end of the truck (the entrance to the receptacle) inward into the receptacle, where it was thereafter compressed by mechanical means. This blade could be activated either by a person operating a switch at the rear of the truck or by the driver using a switch located in the driver's cab.

Plaintiff's specific duties on the garbage detail consisted of picking up the residents' garbage containers, emptying them at the rear of the truck, returning the container, and then boarding the rear of the truck and riding it to the next stop. Usually one, two, or three other fellow prisoners would go along and perform the same duties. Plaintiff testified that he learned what was expected of him by watching these fellow prisoners. According to plaintiff, neither Joe Camacho nor anyone eise in behalf of the City had ever indicated that any set routine was to be followed, or that there were any safety precautions that were to be observed. The record leaves open to doubt whether there was any kind of express or commonly shared tacit understanding as to just when or how often or under what particular circumstances the blade would be activated, or whether at any particular time it would be activated by the driver Camacho or by one of the men at the back of the truck. The record indicates that the truck was equipped with a door over the rear of the receptacle which could be closed prior to operating the blade but which was not closed at the time of the accident.

Plaintiff was 18 years old in July of 1965. On the afternoon of July 27, 1965, at which time plaintiff had worked on the garbage collection detail a few days, the truck made a stop and plaintiff picked up a can or barrel container from a residence in Tolleson. Plaintiff emptied the container onto the platform at the rear of the receptacle. Plaintiff described the container as 'awful heavy.' With the container about head-high, plaintiff turned and started away from the rear of the truck to return the container. He could not at that point see the blade. At this time, Joe Camacho was sitting in the cab of the truck and was observing plaintiff and two other men at or near the rear of the truck in a rear-view mirror on one side of the cab. Camacho testified in his deposition that he saw plaintiff with the container on his shoulder, but he was not certain whether it was full or empty. Plaintiff at that time was at or near the rear corner of the truck. Camacho indicated that he thought that the other two men were waiting for the blade to be activated and the platform swept clear of refuse. Immediately thereafter, the blade was activated, but although plaintiff's testimony is very clearly to the effect that it must have been turned on by Camacho, inside the cab, Camacho testified that he did not know of his own personal knowledge who threw the switch that turned the blade on. At nearly the same moment plaintiff, for some unknown reason, lost his balance while lowering the empty container. He instinctively reached out with his left hand for support. The only support available was the rear of the truck, and plaintiff's hand apparently reached it at about the time the blade completed its descent to the platform, catching plaintiff's hand and allegedly causing permanent injury.

The record reveals that although Maricopa County contributed some financial support to the maintenance of the Tolleson County-City Jail, it did not exercise any control over its administration, or over the activities of its inmates. The record indicates that the City of Tolleson alone benefited from the jail work programs, and that they were administered solely by City of Tolleson personnel. While plaintiff asserts in effect that the Justice of the Peace knew in his 'County' capacity that working on the garbage truck was a hazardous activity, we find no evidence in that regard, or indeed any evidence that the Justice concerned himself with the activities of the various prisoners he sente...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc.
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • February 13, 1992
    ...616 P.2d 955, 957 (App.1980) (question whether duty has been breached ordinarily question for jury), citing Moore v. Maricopa County, 11 Ariz.App. 505, 508, 466 P.2d 56, 59 (1970). Because the issue of breach of duty is linked inexorably with the question of whether a general contractor has......
  • Molever v. Roush
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • August 19, 1986
    ...those instances where no reasonable persons could disagree. Harmon v. Szrama, 102 Ariz. 343, 429 P.2d 662 (1967); Moore v. Maricopa County, 11 Ariz.App. 505, 466 P.2d 56 (1970). However, when the consequences of an attorney's alleged negligence bear upon a legal ruling by the court, the cau......
  • Bloom v. Fry's Food Stores, Inc., 1
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • September 1, 1981
    ...say that reasonable trial jurors would have to agree that there was no breach of the duty to exercise due care. Moore v. Maricopa County, 11 Ariz.App. 505, 466 P.2d 56 (1970). The present record precludes any such The judgment of the superior court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for......
  • Flowers v. K-Mart Corp.
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • August 12, 1980
    ...(App.1977); the question of whether such a duty has been breached is ordinarily reserved for a jury to determine, Moore v. Maricopa County, 11 Ariz.App. 505, 466 P.2d 56 (1970); and the question of whether such negligence is the proximate cause of an injury is also usually a question for th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT