Moore v. Moore
| Decision Date | 17 May 1977 |
| Citation | 173 Conn. 120,376 A.2d 1085 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Julie Prest MOORE v. John Hollister MOORE. |
William J. Kupinse, Jr., Bridgeport, for the appellant (defendant).
Gregory P. Patti, Fairfield, with whom, on the brief, was Paul V. McNamara, Bridgeport, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Before HOUSE, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and SPEZIALE, JJ.
The plaintiff wife commenced an action for divorce in September, 1968. On September 24, 1969, a judgment of divorce was rendered which also provided that the defendant husband pay the plaintiff $75 per month for the support of each of their two minor children. On February 13, 1974, the plaintiff filed a motion for modification. On February 26, 1974, the court granted the motion for modification and increased the support to $150 per month for each child. The defendant has appealed.
The court did not hear any evidence but had before it the sworn financial affidavits of the parties as of the time of the divorce on September 24, 1969, and those filed on February 26, 1974, the day of the hearing. In its finding the court compared the income and assets of each party at the time of divorce and at the time of the hearing for modification. Further, the court took judicial notice in its finding that each child was four and one-half years older than she had been at the time of the divorce "with commensurate greater costs for clothing and maintenance" and took further judicial notice "of the marked economic inflation and devalued buying power of the dollar from September, 1969 to February, 1974." The entire transcript of the proceedings, printed in the defendant's brief, reveals that the court did not mention to counsel that it planned to take judicial notice of these two matters.
Notice to the parties is not always required when a court takes judicial notice. Our own cases have attempted to draw a line between matters susceptible of explanation or contradiction, of which notice should not be taken without giving the affected party an opportunity to be heard; see Nichols v. Nichols, 126 Conn. 614, 622, 13 A.2d 591; McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed.) § 333, pp. 771-72; and matters of established fact, whose accuracy cannot be questioned, such as court files, which may be judicially noticed without affording a hearing. Krawiec v. Kraft, 163 Conn. 445, 451, 311 A.2d 82; Guerriero v. Galasso, 144 Conn. 600, 605, 136 A.2d 497.
Even when a fact, such as whether a certain date fell on a Tuesday, is not open to argument, it may be the better practice to give the parties an opportunity to be heard. Karp v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 162 Conn. 525, 527, 294 A.2d 633.
Other authorities have drawn a distinction between "legislative facts," those which help determine the content of law and policy, and "adjudicative facts," facts concerning the parties and events of a particular case. The former may be judicially noticed without affording the parties an opportunity to be heard, but the latter, at least if central to the case, may not. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Colum.L.Rev. 945, 952-59, 984. The distinction has been adopted in rule 210 of the new Federal Rules of Evidence, which requires an opportunity to be heard when any adjudicative fact is judicially noticed.
Whether a child's clothing expenses increase "commensurately" with her age is open to argument. Young children may outgrow clothes more rapidly, but older children may require more varied wardrobes. This "fact" is one of which judicial notice should not be taken 1 and certainly not without giving the parties an opportunity to be heard.
Whether there has been inflation between 1969 and 1974 is not open to argument. The extent of that...
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State v. Santiago, SC 17413
...facts," which concern "the parties and events of a particular case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moore v. Moore, 173 Conn. 120, 122, 376 A.2d 1085 (1977); accord State v. Rizzo, supra, 303 Conn. 184 n.81. 45. See Association for the Study of Connecticut History, 2012 Award Recipient......
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State v. Morrill
...district, where this case was pending, assume that this condition caused any substantial delay in the case. See Moore v. Moore, 173 Conn. 120, 123, 376 A.2d 1085 (1977). Nor can the state's nonfrivolous resistance to disclosure of certain evidence, reciprocated in kind by the defendant's ob......
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State v. Santiago
...(considering scientific studies in context of sixth Geisler factor, although not "part of the trial court record"); Moore v. Moore, 173 Conn. 120, 122, 376 A.2d 1085 (1977) (legislative facts, that is facts that "help determine the content of law and policy," are subject to judicial notice)......
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State v. Lockhar
...policy. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 201-202, 957 A.2d 407 (2008); see also Moore v. Moore, 173 Conn. 120, 122, 376 A.2d 1085 (1977) (legislative facts, that is, facts that ''help determine the content of law and policy, '' can be ''judicially noticed......
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Survey of 1989 Developments in Connecticut Family Law
...for modification, because inflation was either contemplated, or not a substantial change in circumstances, or both. See, Moore v. Moore, 173 Conn. 120, 376 A.2d 1085 (1987). But see Benson v. Benson, 187 Conn. 380,446 A.2d 796 (1982). Presumably, that inflation was contemplated will not pre......