Moore v. Moore, 11-16-00282-CV

• Decision Date: 31 January 2019
• Docket Number: No. 11-16-00282-CV,11-16-00282-CV
• Citation: 568 S.W.3d 725
• Parties: Ronald Keith MOORE, Appellant v. Zuzanna E. MOORE, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

568 S.W.3d 725

Ronald Keith MOORE, Appellant

v.Zuzanna E. MOORE, Appellee

No. 11-16-00282-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Eastland.

Opinion filed January 31, 2019

David W. Lauritzen, Cotton, Bledsoe, Tighe & Dawson, P.C., P.O. Box 2776, Midland, TX 79702, David G. Rogers, Fivecoat & Rogers, P.L.L.C., 214 West Texas Ave., Suite 811, Midland, TX 79701, for Appellant.

Michael D. Jones, Jones Gill, LLP, 6363 Woodway, Suite 1100, Houston, TX 77057, for Appellee.

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J.¹

JIM R. WRIGHT, SENIOR CHIEF JUSTICE

The trial court denied Ronald Keith Moore’s petition to clarify a prior divorce decree, and it granted Zuzanna E. Moore’s motion to enforce that decree. In this appeal, Appellant complains of both of those rulings. We affirm.

Appellant and Appellee were divorced on June 29, 2005, in Midland County. Appellee was represented by an attorney, but Appellant executed a waiver of citation, did not hire a lawyer, and did not appear at the final hearing. The Final Decree of Divorce contains an erroneous statement that, although he was duly and properly cited, Appellant "did not appear and wholly made default." In the decree, the trial court divided the "oil, gas or other minerals ... standing in the name of the parties or either party" equally between Appellant and Appellee as part of "a just and right division of the parties' marital estate." The decree did not contain a listing of any specific oil and gas interests, nor did it contain an award of any specific oil and gas interests to Appellant as his separate property.

After the trial court entered the decree of divorce, Appellant filed a motion for new trial, and the trial court denied it. Appellant did not appeal the divorce decree.

Appellee testified that she discovered Appellant’s oil and gas interests in 2013 through online research. Appellee contacted the producers of oil and gas from the properties and instructed them to pay half of all revenue from those interests directly to her. Subsequently, Appellant received division orders in which the producers allocated 50% of Appellant’s interest in the oil and gas production payments to Appellee.

After Appellant received the division orders, he filed a "Petition for Clarification of Prior Order and Request for Temporary Restraining Order" in the trial court. In the petition, Appellant stated that, "[s]ince the date of the decree, a dispute has arisen ... concerning the construction and interpretation of these provisions." Appellant requested that the trial court enter "a clarifying order that confirms these separate property interests as [Appellant’s] sole and separate property."

Appellee filed an answer and argued that the decree "clearly awards" her 50% of Appellant’s oil, gas, and other mineral interests and that, since Appellant had failed, at the time of the divorce, to establish that the interests were his separate property, she was entitled to half of all his mineral interests. Several months later, Appellee also filed a motion to enforce the decree. In that motion, Appellee asserted that Appellant "fraudulently and willfully withheld the identity of property" subject to the Final Decree of Divorce that "rightfully belongs to her."

Appellant raised numerous arguments in the trial court, including estoppel, laches, statute of limitations, waiver, and adverse possession. After a hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s petition for clarification. In that order, the trial court noted that the "Final Decree of Divorce controls the rights of [Appellee] and [Appellant] to the community property." Appellant moved for a new trial, and the trial court denied it.

A few months later, the trial court held a hearing on Appellee’s motion to enforce the decree. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled in favor of Appellee. The trial court entered an order by which it granted Appellee’s motion to enforce. In its order, the trial court provided as follows:

The Court finds that the Motion to Enforce Final Decree of Divorce should be GRANTED.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Respondent, RONALD KEITH MOORE, execute all Mineral Deeds necessary to transfer to Zuzanna Moore 50% of the oil, gas and other minerals, whether mineral interest, royalty interest or overriding royalty interest, wherever located, standing in the name of the parties, or either party, on June 29, 2005 as provided in the Final Decree of Divorce within thirty (30) days of this ORDER; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent, RONALD KEITH MOORE, pay ... to Petitioner, ZUZANNA E. MOORE, as damages caused by the Respondent’s failure to comply with the Final Decree of Divorce [the following sums]:

One half of the royalties paid solely to Respondent from community property from and after June 29, 2005 less all offsets and credits ...,

One half of the sales proceeds from the sale of community mineral property in 2013....

The trial court further ordered Appellant to pay prejudgment interest and attorney’s fees. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s denial of his motion for clarification and an amended notice of appeal to include the trial court’s order by which it granted Appellee’s motion to enforce.

Appellant brings five issues on appeal. In all five issues, Appellant essentially addresses the question of whether the trial court erred when it granted Appellee’s motion to enforce. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for clarification or enforcement of a divorce decree under an abuse of discretion standard. See Woody v. Woody , 429 S.W.3d 792, 797 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) ; Morales v. Rice , 388 S.W.3d 376, 381 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.) ; Murray v. Murray , 276 S.W.3d 138, 143 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. dism'd). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner or whether it acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc. , 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). The mere fact that a trial court may decide a matter within its discretionary authority in a different manner than the appellate court in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion occurred. Id. at 242. We must affirm the judgment of the trial court on any legal theory that finds support in the evidence. In re W.E.R. , 669 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. 1984).

"In family law cases, the traditional sufficiency standard of review overlaps with the abuse of discretion standard of review; therefore, legal and factual insufficiency are not independent grounds of error but are relevant factors in our assessment of whether the trial court abused its discretion." Sink v. Sink , 364 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) ; see Boyd v. Boyd , 131 S.W.3d 605, 611 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). When legal sufficiency is challenged, we must determine whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review. City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and disregarding any contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id. at 821–22. A legal sufficiency or "no evidence" challenge will be sustained if the party suffering the adverse decision at trial shows one of the following: (1) the complete absence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact. Id. at 810 (citing Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error , 38 TEX. L. REV. 361, 362–63 (1960) ). When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which that party had the burden of proof, the party must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence conclusively establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis , 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001).

To analyze a factual sufficiency challenge, we must consider and weigh all the evidence and determine whether the evidence in support of a finding is so weak as to be clearly wrong and unjust or whether the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Id. at 242 ; Pool v. Ford Motor Co. , 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) ; In re King’s Estate , 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951).

In Appellant’s first issue, he argues that the trial court erred when it granted Appellee’s requested relief because her claims were barred by statutes of limitations. Appellant argues in his brief that the "statute of limitations to foreclose a lien on real property and for fraud is four (4) years." See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.004(a), 16.035 (West 2002). Appellant also cites the residual limitations period in Section 16.051 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code : "Every action for which there is no express limitations period, except an action for the recovery of real property, must be brought not later than four years after the day the cause of action accrues." Id. § 16.051 (West 2015).

Conversely, Appellee argues that "this is not an action to enforce a lien, but an action to enforce a final judgment." We agree. Appellant’s appeal is from the order granting Appellee’s motion to enforce, not from an order to foreclose on a lien on real property. Further, Appellee did not bring an independent cause of action for fraud against Appellant; rather, she argued that the trial court should order enforcement of the Final Decree of Divorce because Appellant fraudulently concealed the subject mineral interests. Therefore, we look to the rules governing motions...