Moore v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
| Decision Date | 05 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. ELH-16-3015 |
| Parties | BESSIE MOORE, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORP. Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Bessie Moore, the self-represented plaintiff, brought suit against defendant National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak"), arising out of an injury that she sustained on December 20, 2013, when she tripped over a luggage strap while boarding an Amtrak train in Baltimore. ECF 1. By Memorandum (ECF 13) and Order (ECF 14) of April 18, 2017, I granted Amtrak's motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). I concluded that Moore did not allege the elements of a prima facie case of negligence because she "ha[d] not alleged that Amtrak had actual or constructive knowledge of the luggage strap . . . ." ECF 13 at 10. However, the dismissal was without prejudice and with leave to amend. ECF 14. Thereafter, Moore filed an unsigned Amended Complaint, alleging that "defendant was negligent." ECF 15.
Amtrak has again moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF 16), supported by a memorandum of law. ECF 16-1 (collectively, " Motion").1 The Clerk subsequently sent a notice to Moore stating, in part: ECF 18. Moreover, the Clerk advised Moore of her right to respond to the Motion. Id.
On June 14, 2017, the Clerk received Moore's "Response To Defendant's Answers To Plaintiff's Amended Complaint", which did not contain Moore's original signature. See Docket. In a Return Document Order of the same date (ECF 19), I stated: "It is not necessary to respond to the defendant's answer to the amended complaint; however, you can respond to the motion to dismiss within the time specified in the rule 12/56 letter sent on 5/26/17, ECF 18." On July 5, 2017, Moore again filed a document with the heading: "Response To Defendant's Answers To Plaintiff's Amended Complaint." ECF 20 ("Response"). It contains responses to the various defenses asserted by Amtrak in its Answer to the Amended Complaint.
The Court is mindful of its obligation to construe liberally the pleadings of a pro se litigant, which are "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1989). Because Moore is a self-represented litigant, the Court will construe Moore's Response (ECF 20) as her opposition to the Motion. For the same reason, I will assume that plaintiff intended to incorporate in her Amended Complaint (ECF 15) all of the factual allegations she included in ECF 1.
Nevertheless, no hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, I shall grant the Motion.
In her Complaint (ECF 1), Moore stated that at 1:30 p.m. on December 20, 2013, she boarded an Amtrak train at Pennsylvania Station in Baltimore for a trip to Philadelphia. Id. at 2. As she was walking down the aisle, her "right foot became entangled in the strap of apassenger's bag." Id. According to Moore, she was "unable to disengage [her] right foot from the strap", causing her to fall forward. Id. Moore claims that she tore her right rotator cuff in the fall, which had to be surgically repaired. Id. She also suffered pain in her left arm and hips as a result of the fall. Id. Moore seeks $200,000 in damages. Id. at 3.
Moore's Amended Complaint (ECF 15) does not recite these facts in detail. She generally reiterates that she fell while boarding an Amtrak rail car because of "the unsafe condition [that] was on the plaintiff's [sic] property." Id.
In the Amended Complaint, Moore notes that Amtrak conductors are typically "diligent in maintaining safe passage through rail car aisles", that "safe travel is rightfully expected" by passengers, and "due diligence should have been taken [by Amtrak] to assure safe travel." ECF 15. According to Moore, Amtrak was aware of the "possibility" that another passenger's luggage could obstruct the aisle, and could have "prevented this accident" by the "exercise of due diligence to clear the aisles . . . ." Id. Notably, Moore states that it was "impossible" for her to "have known how long the [luggage] strap was in the aisle" because "the incident occurred while [she] was boarding the train." Id.
A defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom. McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendant with "fair notice" of the claims and the "grounds" for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
To survive a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) ; see also Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). But, a plaintiff need not include "detailed factual allegations" in order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
To be sure, federal pleading rules "do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted." Johnson v. City of Shelby, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 346, 346 (2014) (per curiam). Nevertheless, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). A complaint is insufficient if it provides no more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, to satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest" a cognizable cause of action, "even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotations omitted).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court "'must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint'" and must "'draw all reasonable inferences [from thosefacts] in favor of the plaintiff.'" E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see Semenova v. Maryland Transit Admin., 845 F.3d 564, 567 (4th Cir. 2017); Belmora, LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697, 705 (4th Cir. 2016); Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015); Kendall v. Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515, 522 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 943 (2011). But, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). "A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer" that the plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Society Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012).
In general, courts do not "resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses" through a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). The purpose of the rule is to ensure that defendants are "given adequate notice of the nature of a claim" made against them. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (2007). But, "in the relatively rare circumstances where facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense are alleged in the complaint, the defense may be reached by a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6)." Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc); accord Pressley v. Tupperware Long Term Disability Plan, 533 F.3d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 2009); see also U.S. ex rel. Oberg v. Penn. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 745 F.3d 131, 148 (4th Cir. 2014). However, because Rule 12(b)(6) "is intended [only] to test the legal adequacy of the complaint", Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993), "[t]his principle only applies . . . if all facts necessary to the affirmativedefense 'clearly appear[ ] on the face of the complaint.'" Goodman, 494 F.3d at 464 (quoting Forst, 4 F.3d at 250) (emphasis added in Goodman).2
In the Motion, Amtrak argues that the Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal because Moore "fails once again to allege facts sufficient to meet her prima facie burden" for a claim of negligence under Maryland state law. ECF 16-1 at 2-5.
The Maryland Court of Appeals recounted the elements of a prima facie case of negligence in Hamilton v. Kirson, 439 Md. 501, 523-24, 96 A. 3d 714, 727-728 (2014). It said, id. (internal quotations, alteration, and citation omitted):
To state a claim for negligence a party...
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