White v. White, 88-7141

• Decision Date: 03 October 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-7141,88-7141
• Citation: 886 F.2d 721
• Parties: Judson Warren WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. C.M. WHITE, Warden; A.V. Dodrill, Commissioner of Corrections, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 721

886 F.2d 721

Judson Warren WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. C.M. WHITE, Warden; A.V. Dodrill, Commissioner of Corrections, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 88-7141.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued April 14, 1989.

Decided Oct. 3, 1989.

Richard D. Horn, Student Atty. (Nancy Louise Cook, Washington, D.C., American University Washington College of Law, Appellate Advocacy Law Clinic, on brief), for plaintiff-appellant.

Edward Lee Bullman (Charles G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Dana D. Davis, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, W.Va., on brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before MURNAGHAN, CHAPMAN, and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges.

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

In this case we must determine if the district court abused its discretion in dismissing without prejudice plaintiff's pro se complaint as frivolous within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). We find that such dismissal was proper and affirm.

I.

Plaintiff Judson Warren White is an inmate at the Huttonsville Correctional Center. On March 25, 1988, plaintiff tried to mail legal correspondence to his attorney. Under prison directives, plaintiff was classified as a non-indigent inmate since he had had $5.00 or more in his prison account on the fifteenth of the month. As a non-indigent inmate, plaintiff was not entitled to free postage during the course of the month. Since plaintiff had no funds remaining in his account on March 25, he was unable to pay the postage on his letters and thus was not permitted to mail his correspondence.

On April 21, 1988, plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia against defendants C.M. Bud White, Warden, Huttonsville Correctional Center, and A.V. Dodrill, Commissioner of Corrections. He alleged, inter alia, that he was deprived of meaningful access to the courts as a result of defendants' policy requiring inmates to pay cash for postage. Plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The district court granted plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis but dismissed his complaint without prejudice, sua sponte, as frivolous within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). Plaintiff appeals.

II.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d), a trial court may dismiss an in forma pauperis action "if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious." See Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 950 (4th Cir.1979). The district court need not look beyond the complaint's allegations in making such a determination. It must, however, hold the pro se complaint to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys and must read the complaint liberally. Trial courts, however, are granted broad discretion in determining whether a suit is frivolous or malicious. See, e.g., Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 974 (4th Cir.1981); Boyce, 595 F.2d at 951; Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir.1983); Holloway v. Gunnell, 685 F.2d 150, 155 (5th Cir.1982); Milton v. Nelson, 527 F.2d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir.1976). Our inquiry is thus limited to whether dismissal was an abuse of discretion. See Camp v. Oliver, 798 F.2d 434, 437 (11th Cir.1986).

The Supreme Court recently addressed the Sec. 1915(d) standard for dismissal of frivolous claims in Neitzke v. Williams, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). The question before the Court was whether a complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is automatically frivolous under Sec. 1915(d). While noting that there is "considerable common ground" between the standards, id., 109 S.Ct. at 1833, the Court ruled that failure to comply with 12(b)(6) does not necessarily dictate dismissal under Sec. 1915(d).

In reaching its decision, the Neitzke Court recognized that the purpose of Sec. 1915(d) is "to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing suit and because of the threat of sanctions for bringing vexatious suits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11." Id. 109 S.Ct. at 1832-33. In order to further this goal while still protecting the rights of indigent litigants under the in forma pauperis statute, the Court announced that a complaint should be dismissed as frivolous "where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Id. at 1831.

Applying this standard to the facts of its case, the Court affirmed the circuit court's refusal to permit the dismissal of a prisoner's Sec. 1983 claim alleging that he had failed to receive proper medical treatment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The prisoner's complaint alleged that he had notified prison officials that he suffered from a brain tumor, and that they had refused to treat him. It failed, however, to state a claim of "deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical needs," as required in Eighth Amendment suits. The circuit court ruled that given the complaint's factual allegations, it could not determine with certainty that the prisoner was "unable to make any rational argument in law or fact to support his claim for relief," and the complaint therefore could not be considered frivolous. Id. at 1830; Williams v. Faulkner, 837 F.2d 304, 308 (7th Cir.1988).

In the case before us, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint. Unlike the complaint at issue in Neitzke, plaintiff's complaint failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion that he was deprived by prison policy of meaningful access to the courts. Plaintiff's complaint speculated that the papers "might have helped his attorney." Plaintiff did not allege, however, any detriment to his state appeal as the result of his inability to mail the letter in question. Likewise, he does not dispute that he had eight months to appeal his conviction, during which time he could have informed his attorney of the information in the letter in question at a time when he concededly had funds in his prison account. Nor does he dispute that he had access to a telephone, with which he could have communicated the relevant information to his attorney.

It is well settled that "[p]risoners do not have an unlimited right to free postage in connection with the right of access to the courts. Reasonable regulations are necessary to balance the rights of prisoners with budgetary considerations." Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 359 (10th Cir.1978). To state a claim such as this, a prisoner must provide some basis for his allegation that the delay or failure in delivering his legal mail deprived him of meaningful access to the courts. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir.1987); Hoppins v. Wallace, 751 F.2d 1161, 1162 (11th Cir.1985); Twyman, 584 F.2d at 359. Plaintiff's complaint contained no such allegation.

Pro se complaints are to be read liberally, but Sec. 1915(d) does not demand that we conclude "White had alleged that he was appealing a criminal conviction returned on the planet Saturn," before such a complaint would warrant dismissal sua sponte as frivolous. See dis. op. infra, at 732 n. 13. While we do not require that a plaintiff always allege some actual injury in order to avoid dismissal on grounds of frivolousness, we do think it was within the statutory discretion of the district court to dismiss this speculative a complaint, which even appointed counsel on appeal concedes to be "discursive." Although the plaintiff in Neitzke prayed for relief at law, and claims of denial of meaningful access will generally seek relief which is prospective, we do not think such differences are dispositive. The district court's view that this complaint should have contained some allegation of adverse consequences allows a federal court to avoid becoming embroiled in the endless litigation of abstract dissatisfactions with prison policies.

Analogous is the rule adopted in some form by every circuit that civil rights plaintiffs must allege with specificity facts to support their claims. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 29-30 & n. 87 (D.C.Cir.1984) (reviewing cases from each circuit). Federal courts have insisted that such plaintiffs allege with specificity some minimum level of factual support in part "to weed out at an early stage frivolous claims." Hynson v. City of Chester Legal Dept., 864 F.2d 1026, 1031 n. 13 (3d Cir.1988); see also Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir.1977) (requiring that facts be pled with specificity "[i]n an effort to control frivolous conspiracy suits under Sec. 1983"). Similarly, Sec. 1915(d) seeks to forestall frivolous pro se lawsuits that would not be brought by paying litigants. It is commonsensical that Sec. 1915(d) would require that pro se complaints likewise contain some minimum level of factual support for their claims.

In Neitzke, the Court noted that "[t]he brevity of Sec. 1915(d) and the generality of its terms have left the judiciary with the not inconsiderable task[ ] ... of giving content to Sec. 1915(d)'s indefinite adjectives." Neitzke, 109 S.Ct. at 1831. Although the Court provided some guidance by defining frivolousness as lacking "an arguable basis either in law or in fact," id., district courts which must apply Sec. 1915(d) on a day-to-day basis and in a myriad of contexts obviously will play a major role in fleshing out the standard. We do not intend to overturn lightly their judgments in this regard. We need not now attempt to provide an exhaustive definition of frivolousness. It is sufficient to hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this complaint. The dismissal, moreover, was without prejudice, and plaintiff will have ample opportunity to cure any deficiencies in his pleading.

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

By affirming ...