Moore v. Norman, 10704.

• Decision Date: 14 February 1940
• Docket Number: No. 10704.,10704.
• Citation: 137 S.W.2d 833
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Parties: MOORE v. NORMAN.

137 S.W.2d 833

MOORE v. NORMAN.

No. 10704.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

February 14, 1940.

Rehearing denied March 13, 1940.

Error from District Court, Thirty-Seventh Judicial District, Bexar County; Harry L. Howard, Judge.

Action by Genevieve Norman against S. J. Moore to recover damages suffered in automobile accident. To review a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error.

Affirmed.

Eskridge & Groce, Dodson & Ezell, Chas. W. Duke, and Walter Groce, all of San Antonio, for plaintiff in error.

Morriss & Morriss, of San Antonio, for defendant in error.

MURRAY, Justice.

This is an appeal by writ of error from a final judgment of the District Court of Bexar County, 37th Judicial District of Texas, rendered in favor of the defendant in error, Genevieve Norman, for damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision, against the plaintiff in error, S. J. Moore (doing business as the Midway Distributing Service), in the sum of $5,500.

For convenience, S. J. Moore will be referred to as appellant and Genevieve Norman as appellee.

The collision complained of occurred at the intersection of Bailey and Gevers Streets in the City of San Antonio, on the night of December 1, 1937. Appellee Genevieve Norman was riding in a Ford sedan operated by one J. G. Blackman, also riding in the same car was one Lester Beauchamp. The Blackman car was proceeding in a westerly direction along Bailey Street when it collided with a truck operated by an employee of appellant, S. J. Moore. Moore's truck was proceeding in a southerly direction along South Gevers Street. There are stop signs at the intersection of Bailey and Gevers Streets, requiring, under the provisions of an ordinance of the City of San Antonio, that all vehicles proceeding along Bailey Street shall come to a stop before crossing Gevers Street.

The cause was tried to a jury, and in response to special issues submitted by the court the jury found as follows:

"(1) The driver of defendant's truck was operating the same just before the time of the collision in excess of twenty miles per hour, and that such rate of speed was a proximate cause of the accident;

"(2) That the driving of the truck in excess of twelve miles per hour through the intersection was a proximate cause of the collision;

"(3) That the driver of the truck failed to keep a proper lookout just before and at the time of the collision, and that such conduct constituted negligence which was a proximate cause of the collision;

"(4) That he was not operating the truck on the wrong or lefthand side of the street;

"(5) That Blackman, the driver of the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding, did not fail to bring his car to a stop at the stop sign before entering Gevers Street; did not fail to keep a proper lookout; did not drive his car through the intersection in excess of twelve miles per hour; did not drive his car through the intersection in excess of twenty miles per hour, and that `as the two cars in question approached the intersection of Bailey and Gevers Streets there was not a reasonable indication of danger of collision if both cars proceeded';" and further found that the plaintiff did not fail to keep such a lookout as a person of ordinary prudence would have kept under the same or similar circumstances, and fixed the amount of her damages at $5,500.

The term of court at which this trial was had met on the 2nd day of January, A. D. 1939, and adjourned on the 3rd day of March, A. D. 1939. The verdict of the jury was returned on March 1, 1939, and judgment was not entered until March 3, 1939, just prior to the adjournment of the term of court at which the cause was tried. The date upon which the trial was concluded, judgment entered, and the court adjourned, is important, since the judgment was entered just before the adjournment of the court and too late for a motion for new trial to be filed and acted upon.

During the trial T. N. Reed, a witness for appellant, in answer to the question: "He didn't tell you anything about who he was representing?" stated, "No. He said he was representing an insurance company." This question was propounded by counsel for appellee by way of cross-examination of T. N. Reed, who was an important witness for appellant. The question related to the first person who had talked to Reed about the case. Appellee contends that inasmuch as Reed was a witness offered by appellant and apparently friendly to appellant, and in view of the further fact that the...