Moore v. Pederson

• Decision Date: 15 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–14201.,14–14201.
• Citation: 806 F.3d 1036
• Parties: Elvan MOORE, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Kevin PEDERSON, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

806 F.3d 1036

Elvan MOORE, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Kevin PEDERSON, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 14–14201.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Oct. 15, 2015.

Carlus Haynes, Bradley Laurent, Haynes & Laurent, Orlando, FL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Thomas W. Poulton, Colin Stephen Baker, Debevoise & Poulton, PA, Winter Park, FL, for Defendant–Appellee.

Opinion

ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:

Dorothy may have said it best when she said, “There is no place like home.”²Though we are pretty sure that she was not talking about the Fourth Amendment, she may as well have been. Under the Fourth Amendment, the home is a sacrosanct place that enjoys special protection from government intrusion. The government may not enter a person's home to effect a warrantless arrest without probable cause and either consent or exigent circumstances.

But here, that is exactly what happened. Defendant–Appellee Deputy Kevin Pederson claimed to be conducting a Terrystop³of Plaintiff–Appellant Elvan Moore while Moore was in his home. When Moore would not identify himself, Pederson concluded that he had probable cause to believe that Moore had violated the law by resisting an officer. In Pederson's view, exigent circumstances also existed and Moore implicitly consented to Pederson's arrest of him while Moore was still in his home. So Pederson reached into Moore's home, handcuffed Moore, and arrested him. In fact, though, Pederson lacked probable cause, the circumstances were not exigent, and Moore did not implicitly consent to Pederson's entry into Moore's home to arrest Moore.

Nevertheless, at the time of the arrest, the law was not clearly established in this Circuit that a Terrystop could not be conducted inside the home in the absence of exigent circumstances. Nor was the law clearly established that a person in his own home who simply follows an officer's instructions from outside the home to turn around and present hands for cuffing does not “surrender” and therefore consent to entry for the purposes of arrest. For these reasons, we hold today that, in the absence of exigent circumstances,⁴the government may not conduct the equivalent of a Terrystop inside a person's home. We further hold that a person does not consent to entry into his home by an officer outside simply by following an officer's instructions to turn around and be handcuffed, while the person remains inside his home.

But because the law on these points was not clearly established in this Circuit before our decision today, we affirm the district court's entry of summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds to Pederson. We also affirm the district court's dismissal of Moore's state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

I.

In the early morning hours of November 15, 2008, Defendant Seminole County Sheriff's Deputy Kevin Pederson was working road patrol. He received a dispatch from the Sheriff's Office in response to a call from someone at the Colonial Grand apartments. The complainant reported that a male and two females were outside, yelling at one another, though the complainant added that the dispute did “not sound violent.”

At approximately 4:45 a.m., Pederson arrived at the apartment complex. When Pederson got there, the caller met him and explained that a man and two women had been arguing in the parking lot and that one of the women had left in a white vehicle. According to the caller, verbal disputes involving these people were “an everyday occurrence.” The caller then directed Pederson to Plaintiff Elvan Moore's apartment as the unit into which the couple retreated.

Based on this information, Pederson approached Moore's residence to further investigate the situation. As he neared the door, he heard what he described sounded like an argument, though he could not make out any words. In addition, Pederson stated that he heard music coming from the apartment.

Pederson knocked on Moore's door. When Moore opened the door, he was wearing a towel wrapped at the waist, and two women were visible inside the apartment—one naked and one clothed. Though neither woman asked for assistance or otherwise indicated she was in distress, Pederson stated that he thought that one of the women “had a scowl on her face” and “appeared visibly upset, pissed off,” but he could not discern at whom she was mad. From Pederson's “initial impression,” he thought “maybe this is a girlfriend that just walked in on a boyfriend who is with another woman.”

Pederson began interviewing Moore in order to investigate Moore's involvement in the parking-lot disturbance. In addition, Pederson explained, he did not know whether “a domestic violence situation” existed, based on what he had seen.

In response to the questioning, Moore expressed lack of knowledge that a parking-lot disturbance had occurred, and when Pederson requested that Moore provide his name and identification, Moore declined. Moore also refused subsequent requests from Pederson to identify himself.

At some point during the conversation and after Moore's multiple refusals to provide identification, Pederson took out his handcuffs and instructed Moore to turn around and put his hands behind his back. Moore did so. At the time, Moore was standing inside the doorway of his apartment.⁵So Pederson reached into Moore's residence, handcuffed Moore, and arrested him. Pederson then led Moore, who was still wearing a towel when he was handcuffed, from the doorway of his apartment to the patrol vehicle.

During the walk to the patrol vehicle, Moore's towel fell off.⁶After placing Moore in the patrol vehicle, Pederson took Moore to the police station where he was booked and eventually provided a jump suit to wear. Moore was subsequently charged with violating Florida Criminal Statute 843.02: resisting officer—obstructing without violence. The charges against Moore were eventually dropped.

II.

Following these events, Moore filed an amended complaint asserting claims for, among other things, unlawful arrest in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983(“ § 1983”) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (under Florida law).⁷According to the amended complaint, Moore claimed that he was unlawfully arrested without probable cause based only on his refusal of Pederson's request to provide biographical information for a report.

Pederson filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims, and Moore filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on his § 1983claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Pederson on all claims. We now affirm.

III.

We review de novothe district court's disposition of a summary-judgment motion based on qualified immunity. Lee v. Ferraro,284 F.3d 1188, 1190 (11th Cir.2002). Summary judgment should be entered when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In making this determination, we consider the record and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shiver v. Chertoff,549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir.2008)(per curiam); Hoyt v. Cooks,672 F.3d 972, 977 (11th Cir.2012).

IV.

The qualified-immunity defense balances “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan,555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). Qualified immunity exists “to allow government officials to carry out their discretionary duties without the fear of personal liability or harassing litigation.” Durruthy v. Pastor,351 F.3d 1080, 1087 (11th Cir.2003).

In pursuit of that aim, qualified immunity protects government officials engaged in discretionary functions and sued in their individual capacities unless they violate “clearly established federal statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Keating v. City of Miami,598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir.2010)(quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Under its strictures, the doctrine shields from liability “all but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro,284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.2002). As a result, qualified immunity “liberates government agents from the need to constantly err on the side of caution by protecting them both from liability and the other burdens of litigation, including discovery.” Holmes v. Kucynda,321 F.3d 1069, 1077 (11th Cir.2003)(internal quotation marks omitted). This safeguard, however, does not extend to one who “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff].” Id.(internal quotation marks & alteration omitted).

Qualified immunity requires a public official to show first that he was acting within the scope of his or her discretionary authority. Maddox v. Stephens,727 F.3d 1109, 1120 (11th Cir.2013). We have said that the term “discretionary authority” “include[s] all actions of a governmental official that (1) were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties, and (2) were within the scope of his authority.” Jordan v. Doe,38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir.1994)(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, there is no question that Pederson satisfied this requirement, as Pederson engaged in all of the challenged actions while conducting investigative and arrest functions as a deputy sheriff and while on duty.⁸

Because Pederson has established that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to Moore to demonstrate that qualified immunity is inappropriate. See id.Moore must show that, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, the facts demonstrate that Pederson violated Moore's constitutional right and that that right was “clearly established ... in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition[,]” at the...