Moore v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co.
| Decision Date | 18 February 1943 |
| Docket Number | 15508. |
| Parties | MOORE v. POSTAL TELEGRAPHCABLE CO. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Nelson Mullins & Grier, of Columbia, for appellant.
L C. Wannamaker, of Cheraw, and James E. Leppard, of Chesterfield, for respondent.
The respondent, as committee of the person and estate of Allie Foster Moore, commenced this action in 1937, for the recovery of certain benefits alleged to be due to her ward as the surviving wife of John E. Moore, a former employee of appellant, under a pension and benefit plan which appellant established for the benefit of its employees.
The action was tried before Honorable Henry Busbee, Special Judge The parties waived trial by jury. The trial Judge, after hearing the testimony and arguments, awarded judgment for plaintiff, from which defendant appeals.
The material facts are undisputed. John E. Moore entered the employ of appellant on January 1, 1891, and continued therein until May 10, 1920, when he became incapacitated because of his mental and physical condition and was admitted to the South Carolina State Hospital where he remained a patient until his death on November 16, 1935.
In 1907, Mr. Moore made application for membership in "The Postal Telegraph Employees Association." The plan of this Association, the precise benefits given to employees, and the contributions, if any, made by them are not set out in the record. Presumably, it carried benefits similar to the plan later adopted by the appellant which we shall hereafter discuss. In any event, when Mr. Moore became incapacited he was granted disability benefits under the plan of the Association, which was then in force, in the sum of $33.02 per month, based on a salary of $75 per month which he was receiving at the time of becoming incapacitated. The payment of these benefits continued until December, 1929.
On June 30, 1929, "The Postal Telegraph Employees Association" was dissolved and a new pension and benefit plan was adopted by appellant, effective on July 1, 1929. Under the new plan the employees who had been receiving disability benefits under the Association plan were given the option of continuing to receive those disability benefits, or, in lieu thereof, of receiving benefits which their service record would entitle them under the new plan. The election to come under the new plan was required to be made in writing prior to December 31, 1929, and if not made by such employee, it was provided that the benefits under the old plan would be continued for the limited period therein specified, at the expiration of which time the employee would cease to receive further payments from the company in any form.
John E. Moore, after some inquiry and persuasion on the part of appellant, finally elected in December, 1929, to accept the new plan. Under this new plan he was classified as a disability pensioner and was paid a monthly pension of $23.92 from December, 1929, to the date of his death in November, 1935.
The new plan, a copy of which was introduced in evidence, was to be known as the "International Telephone Pension and Benefit Plan." No contributions were required of the employees. This plan or agreement provides for retirement pensions and disability benefits for employees, and death benefits and pensions to their dependents. This action was brought to recover in behalf of the widow, as a dependent of her husband, certain of these benefits under this plan or agreement.
Article V, Section 2, of the plan provides that upon the death of a disability pensioner, there shall be paid to his dependents, if any:
Section 9 of Article II is as follows:
Article VIII, Section 1, provides:
Under the terms of Section 5, Article V, it is provided that the "Committee shall have complete and final power and discretion to determine the existence of dependency."
A claim was made in 1936 in behalf of the widow of John E. Moore for benefits claimed to be due her under this plan. It was referred to the Pension and Benefit Committee established under Section 1, Article VIII. The Committee concluded that she was not a dependent with the intendment of Article II, Section 9, hereinabove quoted, upon the ground that "the widow had, for more than fifteen years prior to the death of said John E. Moore, been confined in the State Hospital for the Insane, where her care, maintenance and principal, if not entire, support were provided at public expense."
It appears to be undisputed that the widow, Mrs. Allie Foster Moore, has continuously been, with the exception of about one year, a mental charity patient in the South Carolina State Hospital for the past twenty-five or thirty years and is still a patient in that institution. Nothing has ever been paid by John E. Moore or his estate to the State Hospital for services rendered by it to Mrs. Moore. While Mr. Moore during his lifetime did render such financial assistance to Mrs. Moore as his limited means permitted, consisting of providing her with extra clothing and from time to time transferring a small amount of funds from his account in the hospital to her name, her principal support was furnished by the State Hospital.
The main question presented for determination is whether under these circumstances Mrs. Moore was a dependent within the meaning and intendment of Article II, Section 9. Appellant contends that the final decision of this question rested with the Pension and Benefit Committee and that since the Committee ruled against respondent, its decision, in the absence of fraud or bad faith, is final and conclusive and not subject to review by the Courts. This contention necessarily involves the question as to whether there was any reasonable basis for the conclusion of the Committee. As the facts are undisputed, the answer to this question depends on the proper construction of Section 9, Article II, which we have quoted. The trial Judge held that under the terms of this Section the wife of the employee was made a dependent, irrespective of whether she was in fact dependent upon her husband for support. Appellant contends that actual dependency is an essential element of the claim.
After a careful consideration of this Section, we think the construction adopted by the trial Judge is correct. The language used is that of appellant and seems to us clear and unambiguous. This Section expressly makes the wife of the employee and his children under the age of 18 "dependents." As to them there is no qualification. As to the other relatives there is a qualification that they must have received "their principal support from the employee." To hold that these qualifying words apply to the wife and children under the age of 18 would necessitate a strained and unreasonable construction of this Section. The latter portion of this section...
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McPherson v. J. E. Sirrine & Co.
... ... We ... might add that in our opinion the case of Moore v. Postal ... Telegraph-Cable Co., 202 S.C. 225, 24 S.E.2d 361, cited ... by respondent's ... ...