Moore v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America
Decision Date | 09 September 1937 |
Docket Number | 26179. |
Parties | MOORE v. PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
A suit by an employee against an insurance company for an alleged wrongful cancellation of a certificate of insurance issued to him under a group policy issued to his employer by the defendant will not lie, where it appears that the certificate was canceled because of his discharge from employment, where the policy expressly provided that the insurance would cease and determine upon termination of such employment. The defendant's refusal to consider a claim for benefits for total and permanent disability alleged to have occurred before the cancellation, on the ground that the policy required proofs of loss to be submitted while the policy was in full force and effect (the correctness of which we need not here consider), was not a repudiation of the contract but amounted to merely a refusal to pay under the terms of the contract. Whether or not the defendant is liable for such claim should be adjudicated in a suit to enforce the terms of the policy.
Error from Superior Court, Richmond County; A. L. Franklin, Judge.
Action by Ernest C. Moore against the Prudential Insurance Company of America. To review an adverse judgment, plaintiff brought error, and, his death being suggested, M. F. Moore, his administratrix, was substituted as plaintiff in error.
Affirmed.
A. R Williamson, of Augusta, for plaintiff in error.
Jones Russell & Sparks, of Macon, and Cumming, Harper & Nixon, of Augusta, for defendant in error.
This is an action by Ernest C. Moore against the Prudential Insurance Company. The plaintiff alleged that on January 12, 1920, the defendant issued to Ballard & Ballard Company a group insurance policy upon its employees, that at that time he was an employee of Ballard & Ballard Company, and that a certificate of insurance was issued to him under this master policy. The pertinent provisions of the master policy issued to Ballard & Ballard Company are as follows:
The petition alleged that on December 17, 1934, while said policy of insurance was in full force and effect the plaintiff became totally and permanently disabled within the terms of the policy; that at said time he had a vested right in said insurance in the sum of $1000; that on February 5, 1935, the defendant wrongfully canceled the policy of insurance, including the group policy and the certificate issued to plaintiff; that such cancellation was positive and affirmative, both being canceled in toto, without his assent or agreement, "and such cancellation was wrongful, and the sole cause of action herein set out is for the wrongful cancellation of said policy and certificate, and the damages suffered by plaintiff by reason of said wrongful cancellation"; that "the wrongful cancellation was made by the defendant for the purpose of avoiding liability to the plaintiff under the master policy and the certificate of insurance." The defendant filed its answer and admitted the employment, the issuance of the policy and the certificate thereunder, but alleged that if plaintiff became totally and permanently disabled in December, 1934, it had no knowledge thereof until July, 1935. The answer denied that there was any vested interest in said policy in favor of plaintiff by reason of the disability which occurred in December, 1934, denied the alleged wrongful cancellation of the policy, admitted that the certificate issued to the plaintiff thereunder was affirmatively and positively canceled on February 5, 1935, and denied that the group or master policy was canceled on that date. The answer further alleged that by reason of the fact that the employment of plaintiff by Ballard & Ballard Company terminated on February 5, 1935, the insurance issued to plaintiff terminated; that plaintiff made no effort to have the policy converted into other insurance; that the policy was canceled by its own terms; and that any premiums paid were paid by Ballard & Ballard Company and not by plaintiff, and were a gift by Ballard & Ballard Company to the plaintiff.
It appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff became an employee of Ballard & Ballard Company in July, 1919; that because of ill health, in December, 1934, at his request, he was given a leave of absence, with pay, until further notice and that on February 5, 1935, he was formally discharged. On August 4, 1934, he was examined by Dr. John W. Brittingham, who testified that he found the plaintiff with coronary heart disease. In December, 1934, because of repeated attacks, he advised the plaintiff to cease work. "From December, 1934, and from that time right on he was unquestionably totally and permanently disabled from performing any work of any kind for compensation at all." William S. Snyder, clerk for Ballard & Ballard Company, swore that a day or two after the discharge he sent the following letter by U.S. mail, in a regular envelope, with a three-cent stamp on it, properly addressed to the plaintiff: ...
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