Moore v. Sanders
Decision Date | 01 July 1881 |
Docket Number | CASE No. 1060. |
Citation | 15 S.C. 440 |
Parties | MOORE v. SANDERS. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
A will provided as follows: over. Held, that the limitation over depended upon a condition subsequent, which was void because repugnant to the estate devised, and that Matthew held, in fee simple absolute, a tract of land derived under this will.
Before THOMSON, J., Sumter, February, 1881.
This was a controversy without action instituted in February 1881. The will here construed bears date January 4th, 1868. The opinion states the case.
Mr. Jos. H. Earle, for appellant, cited Co. Lit. 112, b, note 144; 2 Roper on Leg., § 1460; 1 Hill's Ch. 367; 6 Ves. 100; 1 Jarm. on Wills 593; 16 Ves. 135; 8 Cow. 277.
Messrs. Blanding & Blanding, contra, cited 7 Bligh 56; 2 Williams on Ex'rs (2 d Am. ed.) 789; 4 Kent 270; 1 Jarm. on Wills (Perk. ed.) 677; 19 Johns. 20;8 Rich. 88.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This is a case submitted without action under Section 389 of the code. It appears that Matthew S. Moore, the respondent, bargained to sell and convey, in fee simple, a certain tract of land to George M. Sanders, the appellant, for $3500. Moore offered and is still ready to execute titles, but Sanders declines to accept his deed, alleging that Moore cannot convey in fee. Moore's title is derived from the will of his mother, Mrs. Sarah J. C. Elliott, deceased. So much of this will as it is necessary to consider, is in the following language:
Upon the hearing below Judge Thomson decreed that the estate devised to Moore is a fee and that he is able to make good and sufficient titles to Sanders. Sanders excepted to this decree. His appeal brings up the single question: “Did Moore take under the will of Mrs. Elliott a fee indefeasible in the land in question?
It will be seen on reading the will that Mrs. Elliott in the beginning of the clause above, bequeathed and devised to her son, the respondent, her entire personal property, and also a fee in all of her real estate; and if there was no other provision in her will, no difficulty whatever could have arisen as to its construction. She, however, with the view, as she thought, more distinctly to declare her intention, went further, and, as is not uncommon in such cases, instead of more clearly expressing her purpose, said just enough to create doubt and to demand the assistance of the courts to ascertain and declare what she really did mean. After...
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...an agreement imposes a duty upon the parties, they must show performance before they can claim rights thereunder." In Moore v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440, 40 Am. Rep. 703, it is said that a condition precedent is "a condition upon the happening of which an estate [or interest, I interpolate] wil......
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Mulvane v. Rude
... ... 506, 9 N.E. 467; ... McKenzie's Appeal, 41 Conn. 607, 19 Am. Rep ... 525; Jones v. Bacon, 68 Me. 34, 28 Am. Rep ... 1; Moore v. Sanders, 15 S.C. 440, 40 Am ... Rep. 703; Sherburne v. Sischo, 143 Mass ... 439, 9 N.E. 797 ... When ... real estate is ... ...
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Levan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
...an agreement imposes a duty upon the parties, they must show performance before they can claim rights thereunder." In Moore v. Sanders, 15 S.C. 440, 40 Am. Rep. 703, is said that a condition precedent is "a condition upon the happening of which an estate [or interest, I interpolate] will ve......
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Shevlin v. Colony Lutheran Church
...the first taker a fee simple estate. We have carefully examined the following decisions upon which appellants principally rely: Moore v. Sanders, 15 S.C. 440; Smith v. Smith, 93 S.C. 213, 76 S.E. 468; Tiencken v. Zerbst, 196 S.C. 438, 13 S.E.2d 483; Schroder v. Antipas, 215 S.C. 552, 56 S.E......