Moore v. Spiegel

• Decision Date: 10 January 1887
• Citation: 143 Mass. 413,9 N.E. 827
• Parties: MOORE, Adm'r, v. SPIEGEL.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

143 Mass. 413

9 N.E. 827

MOORE, Adm'r,

v.SPIEGEL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

January 10, 1887.

Tort for the conversion of a lot of whisky The answer denied the conversion, and that the whisky was the property of the plaintiff; alleged an assignment of the plaintiff's claim to one Vanderveer, and the bringing of a suit thereon in New York by said Vanderveer, where the defendant resided; and further alleged that the whisky belonged to one Mrs. Reilly, of Boston, and was sold by due process of law against her. It was admitted that the whisky was sold in bond by the defendant to one E.J. Reilly, husband of the said Mrs. Reilly, subject to the payment of the government tax thereon. Reilly suffered the whisky to remain in bond, and, while it was so in bond, and the tax unpaid, said Reilly died, and the plaintiff was appointed administrator upon his estate.

At the trial in the superior court before PITMAN, J., it appeared that in September, 1883, the defendant, in New York, received a letter purporting to come from the plaintiff, inquiring when the time would expire “for withdrawing the Guckenheimer rye whisky sold by you, April 4, 1881, to E.J. Reilly, of Boston.” The letter also contained the following: “The widow of said Reilly would like to sell it, if she could, there; but, if she cannot, then the government tax will be forwarded to you, with charges, storage,” etc. The letter was signed “ROBERT MOORE, Administrator, per E.W.S.” The defendant thereupon paid the government tax upon the whisky, which the plaintiff repaid to the defendant, and the defendant thereupon gave the plaintiff the following receipt:

“Received, Boston, October 4, 1883, of Robert Moore, Esq., administrator for E.J. Reilly, the sum of $527.80, tax advanced by us on fifteen barrels of Guckenheimer, held by us for Mrs. E.J. Reilly. M. SPIEGEL & CO.”

The plaintiff then gave the following order to the defendant, indorsed upon the back of the warehouse certificate relating to the whisky in question:

“Please forward within whisky to me, for account of Mrs. E.J. Reilly.

“ROBERT MOORE, Adm'r.”

The plaintiff testified that he signed these papers at the request of the defendant's agent; that he glanced at them, and “thought everything was all straight;” that Mrs. Reilly had in fact nothing to do with the whisky. The defendant's agent testified that he thought that if he had communicated to Mr. Moore his intention to charge the whisky to Mrs. Reilly he would not have paid him a dollar of the tax. The plaintiff contended that he did not authorize the writing of the above letter, and that he did not notice the statement in the above receipt concerning Mrs. Reilly; but admitted he directed the writing of a certain letter relating to the whisky, by the scrivener who wrote the above letter, but denied that he authorized the statement therein contained concerning Mrs. Reilly. The defendant called the said scrivener, one Erastus W. Sanborn, who, on cross-examination, said that Moore, when he asked him to write the letter, said nothing about Mrs. Reilly; that he merely asked him to write to find out when the whisky tax was payable; and that anything beyond that in the letter he (Sanborn) was responsible for. The defendant testified that Mrs. Reilly owed him a certain debt, and relying upon the statements above mentioned, and believing from the above statements that Mrs. Reilly was the owner of the whisky, he caused the same to be attached by due process of law, and sold in satisfaction of said debt, which was the conversion relied upon.

The defendant asked the court to rule that if the plaintiff directed the writing of the above letter as it was written, knowingly received the above receipt without objection, and signed said order for delivery with full knowledge of its contents, and without objection thereto, or explanation thereof, and the defendant, in good faith, relying upon said statements, honestly believed that the said whisky had become the property of the said Mrs. Reilly, and, acting upon such belief, attached and sold the same as her property, that the defendant could set up such attachment and sale in whole or in partial defense to this action, and that the plaintiff was estopped from denying that the whisky was the property of Mrs. Reilly; but the presiding judge ruled otherwise, and instructed the jury that, if the whisky was the property of the plaintiff at the time of the alleged conversion, the attachment and sale in the suit against Mrs. Reilly was no defense to the action, and that the plaintiff was not estopped from showing that the whisky was at said time his property, as said administrator, and not the property of Mrs. Reilly.

The defendant offered in evidence an absolute assignment, under seal, by the plaintiff, of all his right, title, and interest in and to this whisky, to one Vanderveer, before the commencement of this action, upon the back of which was a reassignment from said Vanderveer to the plaintiff, dated several months after the commencement of this action; but the presiding judge ruled that this was no defense to the action. The defendant offered evidence tending to show that, before the commencement of this action, the plaintiff sold and assigned the claim now in suit, and all his interest in and to this whisky, to the said Vanderveer; that said Vanderveer brought suit upon the said claim in New York; that said sale and assignment were still in force at the time this suit was brought; and contended that, if the jury should be satisfied of these facts, and that the plaintiff was prosecuting this suit for his own use and benefit as administrator, and not for the use and benefit of the said assignee, that he could not recover; but the presiding judge ruled that this evidence was immaterial, and, if believed by the jury, was not a bar to the action. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant alleged exceptions.G.A. Torrey, for defendant.

There are two questions in this case: (1) Is the plaintiff estopped by his statements that the merchandise was the property of Mrs. Reilly from claiming it as his own? (2) Can he recover for his own use and benefit as administrator, notwithstanding the assignment to another party? See Buckingham v. Hanna, 2 Ohio St. 551; Carr v. London & N.W. Ry. Co., L.R. 10 C.P. 316; Stonard v. Dunkin, 2 Camp. 345. It seems to us too clear that this comes within the ordinary doctrine of estoppel to require further argument. Knights v. Wiffen, L.R. 5 Q.B. 660; Chapman v. Searle, 3 Pick. 38;Drury v. Wyman, 14 Pick. 326;Ladrick v. Briggs, 105 Mass. 508;Fay v. Valentine, 12 Pick. 40;Platt v. Squire, 12 Metc. 494;Hinchley v. Greany, 118 Mass. 595. It has been universally held that an administrator is estopped in precisely the same way as though he had been acting in his private capacity. Stone v. Gilman, 58 N.H. 135;Mardis v. Mardis, 13 La. Ann. 236;Waring v. Purcell, 1 Hill.Eq. 193;Calanan v. McClure, 47 Barb. 206;Rice v. Bixler, 1 Watts & S. 445;Bragg v. Massie, 38 Ala. 89;Bell v. Craig, 52 Ala. 215;Masterson v. Pullen, 62 Ala. 145;Du Val v. Marshall, 30 Ark. 230;Camp v. Moseley, 2 Fla. 171; Ponder v. Moseley, Id. 207; Thomas v. Brooks, 6 Tex. 369. According to the law...