Moore v. State

Decision Date12 June 1947
Docket Number15832.
PartiesMOORE v. STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

R S. Wimberly, of Lumpkin, for plaintiff in error.

E L. Forrester, Sol. Gen., of Leesburg, Eugene Cook, Atty Gen., and Wright Lipford, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

Statement of facts by JENKINS, Chief Justice:

The defendant was indicted for murder and convicted without a recommendation. The evidence consisted of free and voluntary confessions, together with corroboration thereof, that the defendant had killed his father-in-law with an axe. The details of the killing were described in the defendant's own statement. Counsel for the defendant does not argue that the verdict was not supported by the evidence, but insists only upon several special assignments of error, all in effect being based upon the refusal of the trial court to grant a continuance under the circumstances of this case. The record shows that counsel was appointed by the court for defendant on October 17, 1946. The case was called for trial on the morning of October 23, whereupon counsel moved for a continuance on the ground that he wished to procure a witness, and for the further reason that counsel had been continually engaged in court for two days prior to the trial of this defendant, and for that reason had not had sufficient time to properly prepare for trial. Counsel for the defendant was unable to show that the absent person was a material witness, and after consultation with the defendant admitted that the testimony of such witness would probably be inadmissible; and after counsel had made the remark to the court that 'I am probably as ready as I can get at this term of the court,' the case was ordered to trial and resulted in the verdict indicated. On the hearing of the amended motion for new trial, an affidavit made by a physician was introduced, in which it was deposed that: 'At the request of the solicitor-general of the circuit he undertook to make some examination of the mental condition of the defendant, Roosevelt Moore. From this examination deponent is of the opinion that while said defendant has sufficient mind to be denominated sane and to be able to distinguish the defference between right and wrong, he is very seriously mentally undeveloped, and deponent would say that his mental age would correspond approximately to that of an ordinary or average ten-year-old child.' Another affidavit was to the effect that the defendant 'had the mental development of an average boy of four or five years of age.' Another affidavit from one who had employed him for seventeen years was that he had the mental development of an overgrown boy of six or eight years of age, but that the affiant did not wish to convey the impression that he was insane or unable to distinguish between right and wrong. The movant's attorney by affidavit deposed as follows: 'At the time he was appointed to defend Roosevelt Moore he had never seen him and knew nothing whatever about him. Deponent conferred with him two or three times before his trial, and while he seemed very indifferent and uncommunicative, deponent did not know nor suspect that he was so low an order of intelligence, and so mentally undeveloped as he since appears to be; and deponent in presenting the case to the jury did not try to give the jury the impression that he was of anything but ordinary, average intelligence for an educated negro. Since his trial and after having a number of further conferences with him, and after having seen and talked with his mother, whom deponent had never seen before the trial, and after talking with other relatives of the defendant, and to other people who had known him for years, it is deponent's opinion that he has no more mind or mental development than a small child, and deponent had in no way been advised of this before the trial.' There were affidavits in rebuttal by the sheriff, who had known the defendant for seven years, and who deposed that he appeared at all times a sane man capable of distinquishing between right and wrong and was a man of average intelligence. There was a similar affidavit from the jailor and from three other persons, who knew the defendant well and who set up in detail their observation of his mental alertness and their conclusion that he was not only sane but possessed average intelligence.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court.

JENKINS Chief Justice.

1. The motion...

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4 cases
  • Dutton v. State, 27010
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • April 6, 1972
    ...not be disturbed by the appellate courts unless it clearly appears that the judge abused his discretion in this regard. Moore v. State, 202 Ga. 357(2), 42 S.E.2d 251; Butts v. State, 211 Ga. 16(1), 83 S.E.2d 610; Harris v. State, 211 Ga. 327, 328, 85 S.E.2d 770; Corbin v. State, 212 Ga. 231......
  • Blackston v. State, 17844
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • June 9, 1952
    ...Code, § 81-1419; Roberts v. State, 14 Ga. 6; Long v. State, 38 Ga. 491; Cannady v. State, 190 Ga. 227, 9 S.E.2d 241; Moore v. State, 202 Ga. 357, 43 S.E.2d 251; Griffin v. State, 208 Ga. 746, 69 S.E.2d 192. The basis for a continuance here being that counsel did not have sufficient time in ......
  • Starr v. State, 17896
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • July 14, 1952
    ...be interfered with unless abused.' Porch v. State, 207 Ga. 645, 63 S.E.2d 902; Harris v. State, 119 Ga. 114, 45 S.E. 973; Moore v. State, 202 Ga. 357, 43 S.E.2d 251; Smith v. State, 198 Ga. 849(1), 33 S.E.2d 338; Cannady v. State, 190 Ga. 227, 9 S.E.2d 241; Griffin v. State, 208 Ga. 746(2),......
  • Moore v. Deal
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • June 12, 1947

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