Moore v. State

Decision Date25 March 1986
Docket Number8 Div. 157
Citation488 So.2d 27
PartiesAllen Buford MOORE v. STATE.
CourtAlabama Court of Criminal Appeals

L. Dan Turberville, Birmingham, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Jean Williams Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PATTERSON, Judge.

Appellant, Allen Buford Moore, was indicted for the murder of John Aaron by shooting him with a gun in violation of § 13A-6-2, Code of Alabama 1975. On May 9, 1984, a jury found appellant guilty as charged in the indictment. The court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment.

On January 20, 1984, J.F. Aaron discovered the body of his father, John Aaron, lying on the floor of the victim's mobile home at the Ponderosa Trailer Park in Franklin County. It was subsequently determined that death was caused by a bullet wound to the brain.

Ernest Eugene Jackson resided in the Ponderosa Trailer Park. Jackson met appellant, who was also a resident of the trailer park, for the first time on January 19, 1984. Appellant came to Jackson's trailer around 7:00--8:00 p.m., looking for someone who no longer lived there. Appellant had consumed "some whiskey" before going to Jackson's trailer; and Jackson had been drinking that afternoon with his brother-in-law, Bill Landrum.

When Jackson informed appellant that the person in question no longer resided there, Jackson invited appellant in. Appellant, Jackson, and Landrum continued to drink from a "fifth" of whiskey. Jackson and Landrum wanted to meet some women, so appellant suggested they drive to "Spruce Pine," where he knew some women. Landrum drove the trio to the home of a woman related to appellant. The woman's two daughters, ages thirteen and fifteen, were present. This group consumed the remainder of the "fifth" of whiskey, and then proceeded to the "package" store at Littleville, where they purchased more whiskey. Appellant claims that he does not remember anything after visiting the "package" store in Littleville.

According to Landrum and Jackson, the trio returned to the Ponderosa Trailer Park around midnight. Jackson was unable to get into his trailer, so he spent the night at Landrum's. Landrum and Jackson testified that they left appellant at the trailer park. The next day, J.F. Aaron came to Jackson, seeking help for his father. Jackson told Aaron where to find a telephone and Jackson went to the victim's trailer.

Landrum testified that he owned a .22 caliber pistol, which had a taped handle and was not in very good condition. Landrum had placed the pistol in a paper bag with a pair of gloves and a flashlight and put the bag, with its contents, in the back seat of his car on January 19, 1984. The gun was missing on January 20, 1984. Landrum stated that the only persons who had been in his car were he, Jackson, and appellant; however, on cross-examination, it was established that two young boys had also been in the car.

Belinda Kaye Abbott was living with appellant at the Ponderosa Trailer Park during January of 1984. Appellant was married to another woman, but was separated from her during this time. Abbott stated that appellant left their trailer about 5:30 p.m. on January 19, 1984. She next saw appellant around 10:30 p.m. and he was "very drunk." Appellant told Abbott that he "either had to kill someone, or the Mafia was going to kill him." Appellant picked up his coat and a pistol with a taped handle fell out. Abbott picked up the gun and put it away. Abbott testified that around 11:15--11:30 p.m. appellant took the pistol and left the trailer. Appellant returned about forty-five minutes later and told Abbott that he had killed someone. Abbott checked the pistol and noticed that one chamber was empty. When she had checked previously, the chamber contained a round of ammunition.

Abbott told appellant that he should get rid of all the evidence, which consisted of the gun, a carton of L & M cigarettes (the brand smoked by the victim), and some pill bottles. According to Abbott, one pill bottle had the victim's name on it. Appellant took the evidence to the "Pump Pond Spillway," located near the trailer park, for disposal. Some time later, Abbott voluntarily went to police authorities with this information.

On cross-examination, Abbott stated that appellant was "really drunk" that night, and that she thought he was "fooling" around at first. She testified that appellant told her that he stole the gun from Landrum's car and that he described how he killed the victim. Abbott further testified that appellant said that he grabbed Aaron around the neck, put the gun to his head, and pulled the trigger.

Officer Dale Nix, an investigator with the Franklin County Sheriff's Department, picked up appellant the morning of February 4, 1984, and took him to the sheriff's office for questioning. After proper Miranda warnings, appellant made a full and complete confession. His statement was essentially consistent with the testimony of Jackson, Landrum, and Abbott, and contained a detailed account of the facts which, at trial, he claimed he could not remember. Appellant had previously, when questioned by Nix on two occasions, denied any knowledge of the killing when questioned by Nix. Appellant stated in his confession that he tied "some" wires together in the victim's trailer, hoping to create an electrical short which would cause a fire. Nix went to the victim's trailer and found several "hot" wires tied together as described by appellant in his confession.

Appellant testified in his own defense and his testimony was substantially the same as that of Landrum and Jackson. Appellant stated that he had no memory of the events subsequent to stopping at the Littleville "package" store. Although appellant admitted that he signed the confession, he testified that he could not remember making parts of the statement. According to appellant, he was intoxicated when the statement was obtained by Nix. (The facts surrounding the taking of appellant's confession will be discussed in more detail in part I of this opinion.) According to appellant, everything he knew about the murder was told to him by others. He stated that most of what he knew was told to him by Abbott three days after the murder.

I

Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the confession. It is argued that appellant was so highly intoxicated from consumption of drugs and alcohol that the confession must be deemed involuntary. We disagree.

The testimony presents conflicting evidence on this issue. There is evidence that on the evening prior to appellant's arrest and subsequent confession, he was given four Libratrol pills, two of which he immediately consumed; that he and several friends then consumed "a lot" of beer and whiskey and smoked several "joints" of marijuana; and that he later purchased more beer and liquor and a bottle of wine; and there is evidence that he "passed out" at approximately 2:30 a.m. the following morning. At approximately 8:00 a.m. when he was notified that Nix was coming to see him, appellant told a companion that he was still "light-headed" from drinking. However, this companion testified that appellant was not so drunk that he "didn't know where he was" and that he "walked pretty straight." The companion's wife testified that, although she could smell alcohol about appellant's person, he did not appear to be intoxicated. Appellant testified that he was "a little drunk" at 7:30 a.m., but that he was thinking clearly; that, on the way to the police station, he took the remaining two Libratrol pills and was "high" within a few minutes; that he remembered giving part of the confession and signing it of his "own free will"; that Nix read the statement to him before he signed it; and that he gave the confession because he was on the brink of suicide and, by confessing to a murder, he would be letting the State kill him rather than do it himself.

Nix testified that he was within three to three and a half feet of appellant the morning of February 4 and did not smell alcohol about appellant's person. In Nix's opinion, appellant was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and was "very" alert. Investigator Carson testified that when he observed appellant that morning, appellant acted normal. Carson was close to appellant and did not smell alcohol and his speech was "all right." In Carson's opinion, appellant was not "under the influence" when he confessed to the murder.

Appellant stipulated at the suppression hearing that the Miranda rights were read to him and that his signature appears at the end of the confession. Nix stated that appellant said he understood each right as it was read to him and that no force or coercion was used to obtain the statement.

It is well settled that in order for intoxication to render a confession inadmissible, it must be shown that the mind of the defendant was substantially impaired when the confession was made. Moore v. State, 415 So.2d 1210, 1214 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), cert. denied, No. 81-728 (Ala.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1041, 103 S.Ct. 459, 74 L.Ed.2d 610 (1982), and cases cited therein. "Intoxication, short of mania or such impairment of the will and mind as to make an individual unconscious of the meaning of his words, will not render a statement or confession inadmissible." Tice v. State, 386 So.2d 1180, 1185 (Ala.Cr.App), cert. denied, 386 So.2d 1187 (Ala.1980), and cases cited therein. See also Palmer v. State, 401 So.2d 266, 268 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 401 So.2d 270 (Ala.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 1280, 71 L.Ed.2d 463 (1982).

The voluntariness of an alleged confession is a question of law addressed to the trial court, whose ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears to be contrary to the great weight of the evidence or is manifestly wrong. Tice; Garrison v. State, 372 So.2d 55 (Ala.Cr.App.1979).

"The degree of intoxication which would affect the voluntariness...

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  • Hubbard v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 13 Mayo 1986
    ...inadmissible, it must be shown that the mind of the defendant was substantially impaired when the confession was made. Moore v. State, 488 So.2d 27 (Ala.Cr.App.1986); Moore v. State, 415 So.2d 1210 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 415 So.2d 1210 (Ala.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 1041, 103 S.Ct. 45......
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    ...cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 [107 S.Ct. 1591, 94 L.Ed.2d 780] (1987) ]; McCammon v. State, 499 So.2d 811 (Ala.Cr.App.1986); Moore v. State, 488 So.2d 27 (Ala.Cr.App.1986); Palmer v. State, 401 So.2d 266 (Ala.Cr.App.), writ denied, 401 So.2d 270 (Ala.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct......
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