Moore v. State, 69496

Decision Date26 May 1988
Docket NumberNo. 69496,69496
Citation13 Fla. L. Weekly 347,525 So.2d 870
Parties13 Fla. L. Weekly 347 Alton MOORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

May L. Cain, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, North Miami, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Ralph Barreira, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Alton Moore appeals his convictions for first-degree murder and armed burglary. The trial judge imposed the death sentence on the murder conviction in accordance with the jury's recommendation. He also imposed a life sentence for armed burglary and a five-year sentence for possessing a weapon while engaged in a felony. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. The appellant's primary defense was mental competency at the time of the offense. We find we must reverse both the convictions and the death sentence and remand for a new trial because the trial judge failed to excuse a challenged juror for cause who said his belief about the insanity defense would probably prevent him from following the court's instructions on that issue.

This was a particularly gruesome crime. Paramedics found the victim in her home, bleeding profusely from an ear-to-ear severe knife cut. The appellant, who sometimes worked as a handyman and gardener on the victim's premises, was identified by the victim before she died. Other testimony established the appellant's presence near the victim's home at the time she died, and shortly after the incident appellant confessed to the crime. Appellant's defense theory throughout the trial was that his paranoid schizophrenic condition rendered the confession unreliable and that he was insane at the time of the offense. Counsel for the state and for the defense questioned the jury extensively concerning the insanity defense and the jurors' ability to accept or reject expert opinions from mental health professionals. The following exchange occurred during the voir dire examination of a prospective juror, Mr. Lopez:

MR. BAND [STATE ATTORNEY]: Does anybody here have any particular feelings about the defense you have all heard about on TV? In certain cases, there's been some notoriety in the use of insanity defense. Does anybody have any feelings that it is not a viable defense? It's not a real defense?

MR. LOPEZ: I think it's overused.

....

MR. LOPEZ: I think we are interested in the frame of mind of the person at the time of the incident, when it took place. When was he evaluated, three weeks later?

THE COURT: That is something to be determined later on. That goes to the weight of the evidence, once it's been submitted to you....

MR. SMITH [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: You responded you thought the defense issue of insanity is overused. Do you have a view about insanity or about psychiatrists or all of this we're talking about that would prevent you from being fair to somebody that asserts a defense of that type? Do you think you would be unfair to somebody?

MR. LOPEZ: I feel that anybody that takes another person's life is a bit insane, premeditated, takes a person's life. I don't see how you could let somebody off because of that factor.

MR. SMITH: You don't think somebody could be legally insane?

MR. LOPEZ: I--I believe he can be. I don't believe he should be let go because he is.

THE COURT: What do you mean by the phrase let go?

MR. LOPEZ: Set free.

MR. SMITH: Let me just ask you this, Mr. Lopez, if the judge were to further instruct you, and I believe he will in this case, if you were selected as a juror, if your verdict in this case is that the defendant is not guilty because legally insane, that does not mean he will be released from custody. The judge can conduct an additional proceeding to determine if he should be committed to a mental hospital, kept in jail or given treatment. If the judge were to tell you that, would that satisfy you and would you be able to listen to the instructions?

MR. LOPEZ: If he gets committed to a hospital when deemed insane, where does he go, go to jail or set free?

MR. SMITH: Unfortunately, that is not for your consideration in this case. Your consideration is whether or not someone is guilty or not guilty in accordance to the instruction the judges gives. Will that interfere with your decision making?

MR. LOPEZ: No.

MR. SMITH: You're not going to be thinking about, well, this guy is going to be getting out sometime in the future?

MR. LOPEZ: Yes, I will.

MR. SMITH: That may prevent you from following these instructions about insanity?

MR. LOPEZ: Probably it would, yes.

Appellant's trial counsel challenged Lopez for cause based on his stated inability to follow the court's instructions. The trial court denied the challenge, although it granted a defense motion to excuse another juror for cause based on almost identical answers. The appellant expended a peremptory challenge to remove Mr. Lopez from the jury panel. Later, appellant exhausted his peremptory challenges and made a request for additional peremptory challenges which was denied by the trial judge.

The record clearly reflects that the sole issue presented to the jury in the guilt phase of appellant's trial concerned appellant's mental illness. This is illustrated by the prosecutor's closing argument, where he stated: "We agree that the defendant has some form of mental illness, but is he insane? That is the $64,000 question. Was he insane on ... the 29th of August, 1985? That is the question. That is the sole...

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