Moore v. State
| Decision Date | 29 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02–1505–CR–321.,49A02–1505–CR–321. |
| Citation | 49 N.E.3d 1095 |
| Parties | Willie MOORE, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Megan Shipley, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Larry D. Allen, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
, Judge.
[1] Appellant/Defendant, Willie Moore (“Moore”), appeals his convictions for Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement1 and Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon.2 Moore, a former resident of the Coppertree Apartment Complex (“Coppertree”), was stopped by Coppertree's courtesy police officer one day. The officer discovered Moore's name after stopping him and believed that he was a former resident who was on the complex's trespass list. As a result, he requested to pat Moore down, but Moore ran. When the officer caught Moore, he arrested him, searched him, and discovered a firearm in Moore's possession. Moore was subsequently convicted of: (1) resisting law enforcement as a Level 6 felony because the officer had been injured while pursuing Moore; and (2) possession of a firearm as a serious violent felon because Moore had a prior out-of-state conviction for residential burglary, which the trial court concluded was substantially similar to Indiana's statute for burglary.
[2] On appeal, Moore argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the firearm because he was unlawfully stopped by Coppertree's officer and, therefore, the resulting arrest and search violated his right to privacy under the United States and Indiana Constitutions; (2) the trial court erred in convicting him of possession of a firearm as a serious violent felon because his prior out-of-state conviction for residential burglary was not substantially similar to a conviction for burglary in Indiana; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for resisting law enforcement as a Level 6 felony because there was no evidence that he caused the injuries Coppertree's officer suffered while pursuing him. We conclude that: (1) the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Moore, so the stop was lawful under the United States Constitution; (2) the officer's actions were reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, so the stop was lawful under the Indiana Constitution; and (3) the Illinois statute for residential burglary was substantially similar to the Indiana statute for burglary. However, we agree with Moore that there was not sufficient evidence to elevate his resisting law enforcement conviction to a Level 6 felony because there was no evidence that he proximately caused the officer's injuries. As a result, we affirm Moore's conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, but we reverse his conviction for resisting law enforcement as a Level 6 felony. We remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate Moore's resisting law enforcement conviction and to enter a new conviction and sentence for the lesser-included offense of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.
[3] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
[4] Officer Christopher Helmer (“Officer Helmer”), a patrolman with the Speedway Police Department, worked as a “courtesy officer” for Coppertree when he was not working as a patrolman with the police department. (Tr. 4
). As a courtesy officer, he was responsible for Coppertree's security and responding to service calls. On July 12, 2014, Officer Helmer was at Coppertree when he saw Moore and another male walking along the street next to the complex. He stopped his patrol car next to them and got out to question them because he found it suspicious that Moore was wearing a dark hoodie when it was “roughly eighty” degrees outside that day. (Tr. 6 ). He also could not remember ever having seen the two males before. When he stopped, he did not activate his patrol car's lights or siren or ask either man to stop. Nevertheless, the men stopped to talk to him.
[5] Officer Helmer asked whether the men lived in Coppertree. Moore told him that they did not, but he gave Officer Helmer his name, which the officer recognized. Officer Helmer knew that Coppertree “had had several complaints about Willie Moore,” and another officer at Coppertree had told Officer Helmer that he had issued a written trespass warning to a Willie Moore. (Tr. 10
). Officer Helmer also knew that Moore had previously lived at Coppertree but that his family had been evicted.
[6] While he was talking to the officer, Moore put his hands in his pocket. Out of concern for his safety, Officer Helmer asked both men if he could pat them down. Moore's companion complied with Officer Helmer's request and put his hands up so that the officer could pat him down. However, as Officer Helmer began to pat his companion down, Moore said, “Man, lets' get out of here,” and started walking backwards away from the officer. (Tr. 10
). Officer Helmer told him to stop, but, instead, Moore turned around and ran.
[7] Officer Helmer radioed to dispatch that he was engaged in a foot pursuit and pursued Moore. Two blocks into this pursuit, he fell down as he ran and suffered a partially-torn tendon in his left shoulder. Still, he followed Moore into one of the buildings on the complex and found him trying to get into an apartment in that building. He deployed his taser, gained control over Moore, and then radioed for backup. When additional police officers arrived, Officer Helmer placed Moore in handcuffs and searched him. As a result of this search, he found a loaded firearm in a firearm holster in Moore's pant leg.
[8] Subsequently, on July 15, 2014, the State charged Moore with Level 5 felony possession of an altered handgun and Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement. On August 15, 2014, the State added an additional count charging Moore with Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. The State's basis for this charge was that in 2013 Moore had been convicted of residential burglary in Cook County, Illinois. The State believed that the statutory elements of residential burglary in Illinois were substantially similar to the statutory elements of burglary, a serious violent felony, in Indiana.
[9] Prior to trial, Moore moved to suppress evidence of “any items seized, or statements made by [Moore,]” during Officer Helmer's investigatory stop. (App. 52). He argued that Officer Helmer had stopped him without a warrant, did not have probable cause to arrest him, and did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. He asserted that, absent those constitutional requirements, the stop violated his right to privacy under the United States and Indiana Constitutions, and that all of the evidence gained as a result of the stop was therefore inadmissible. The trial court took the motion under advisement and held a bench trial on the charges on January 29, 2015.
[10] At the trial, Officer Helmer testified that, when he stopped Moore, he had known that two men named Willie Moore had lived at Coppertree—Moore and Moore's father, Willie Moore, Sr. Officer Helmer knew that Willie Moore, Sr., had held the lease at Coppertree, but that the residents' complaints had concerned Willie Moore, Jr. He testified that when he had stopped Moore, he had not known Moore and Moore, Sr.'s respective ages, weights, or heights. However, he said that he had previously heard Moore described as “a younger in the early 20's black male.” (Tr. 23
). Based on this description, he said that he had believed that the Willie Moore he had stopped on July 12 was Willie Moore, Jr., the subject of the complaints Coppertree had received.
[11] Also at trial, Moore testified and stipulated to the fact that he had been convicted of residential burglary in Chicago, Illinois on December 5, 2013. He also acknowledged that he had been on probation for that conviction when he committed his offenses in the current case.
[12] At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, the trial court took the matter under advisement. It then held a hearing on March 16, 2015, at which it denied Moore's motion to suppress. At the same hearing, the court rendered its verdict that Moore was guilty as charged. However, the court found that Moore's charge for possession of an altered handgun was a lesser-included charge of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, and the court did not enter a judgment of conviction for Moore's possession of an altered handgun.
[13] Thereafter, on April 22, 2015, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. It sentenced Moore to one (1) year for his resisting law enforcement conviction and five (5) years for his unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently. The court found that Moore's age—twenty-one—was a mitigating factor and that his history of delinquency and the fact that he was on probation at the time of his offenses were aggravating factors. Moore now appeals.
[14] On appeal, Moore raises three issues: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the handgun; (2) whether the trial court erred in determining that the Illinois residential burglary statute was substantially similar to the Indiana burglary statute; and (3) whether there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction for resisting law enforcement as a Level 6 felony. We will address each of these...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Douglas v. United States, 17-1104
...exclude any possibility that the injuries occurred by accident or an unforeseeable intervening circumstance. See, e.g., Moore v. State , 49 N.E.3d 1095 (Ind. App. 2016). Indiana's statute therefore must be treated the same way Yates treated Wisconsin's.According to Douglas, however, no stat......
-
Holloway v. State
...by prohibiting, as a general rule, searches and seizures conducted without a warrant supported by probable cause. Moore v. State , 49 N.E.3d 1095, 1101 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied. As a deterrent mechanism, evidence obtained in violation of this rule is generally not admissible absen......
-
Thrash v. State
...State, 843 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied; Smith v. State, 21 N.E.3d 121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) ; and Moore v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1095, 1108 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).[17] In Whaley, Whaley, attempted to prevent police officers from handcuffing him when he was lying on the ground by pl......
-
Cole v. State
...show his hands.[13] This court recently discussed causation in the context of the resisting law enforcement statute in Moore v. State , 49 N.E.3d 1095 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied . In that case, the court was asked to consider whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that th......