Moore v. State
| Decision Date | 31 January 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 10A04-9903-CR-134.,10A04-9903-CR-134. |
| Citation | 723 N.E.2d 442 |
| Parties | James MOORE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
William P. McCall, III, David E. Mosley, Mosley, Bertrand, Jacobs & McCall, Jeffersonville, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellant.
Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Sarah E. Scherrer, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
James Moore appeals his conviction for attempted murder,1 a Class A felony, following a jury trial. We affirm.
Moore raises three issues which we restate as:
The facts most favorable to the verdict reveal that both Moore and Josh Walker were involved in a relationship with Stacy Eicher.3 During a July 1997 telephone conversation between Moore and Walker, Moore threatened to kill Walker.
On November 7, 1997, after an earlier argument, Eicher, Walker, and Moore were all at Eicher's house when the argument escalated. Moore again stated that he was going to kill Walker. Moore and Walker fought outside and Moore got into his car to leave. Walker was beside the car, beating on the window and kicking the tire. Moore started his car, backed up a little bit and then proceeded to pull forward, brushing Walker and knocking him off balance. Moore drove off but then turned his car around and proceeded to drive back toward Walker at a high rate of speed for a residential area. Moore drove up onto the yard and struck Walker. The impact fractured Walker's left leg, shattered the car's windshield, and dented the car's hood.
Moore returned to Eicher's house where Bill McGregory, a mail carrier who witnessed the incident, instructed Moore to stay. Off-duty officer Scott Merchant reported to the scene of the accident wearing plain clothes and driving an unmarked car. He approached Moore and asked him if he was involved in the accident to which Moore responded affirmatively. Officer Rayborn then arrived at the scene and Merchant informed him about the accident. Rayborn placed Moore in the back seat of his car4 to gather information from him for the accident report. Moore was not free to leave the scene of the accident until the officer had been given the information he needed for and completed his accident report.
For the accident report, Rayborn asked Moore for his license and registration and questioned him about what had happened. Moore then told the officer that he and Walker had argued and that after he left in his vehicle, he turned around, drove up on the sidewalk and struck Walker. After Rayborn received this information from Moore he contacted his shift leader and the decision was made to charge Moore with attempted murder.
At that time, Moore was handcuffed and read his Miranda Rights. Rayborn then proceeded to begin filling out paperwork and realized that Moore was a juvenile.
Moore was arrested on allegations of attempted murder and criminal recklessness. Because he was a juvenile, the allegations were filed as a delinquency petition. After a waiver hearing, the trial court waived juvenile jurisdiction. Moore was subsequently charged with attempted murder, a Class A felony, and criminal recklessness, a Class C felony. Moore filed a motion to suppress the statements he made at the scene of the accident to Rayborn; however, at a hearing on the motion, it was denied.
At Moore's jury trial he was found guilty and convicted of both attempted murder, a Class A felony, and criminal recklessness, a Class C felony. During Moore's sentencing hearing, the trial court vacated the conviction for criminal recklessness and sentenced Moore to thirty years imprisonment for attempted murder. Moore now appeals.
Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Moore argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it waived his case to adult jurisdiction because the court failed to consider alternative dispositions available through the court's juvenile jurisdiction and failed to articulate reasons why such alternatives were inappropriate. Moore contends that the trial court, in finding that it was proper to waive juvenile jurisdiction, relied on criteria that did not support such a finding. Moore also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it questioned a witness about a previous incident regarding Moore.
We review a juvenile court's5 decision to waive its jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. Vance v. State, 640 N.E.2d 51, 57 (Ind.1994). "It is for the juvenile court judge, after weighing the effects of retaining or waiving jurisdiction, to determine which is the most desirable alternative." Id. (citation omitted).
Waiver of juvenile jurisdiction is governed by Indiana Code section 31-30-3-5, which provides in pertinent part that:
Here, the trial court conducted a hearing on the State's motion to waive jurisdiction. The trial court found that Moore was charged with committing attempted murder, which is a Class A felony if committed by an adult, there was probable cause to believe that Moore committed the acts alleged,6 and Moore was seventeen (17) years of age7 on November 7, 1997, the date when the ] Id.
Proof of these elements creates a presumption in favor of waiver. Hagan v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1292, 1295 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996). Although Moore argues that the trial court erred in not considering alternate juvenile system options,8 the burden is on the juvenile to present evidence and prove that waiver is not in his best interest or that of the safety and welfare of the community. Hagan, 682 N.E.2d at 1295.
Moore contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it waived juvenile jurisdiction because it would have been in his best interest and the safety and welfare of the community for him to remain in the juvenile justice system. He asserts that he satisfied his burden of proving that waiver was not in his best interest or the best interest of the safety or well being of the community.
Moore had the opportunity to, and did, present evidence in an attempt to rebut the presumption of waiver that was established. He demonstrated that he was enrolled in school, had been involved in a job training program at school, worked to help pay bills at home, and volunteered for political campaigns. He also showed that he had previous anger outbursts but had not been treated.
Moore argues that Robert Jones, a probation officer who had never spoken to Moore, testified that Moore was beyond rehabilitation by the juvenile justice system, but could report that Moore had "`done well' and had `maintained the highest level' during his detention." Brief of Appellant at 7.
The trial court noted that:
[w]hile a number of [Moore's] qualities may be somewhat admirable, and while it may be true that James is in need of anger management counseling, this court finds it to be insufficient reason to retain James [Moore] in the juvenile justice system. Moreover, this testimony is overshadowed by that of Chief Probation Officer Robert C. Jones. Mr. Jones testified that at James Moore's age, (he will be eighteen (18) years old on January 19, 1998), there are few rehabilitative options practically available to him within the juvenile justice system. . . . [T]he most restrictive rehabilitative option available for James Moore, and the only one appropriate for the acts charged in Mr. Jones' estimation, would be commitment to the Clark County Juvenile Detention Center for up to 120 days. This option, however, would provide James Moore with only minimal rehabilitation.
R. 256. The trial court considered Moore's attempt to rebut the presumption of waiver, but concluded that "Moore has been unable to overcome this [waiver] presumption with evidence that it would be in his best interests and the best interests of the safety and welfare of the community for him to remain within the juvenile justice system." R. 257.
The trial court heard and considered the evidence before it and determined that the presumption of waiver had not been overcome. The trial court's discussion demonstrates that the court's findings were sufficiently clear and specific. Further, the "supporting facts must appear either in the order or in the record of the waiver hearing." Daniel v. State, 582 N.E.2d 364, 368 (Ind.1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 838, 113 S.Ct. 116, 121 L.Ed.2d 72 (1992).
This case is similar to the situation in Daniel ( that waiver was appropriate and ample facts existed that it would not be in the best interests of the community to retain the defendant in the juvenile system where defendant shot a high school band director, hit him with a hammer, and burglarized the school), where "the viciousness of appellant's attack, the lack of justification for it, the seriousness of its results, and the relatively mature age, 17, of the juvenile"...
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