Moore v. State
Decision Date | 22 December 1915 |
Docket Number | (No. 2315.) |
Citation | 181 S.W. 438 |
Parties | MOORE v. STATE. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Proceedings by the State against Mrs. J. F. Moore and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals certifies to the Supreme Court whether the defendant named was subject to an injunction. Question answered affirmatively.
Slay, Simon & Wynn, of Ft. Worth, for appellant. John W. Baskin, of Ft. Worth, for the State.
The certificate of the honorable Court of Civil Appeals, with the question submitted, is as follows:
The action appears to have been brought by the county attorney under articles 4689 and 4690 of the Revised Statutes of 1911, which read:
These articles are from the act of 1907, (Acts 1907, p. 246).
The present criminal statute in relation to the keeping of bawdyhouses (article 500 of the Penal Code, as amended by the same act) reads:
"Any person who shall, directly or as agent for another, or through any agent, keep or be concerned in keeping, or aid or assist or abet in keeping, a bawdyhouse or a disorderly house, in any house, building, edifice or tenement, or shall knowingly permit the keeping of a bawdyhouse or a disorderly house in any house, building, edifice or tenement owned, leased, occupied or controlled by him, directly as agent for another, or through any agent, shall be deemed guilty of keeping, or being concerned in keeping, or knowingly permitted to be kept, as the case may be, a bawdyhouse or a disorderly house, as the case may be, and, on conviction, shall be punished by a fine of two hundred dollars, and by confinement in the county jail for twenty days for each day he shall keep, be concerned in keeping or knowingly permit to be kept, such bawdy or disorderly house."
In answering certified question our practice is to confine ourselves to the statement of the case as contained in the certificate of the Court of Civil Appeals, since it must be assumed that it embodies the essential facts upon which the certified question is predicated. We customarily decline to look to the statement of facts, if it accompanies the certificate; and we shall therefore determine the present question simply upon the facts recited in the certificate.
As to the defendant Blackmon, under the statement of the Court of Civil Appeals that the evidence adduced upon the hearing was sufficient to warrant the conclusion that, as the agent of the owner of the premises, he knowingly permitted the house to be used for the unlawful purpose, we think there can be no question as to the injunction having been properly issued. Penal Code, art. 500, attaches criminal liability to any one who shall, "as agent for another," keep or knowingly permit the keeping of a bawdyhouse in any house leased or controlled by him. The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that knowingly permitting the keeping of such a house is simply a method of committing the offense of "keeping," and is not in itself a distinct offense. Willis v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 148, 29 S. W. 787; Schulze v. State (Cr. App.) 56 S. W. 918. Under this ruling, the evidence in relation to Blackmon would have made him subject to criminal prosecution for keeping a disorderly house by knowingly permitting it to be kept for that purpose. From the nature of the act of 1907, which comprises the articles we have quoted, it inevitably follows that any one subject to prosecution for keeping a bawdyhouse, under the Penal Code, is subject to an injunction, under article 4689, for the purpose of restraining such unlawful use of premises. It is hardly logical to conclude that this statute, enacted in aid of the criminal law, is narrower in its operation than the criminal statute, and is without application to one amenable to the criminal law on the same subject.
Whether the injunction rightfully issued against the defendant owner of the premises, who, prior to the institution of the suit, appears to have had no knowledge that they were being used for the wrongful purpose, presents a more difficult question; but, after a careful consideration, in the light of general principles and the statute, we are convinced that she was, at least, a proper party to the proceeding, and the issuance of an injunction running against her, as well, was therefore not unauthorized. If this had been a criminal prosecution against the owner, knowledge on her part of the unlawful use of the premises would clearly have been essential to justify conviction. But the proceeding was not of that nature. It was a civil suit for the suppression of a public nuisance by means of a civil remedy. The object of the statute would be defeated if the elements necessary to constitute the criminal offense must exist in order for it to apply. Its purpose was a broad one, and it should be given a construction which is consonant with that purpose.
At this place it is well to recur to the holding in Marsan v. French, 61 Tex. 173, 48 Am. Rep. 272, the opinion having been rendered by Judge Stayton, a case wherein damages were sought against an owner of premises which it was charged he permitted to be used for the purposes of prostitution to the injury of the plaintiff, whose home was adjacent, and in which by the charge of the court a recovery for the plaintiff was authorized only upon its being proved to the satisfaction of the jury that the defendant not only let the premises to prostitutes knowing them to be such at the time, but that he rented them to such persons for such use, etc. In commenting upon the charge, it was said:
It is the "use" of premises for the unlawful purpose named, habitual, actual, threatened, or contemplated, at which article 4689 is leveled. It is such "use" which it is designed to prevent by the civil remedy which it supplies. It is altogether an impersonal statute. It is not a statute in relation to parties to suits, and does not attempt to prescribe who shall constitute the parties defendant...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Gregg v. People
...159 N.W. 560; People v. Smith, 275 Ill. 256, 114 N.E. 31, L.R.A. 1917B, 1075; State v. Humphrey, 94 Wash. 599, 162 P. 983; Moore v. State, 107 Tex. 490, 181 S.W. 438. 11. is claimed the evidence is insufficient to warrant the conclusion that defendant knowingly permitted the keeping of the ......
-
State ex rel. Bailes v. Guardian Realty Co.
... ... to abate a nuisance which the owner had created, or suffered ... to be created ... This ... duty and obligation on the part of the owner spring from the ... maxim, "So use your property as not to injure the rights ... of another." ... In the ... case of Moore et al. v. State of Texas, 107 Tex ... 490, 181 S.W. 438, which involved the question of whether it ... was necessary to show, in a proceeding for injunction against ... the owner to abate a public nuisance, that the owner knew, or ... had notice of, the unlawful use of his premises by her ... ...
-
Hetrick v. State, 4489.
...Notes, 19 A.L.R. 1441; Trueheart v. Parker (Tex. Civ.App.) 257 S.W. 640; Thurman v. State (Tex.Civ.App.) 67 S.W.(2d) 382; Moore v. State, 107 Tex. 490, 181 S.W. 438. It is finally contended that the evidence does not support the jury's finding in that "all the testimony in this record has t......
-
George W. Armstrong Co. v. Adair
...It must be presumed that such statement ordinarily embodies the essential facts upon which the questions are predicated. Moore v. State, 107 Tex. 490, 493, 181 S. W. 438. We do not mean to intimate that our conclusions would have been different if we had considered the entire Plaintiff did ......