Moore v. State
| Decision Date | 12 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2015–CA–00357–COA.,2015–CA–00357–COA. |
| Citation | 203 So.3d 775 |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Jamar Amin MOORE a/k/a Jamar Moore, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee. |
Richard Brooks Lewis Jr., attorney for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Wilson Douglas Minor, attorney for appellee.
Before IRVING, P.J., FAIR and WILSON, JJ.
WILSON, J., for the Court:
¶ 1. Jamar Moore was convicted of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, a felony, and sentenced to sixteen years' imprisonment, but he was later released on a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR). His PCR motion, which the State did not oppose, was based on a chemical analysis by the State Crime Laboratory that showed that the pills Moore was convicted of possessing were not a Schedule II controlled substance—they were a Schedule III controlled substance, possession of which is punishable only as a misdemeanor. The circuit court granted Moore's PCR motion, he was released from prison, and the State nolle prossed his indictment.
¶ 2. Moore then brought this civil action under state statutes authorizing compensation for persons wrongfully convicted of felonies. He seeks compensation for the two years and 235 days he was incarcerated. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State based on a statutory requirement that the claimant show that his conviction was vacated "[o]n grounds not inconsistent with innocence." Miss.Code Ann. § 11–44–3(1)(b) (Rev.2012). The circuit court reasoned that Moore was not innocent—he was just convicted of the wrong crime. We conclude, however, that the statutory provision refers to innocence of all felonies for which the claimant has been indicted, convicted, and incarcerated. There is no dispute that Moore's conduct did not constitute a felony. Nor is there any dispute that the State nolle prossed Moore's indictment, which satisfies section 11–44–3(1)(c)'s separate requirement of a favorable outcome on the underlying indictment. We therefore reverse and render on the issue of liability. We remand the case for a determination of the amount of compensation Moore is entitled to receive.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 3. Moore delivered pizzas for Domino's Pizza in Clarksdale. Unbeknownst to Moore, one of his coworkers was also a confidential informant (CI) for the Clarksdale Police Department. On a day that the CI and Moore were both working, the CI told the police that Moore had two ounces of marijuana in his car. Moore picked up a large order of pizzas from the store and was on his way to deliver them when he was stopped for failing to signal a turn. The officer who approached his car "noticed a strong odor of marijuana emanating from it," so he searched the car and Moore's person. No drugs were found in the car, but Moore had two sandwich bags of marijuana and eleven pills in his pants. Moore was released without arrest after agreeing to "work off his charges" as a CI, but he "did not adequately assist law enforcement as a CI," so he was prosecuted. The grand jury indicted him for possession of hydrocodone, a Schedule II controlled substance, and possession of marijuana.
¶ 4. At trial, Moore testified that his coworker, who was in the process of "working off" his own marijuana possession charge at the time, set him up. Moore believed that his coworker planted the marijuana in his car while loading the pizzas that Moore was to deliver. Moore said that when the police pulled him over, he opened his glove compartment to get his insurance card and was surprised to find marijuana there. He quickly put the drugs in his pants to hide them from the police. He admitted the pills were his. He testified that he took them for a back injury, although he did not have a prescription and obtained them from "various places, people." The jury convicted Moore of possession of hydrocodone, a Schedule II controlled substance, but acquitted him of possession of marijuana.
¶ 5. Moore was sentenced as a habitual offender to serve sixteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections without the possibility of parole or probation. Miss.Code Ann. §§ 41–29–139(c)(1)(C) (Rev.2013) & 99–19–81 (Rev.2015). This Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on appeal. Moore v. State, 64 So.3d 542 (Miss.Ct.App.2011).
¶ 6. Moore subsequently discovered a Mississippi Crime Laboratory report showing that his pills were actually a Schedule III preparation of hydrocodone and acetaminophen, not Schedule II hydrocodone.1 Possession of eleven dosage units of the Schedule III substance is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment of not more than one year. See Miss.Code Ann. § 41–29–139(c)(3)(A) (Rev.2013). The State had produced the crime lab report in discovery, but its significance apparently was overlooked, and it was not introduced at trial. Upon discovering the report, Moore filed a PCR motion. By the time he did so, he had already served more than two and a half years of his sentence. In his motion, Moore expressly admitted that he committed the misdemeanor offense of possession of a Schedule III substance, and he moved to amend his judgment of conviction to show conviction of a misdemeanor, to be resentenced for that offense, and to be released immediately. The State did not oppose Moore's PCR motion, and the circuit court granted the motion, vacated the conviction, and ordered Moore's immediate release. When he was released, Moore had served two years and 235 days in prison. Rather than pursuing a misdemeanor charge, the State moved to nolle pros Moore's indictment for possession of hydrocodone. The circuit court granted the State's motion and adjudged the indictment nolle prossed.
¶ 7. After he was released from prison, Moore filed a civil complaint under the provisions of chapter 44 of title 11 of the Mississippi Code Annotated, which provides compensation for persons wrongfully convicted. The State answered by denying that Moore was entitled to compensation, and the parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court denied Moore's motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the State. The court reasoned that because Moore admitted that he was guilty of misdemeanor possession of a Schedule III controlled substance, he could not show that his conviction was vacated on grounds consistent with innocence, as required by Mississippi Code Annotated section 11–44–3(1)(b)(ii). As the court put it, Moore was "guilty of a controlled substance crime," but he "was convicted of the wrong controlled substance crime." Moore timely filed a notice of appeal.
ANALYSIS
¶ 8. There are no genuine issues of material fact in this case. The only issue is one of statutory interpretation, so our standard of review is de novo. Wallace v. Town of Raleigh, 815 So.2d 1203, 1206 (¶ 7) (Miss.2002). Our focus is Mississippi Code Annotated section 11–44–3 (Rev.2012), which provides, in relevant part, that in order to state an "actionable claim" for a wrongful conviction, and thereby survive summary dismissal:
There is no dispute that Moore was convicted of a felony, that he served part of his sentence, that his conviction was vacated, and that the indictment was nolle prossed. The only dispute is whether his conviction was vacated "[o]n grounds not inconsistent with innocence." We will return to this issue shortly.
¶ 9. A related provision, Mississippi Code Annotated section 11–44–7 (Rev.2012), provides in relevant part that in order to obtain a judgment and compensation for a wrongful conviction:
There is no dispute that Moore satisfies the provisions of this section: he was convicted of a felony, he served more than two years of his sentence, his conviction was vacated, the indictment was nolle prossed, and the conduct for which he was sentenced constituted a misdemeanor, not a felony. The State does not address and effectively concedes these points; however, the State argues that whether Moore satisfies section 11–44–7 is "irrelevant" because he fails to state an "actionable" claim under section 11–44–3.
¶ 10. "The function of the Court is not to decide what a statute should provide, but to determine what it does provide." Lawson v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 75 So.3d 1024, 1027 (¶ 7) (Miss.2011) (emphasis added). "It is elementary that in applying a statute, this Court will look...
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