Moore v. State

• Decision Date: 17 May 2021
• Docket Number: S21A0220, S21A0221
• Citation: 858 S.E.2d 676,311 Ga. 506
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: MOORE v. The STATE. Milbourne v. The State.

311 Ga. 506

858 S.E.2d 676

MOORE

v.The STATE.

Milbourne

v.The State.

S21A0220, S21A0221

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: May 17, 2021

Sydney Rene Strickland, Strickland Webster, LLC, 803 Glenwood Ave SE, Suite 510-203, Atlanta, Georgia 30316, for Appellant in S21A0220.

Jennifer Snyder Adams, The Snyder Adams Law Firm, 301 Washington Avenue, Marietta, Georgia 30060, Rebekah Reagan Shelnutt, Shelnutt Law Firm, 220 Jeanette Street, Canton, Georgia 30114, for Appellant in S21A0221.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Kathleen Leona McCanless, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334, Joyette Marie Holmes, District Attorney, Linda Jeanne Dunikoski, A.D.A., D. Victor Reynolds, Cobb County District Attorney's Office, 70 Haynes Street, Marietta, Georgia 30090-9602, for Appellee.

Boggs, Justice.

Simeon Gashon Moore and Walter Vernell Milbourne challenge their 2016 convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting of Jamie Milton and the shooting death of Milton's girlfriend, Jamie Moore ("Jamie"). Moore contends that the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to show that he shared responsibility for Jamie's death and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest. Milbourne contends that the trial court violated the continuing witness rule by sending a PowerPoint presentation created by the lead detective that summarized the admitted cell phone evidence out with the jury during deliberations and erred in granting a request by the media to film closing arguments over his objection. Milbourne also contends that his motion for new trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. For the reasons that follow, we affirm both cases.¹

1. On the afternoon of November 12, 2014, Kevin Robinson arranged to meet Milton to buy a quarter-pound of marijuana with money supplied by Milbourne. Milbourne's best friend, Moore, drove Milbourne and Robinson to the meeting in a red Toyota Camry with after-market rims and a paper license tag. They parked at a gas station across the street from the fast-food restaurant where the drug buy was to take place. Milton was already parked at the restaurant in a blue Buick LeSabre, and Robinson walked across the street and got into the front passenger seat of the LeSabre. The transaction fell through, however, and Robinson got out of the LeSabre, walked back across the street, and got into the Camry with Moore and Milbourne. Robinson left one of his cell phones in the LeSabre.

Milton drove to the nearby apartment complex where he and Jamie were living temporarily with friends in Apartment 1707. Milton backed into a parking space by the 1800 building, and as he got out of the car, he noticed Robinson's cell phone on the seat. Milton picked up Robinson's cell phone, threw it somewhere, and went upstairs to Apartment 1707, where Jamie was cooking and talking on the phone.

Moore drove Milbourne and Robinson to Milton's apartment complex, where they located the LeSabre and parked near it. They did not know where Milton lived, so Milbourne and Robinson started knocking on doors, asking if "a guy with dreads" lived there. When they got to Apartment 1707, Milton was in the bathroom, and Jamie spoke to Milbourne and Robinson through the door. A few minutes later, Milbourne and Robinson returned to Apartment 1707 and knocked again. This time, Milton opened the door, and Robinson asked if he could look in the LeSabre for his cell phone. Milton grabbed the car keys, closed the door behind him, and walked downstairs with Milbourne and Robinson.

Milton sat in the driver's seat of the LeSabre, and Robinson got into the front passenger seat and began looking for his cell phone. When Milton put the key in the ignition, Moore and Milbourne approached the LeSabre with guns drawn, and Milbourne demanded to know where Milton's marijuana and money were. Milton replied, "I don't know. I ain't got it ...." Milbourne said that he was "fixing to go upstairs and get that b**ch," referring to Jamie, and ran back up the stairs, telling Moore to keep his gun on Milton, which Moore did as Robinson ran up the stairs after Milbourne. Seconds later, Milton opened the driver-side door of the LeSabre, and Moore opened fire into the car but only grazed Milton, who lay still across the front seat and played dead.

Meanwhile, up in Apartment 1707, Milbourne fought with Jamie, threatened her, and shot her in the head, killing her. Milbourne took marijuana, money, and clothing from the apartment and brought them downstairs to the Camry. When Milbourne saw Milton peeking over the dashboard of the LeSabre, he fired through the windshield at Milton but missed. Moore, Milbourne, and Robinson then got into the Camry, and Milton scrambled out the passenger-side door of the LeSabre. As Moore sped off, Milton ran to the leasing office, where a leasing consultant called 911, and Milton provided a description of the Camry and of Moore, Milbourne, and Robinson.

Within minutes, police officers driving toward the apartment complex spotted the Camry, and Moore led them on a high-speed chase over the Interstate and surface streets, which ended when the Camry hit a van and flipped over. Moore, Milbourne, and Robinson fled on foot but were quickly apprehended. Milbourne threw multiple baggies of marijuana on the ground as he ran from the police; he had more than $1,000 in cash on his person when he was taken into custody. When the police caught up to Robinson, he pulled a bag of marijuana out of his pocket. The gun that Moore used to shoot at Milton was recovered at the crash site, along with the clothing that Milbourne took from the apartment.

Case No. S21A0220

2. Moore contends that the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to prove that he shared responsibility for Jamie's death.

When we consider the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of federal due process, our review is limited to whether the trial evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, is sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

Frazier v. State , 308 Ga. 450, 452, 841 S.E.2d 692 (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). We put aside any questions about conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight of the evidence, leaving the resolution of such matters to the discretion of the jury. See id. at 452-453, 841 S.E.2d 692.

At trial, Moore's defense strategy was to concede that he drove Milbourne and Robinson to meet Milton to buy a quarter-pound of marijuana and to Milton's apartment complex afterward, and that he committed felony fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer after Jamie was shot, but to deny any responsibility for her death on the theory that he did not shoot her and never entered the apartment where she was killed. But to convict Moore of murdering Jamie, "the State was not required to prove that he personally fired the shot that killed [her], only that [he] was a party to the crime[ ], meaning that he intentionally aided or abetted in the commission of the crime[ ]," Frazer , 308 Ga. at 453, 841 S.E.2d 692, or that he conspired with Milbourne to rob drug dealer Milton at gunpoint and Jamie's death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the scheme, see McLeod v. State , 297 Ga. 99, 102-103, 772 S.E.2d 641 (2015). See also OCGA § 16-2-20 (b) (defining ‘‘parties to a crime’’); State v. Jackson , 287 Ga. 646, 652-653, 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010) (noting "the dangerous and violent nature of armed robbery and drug dealing"); Everritt v. State , 277 Ga. 457, 459-460, 588 S.E.2d 691 (2003) (discussing legal responsibility of a criminal defendant for "natural and probable " or "reasonably foreseeable" collateral acts of a co-conspirator (emphasis in original)).

The evidence presented at trial, when properly viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, showed that Milbourne and Moore simultaneously approached Milton with guns drawn when Milton put the key in the ignition of the LeSabre, and Milbourne demanded to know where Milton's marijuana and money were. When Milton refused to cooperate, Milbourne announced that he was "fixing to go upstairs and get that b**ch," referring to Jamie. At Milbourne's direction, Moore held Milton at gunpoint in the parking lot as Milbourne ran up the stairs. When Milton opened the driver-side door of the LeSabre to get away, Moore opened fire into the car, grazing Milton. Milbourne, after shooting Jamie, brought marijuana, money, and clothing downstairs from the apartment, put them in the Camry, and shot at Milton through the windshield of the LeSabre. Moore then got into the Camry with Milbourne and Robinson and sped off, leading the police on a dangerous high-speed chase over the Interstate and surface streets that ended only when the Camry hit a van and flipped over.

A rational jury could infer from Moore's actions before, during, and after the shooting of Jamie that Moore shared a common criminal intent with Milbourne. See Frazier , 308 Ga. at 453, 841 S.E.2d 692 (" ‘While mere presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient evidence to convict one of being a party to a crime, criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship, and conduct before, during, and after the offense.’ " (citation omitted)). A rational jury also could infer from this evidence that Milbourne and Moore conspired to rob Milton at gunpoint and that the murder of Jamie (or anyone else standing in the way of the armed robbery) was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy. See Hicks v. State , 295 Ga. 268, 273-274, 759 S.E.2d 509 (2014). Accordingly, the evidence...