Moore v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd.
| Decision Date | 30 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NUMBER: 65-15556 SECTION: "B"(1) |
| Parties | M. C. MOORE, ET AL v. TANGIPAHOA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
When this case began in 1965, race-based separation of students, teachers and facilities was the result of a de jure system of racial segregation. The groundbreaking unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), and its progeny supplied the framework for rooting out racial isolation and the accompanying pernicious effects it has on children, parents, educators, and the at-large society.
The significant and sensitive issues in the pending motion for provisional unitary status, viewed as a proposed modification of existing desegregation decrees, are clearly and adequately addressed by movants and opponents. Rec. Doc. 1630.
We proceed and join in remembrance with Circuit Judge Carl Stewart's cautionary observations in a concurring opinion in Anderson v. Sch. Bd. of Madison Cty., 517 F.3d 292, 305 (5th Cir. 2008).
While the record [as here] provides a detailed account of the many obstacles that prevent the existence of fully integrated schools—such as the confluence of the geography and demography in the district—the cruel irony is that racial isolation, albeit not as the product of de jure segregation, largely remains as foreboding and potentially deleterious as it was when federal court supervision began. Of course, this case is only the latest indication that despite the societal progress that has been made in dismantling systems of segregation, many of the concerns highlighted in Brown still remain as viable today as when that opinion was first authored.
Id. at 306 (emphasis added)
The ultimate inquiry in determining whether a school district is unitary is whether (1) the school district has complied in good faith with desegregation orders for a reasonable amount of time, and (2) the school district has eliminated the vestiges of prior de jure segregation to the extent practicable. Hull v. Quitman County Bd. of Educ., 1 F.3d 1450, 1454 (5th Cir.1993); see alsoFreeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 492, 498, 112 S.Ct. 1430 (1992). This standard applies in assessing whether the school district is unitary in the remaining areas relative to employment practices, student assignment, and facilities. Unitary status was previously declared in other areas.
In evaluating unitary status, "a court should give particular attention to the school system's record of compliance." The record of good faith compliance must be "consistent". See Fletcher v. Miss., et al, CA#16-60722 (5th Cir. 02/06/2018). For at least three years, the district court should retain jurisdiction and require the school board to file reports with the court. The court then must hold a hearing to consider whether the district should be considered unitary; plaintiffs must receive notice of the hearing and an opportunity to show why the system is not unitary and why continued judicial supervision is necessary. Only after these procedures are followed may a district court be sufficiently certain that a school system is unitary and dismiss the case. SeeMonteilh v. St. Landry Par. Sch. Bd., 848 F.2d 625, 629 (5th Cir. 1988). It must be emphasized that a provisional declaration of unitary status will neither vacate prior decrees nor dismiss this action. It would set forth modifications that credit current successes arising from relevant good faith actions of parties over a reasonable period of time. Moreover, additional circumstances as discussed infra must be weighed in determining present and future conditions within the Tangipahoa Parish School System ("TPSS").
In Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491-492, 498 (1992), the Supreme Court stated: "Among the factors which must inform the sound discretion of the court . . . are the following: whether there has been full and satisfactory compliance with the decree in those aspects of the system where supervision is to be withdrawn; whether retention of judicial control is necessary or practicable to achieve compliance with the decree in other facets of the school system; and whether the school district has demonstrated, to the public and to theparents and students of the once disfavored race, its good-faith commitment to the whole of the court's decree and to those provisions of the law and the Constitution that were the predicate for judicial intervention in the first instance."
Federal courts have broad equitable powers to fashion remedial measures designed to eliminate school segregation. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 279-80, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977). The district court may "adjust remedies in a feasible and practical way to eliminate the conditions or redress the injuries caused by unlawful action." Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 487, 112 S.Ct. 1430, 118 L.Ed.2d 108 (1992). If injunctive relief is "to be enforced with fairness and precision," it must be flexible. Id.
Accordingly, "sound judicial discretion may call for the modification of the terms of an injunctive decree if the circumstances, whether of law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance have changed, or new ones have since arisen." Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler,427 U.S. 424, 437, 96 S.Ct. 2697, 49 L.Ed.2d 599 (1976). A school district, though, is "entitled to a rather precise statement of its obligations under a desegregation decree." Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 246, 111 S.Ct. 630, 112 L.Ed.2d 715 (1991); Moore v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 864 F.3d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 2017).
First, consent decrees are contractual in nature, so parties may fairly expect such orders to be enforced as both a contract and a judicial decree. Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437, 124 S.Ct. 899, 157 L.Ed.2d 855 (2004). As a judicial decree, such injunctions are "subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees," including modification. See id. 540 U.S. at 441. Further, individuals and entities subject to injunctions must have fair notice of the terms of the injunction and any modifications that take place. See W. Water Mgmt., Inc. v. Brown, 40 F.3d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1994); Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Harris, 617 F.2d 385, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1980). Upon proper notice, thedistrict court may modify the terms of an injunction sua sponte. W. Water Mgmt., 40 F.3d at 109.
Litigation Counsel for plaintiffs filed on December 5, 2019 an opposition memorandum which concluded at page 8 that "The motion for unitary status and approval of the proposed settlement agreement (found at Rec. Doc. 1581 - filed on Sept. 26, 2019) should be dismissed without prejudice, subject to re-submission after addressing the concerns expressed by the court at the November 20, 2019 hearing." Rec. Doc. 1609 (Emphasis added)
The court's primary concerns during the November 2019 hearing expressly dealt with the need for additional information showing how the proposed settlement and modification of existing decrees impacted a determination of unitary status. See Rec. Docs. 1606 and 1612 (Transcript). Thereafter, a revision to the original settlement and proposed modification was filed by all parties' Settlement Counsel. See Rec. Doc. 1615, including memorandum and exhibits. Litigation Counsel for plaintiffs filed an opposition to the re-submitted plan,Rec. Doc. 1619, reciting among other things the long history of this case and how it came to the forefront once again when this court granted relief on an employment matter in March 2008. See Rec. Doc. 661 (In re Coach Foster). That 2008 matter effectively revitalized an intermittent monitoring process in all areas. Since then and to establish better pathways to unitary status, the undersigned conducted a series of conferences, hearings, issued various orders, injunctions, plan modifications, and conducted on-site visits to various schools within the noted system. At all stages, we have been ably assisted and/or received involvement by all parties' counsel, leading community members and civic groups, school officials, staff, the Chief Desegregation Implementation Officer ("CDIO") and Court Compliance Officer ("CCO") - all of whom presented, inter alia, perspectives from relevant constituents or stakeholders, e.g. parents, educators, students, administrators, residents, various organizations, etc.
Subsequently, a hearing was held on the latter proposal on February 11, 2020. See Rec. Docs. 1626 and 1627 (Transcript). While indicating provisional approval of the modified proposal at that hearing and to further clarify certain aspects of the modification, we gave parties further opportunity to address certain aspects of the proposal. Implicit again in our consideration is having a plan that could better maintain and promote unitary status, along with consideration of the existing plans and orders found at Record Documents 866-876 and others.
Thereafter on March 23, 2020 Settlement Counsel for all parties filed the instant motion to declare provisional unitary status, suspend existing injunctions and orders, and acknowledge and approve final settlement. See Rec. Doc. 1630 and related exhibits. A hearing was held on July 30, 2020. After hearing from all parties' counsel, parties were given further opportunity to file additional information/data and motions on remaining disputed issues. Rec. Doc. 1638.
On August 18, 2020 Litigation Counsel moved to conduct discovery relevant to the recently submitted documents and inquiries made by the court concerning academic performance of black students. Rec. Doc. 1642. That motion was granted on September 3, 2020 to allow movant focused discovery via Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 31.1 That same procedure was previously used in a similar request by Litigation Counsel for plaintiffs on related issues in preparation for the earlier-mentioned November 2019 hearing. See Rec. Docs. 1599 and 1648.
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