Moore v. Town Council of Edgefield

• Decision Date: 01 August 1887
• Citation: 32 F. 498
• Parties: MOORE and another v. TOWN COUNCIL OF EDGEFIELD.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

32 F. 498

MOORE and another v. TOWN COUNCIL OF EDGEFIELD.

United States Circuit Court, D. South Carolina.

August, 1887

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Under the act of congress (March 4, 1887) the circuit court of the United States had not jurisdiction in a controversy between citizens of different states, if the sum or value of the matter in dispute does not exceed $2,000, excluding from the computation any interest which may have accrued up to the date of suit.

In an application for a mandamus for the levy of a tax to pay a judgment, it is competent to show that the judgment was obtained coram non judice.

R. W Shoud, for plaintiffs.

Ernest F. Gary, for defendant.

SIMONTON J.

On the rule-day, in May, 1887, the plaintiff obtained judgment be default against the town of Edgefield in the sum of $2,105 and costs; the cause of action consisting of certain bonds and coupons issued by defendant. Judgment was entered for the principal of the bonds, and the coupons with interest on them, in detail as follows:

Principal of bonds past due	$1,440 00
Coupons for 3 1/2 years, ...........................	436 80
	---------
	$1,876 80
Interest on such principal and on the coupons, ..	228 95
	---------
	$2,105 75

The execution issued upon this judgment having been returned nulla bona, application was made for a rule to show cause why a mandamus should not issue to the town council of Edgefield requiring the levy of a special tax to pay this judgment. The return to this rule sets out several grounds for refusing the mandamus. It is necessary to consider but one of these. The respondent contends that the subject-matter of the suit on which judgment was had was not within the jurisdiction of this court, and that the judgment is void. The act of congress (March 4, 1887) limits the jurisdiction of this court in controversies between citizens of different states of cases 'in which the matter to dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $2,000.' 120 U.S. 786. This suit began March 9, 1887. On that day the matter in dispute, 'that is to say, the amount claimed by the plaintiffs in their complaint,' (Kanouse v. Martin, 15 How. 207,) consisted of past-due bonds, past-due coupons, and interest on the bonds and coupons. The aggregate of bonds, coupons, and interest exceeds $2,000. If the interest be excluded the result will be less than $2,000. Do the words of the act exclude the interest which had accrued up to the date of the action, or do they refer only to the interest which may accrue between the date of the action and the rendition of verdict or allowance of judgment? The relator with great force presses the latter construction. The act, he says, excludes costs also; 'the matter in dispute, exclusive of interest and costs. ' As costs do not accrue until after suit brought, he contends that the word 'interest,' put into the same sentence and category with the word 'costs,' must mean the interest which, like the costs, accrues after suit brought. This is the first case in this court upon this act. Although the act bears on its face marks of great haste and of an unusual want of care in its passage, and is in some particulars obscure, its purpose is clear to abridge the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States. Before its passage the limit of the jurisdiction was a minimum ascertained on the whole amount claimed, excluding costs. This act ascertains the minimum by excluding from the amount claimed interest as well as costs. The decisions of the supreme court had already decided that accruing interest as well as costs do not enter into the computation in determining the limit of its jurisdiction. The language is the same, 'when the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds $5,000. ' Here neither interest on the judgments nor costs of suit can enter into the computation. Telegraph Co. v. Rogers, 93 U.S. 566; Troy v. Evans, 97 U.S. 1. By analogy of reasoning, when a matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, did not exceed $500, the accrual of interest of the suit brought could not have created jurisdiction in the circuit court under the law as it stood before the act was passed. It would seem, therefore, that congress, when the word 'interest' was inserted, intended something more than to declare the law. The matter in dispute in the present case consists of three elements,-- the past-due bonds, coupons representing past-due interest, and the interest accrued on past-due bonds and coupons. The act of 1887 does not say that the matter in dispute must exceed $2,000, but that the matter in dispute, exclusive of interest, must exceed, etc.; that is to say, the interest must be excluded from the matter in dispute, and the result must exceed $2,000, else the court will not have jurisdiction.

Again the jurisdiction of the court depends upon and is determined by the condition of things existing on the day action is brought. If the jurisdiction depends upon citizenship, and on the day suit is brought the parties to the controversy are citizens of different states, the court will have and will retain jurisdiction, notwithstanding that afterwards they may become citizens of the same state. Conolly v. Taylor, 2 Pet. 556; Dunn v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 1. A petition for removal on a similar ground will not...