Mooreland v. Young, 4469
| Decision Date | 05 March 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 4469,4469 |
| Citation | 197 Va. 771,91 S.E.2d 438 |
| Parties | WILLIAM T. MOORELAND, ET AL. v. JOSEPH S. YOUNG. Record |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Hardee Chambliss, Jr., for the appellants.
Livingston, McCandlish & Prichard, for the appellee.
William T. Mooreland, Herbert F. Schumann, Jr., the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, and the County Board of Zoning Appeals, appellants, complain of a decree entered in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County reversing a decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals which construed paragraphs 9 and 10 of section IV-A of the zoning ordinance. The effect of the decree was to permit the uses and activities sought by Joseph S. Young, appellee, as contained in his petition.
Appellants say that no factual question is involved. They contend that the question is one of statutory construction which they phrase as follows:
'Where the undisputed evidence shows that a landowner whose property of 97 acres is admittedly subject to the * * * zoning ordinance * * *, proposes to establish on said tract, and for the purpose of making a profit, a private club with a minimum of 100 paying members, where games and sports and related activities will be pursued -- then, is this a use which falls within the following expressly permitted uses in such a zone:
The proceedings developed as follows: Joseph S. Young addressed a petition to the Board of Zoning Appeals stating that he was the owner of 97.75 acres of land, and requested an interpretation of section IV-A, paragraphs 9 and 10 of the zoning ordinance to permit the erection of two bath houses and one recreation hall.
The application was heard by the Board. The minutes of the meeting reflect the scope of the facts presented at the hearing and a summary of these facts was embraced in a 'return' of the Board as follows: 'The applicant proposes to establish a club for the operation of a recreational area, which would include swimming (with accessory bath houses), horseshoe pitching, badminton and related activities.'
After the hearing the Board ruled that 'in the light of the arguments and facts presented' the application did not fall within the permitted uses set out under paragraphs 9 and 10 of section IV-A of the ordinance.
From this ruling Young filed a petition for appeal to the Circuit Court under the provisions of § 15-850, Virginia Code, 1950.
Pursuant to the order allowing the appeal, the Board filed its 'return' in which it stated:
'In view of the facts presented * * * it was the Board's opinion that the use to which the petitioner intended to put his property was quasi commercial in character; that paragraphs 9 and 10 of section IV-A should not be construed to permit the type of use which the petitioner proposed; and that this interpretation of those paragraphs finds support in other provisions of the Ordinance, notably paragraph 15-c of section IV-A * * *. The Board considered that the provisions of paragraph 15-c of section IV-A were particularly significant; that this paragraph would seem to apply to the use which petitioner proposed; and that even under this provision of the ordinance, the Board could only grant an application where the 'use is not primarily for gain."
In the 'return' the Board indicated that it might permit an exception to the restrictive provisions of section 15-c upon Young agreeing to certain conditions contained in section XII-F-2, paragraphs a, b, and c, which are not here pertinent, as Young insisted that the use to which he proposed to put his property clearly came within paragraphs 9 and 10 of section IV-A under which no permit is required.
The trial court, by its decree, reversed the findings of the Board and ruled that Young could use his property for the purposes enumerated. The court further held that it was 'immaterial under said paragraphs 9 and 10 whether the uses to which petitioner intends to put his property as set forth in his petition are for gain.'
The decree of the trial court further provided that Young need not obtain the special use permit contemplated by paragraph 15-c of section IV-A which requires a special use permit for 'clubs and grounds for games or sports, provided any such use is not primarily for gain.'
Many definitions were urged in oral argument and in the briefs submitted, construing such words as 'private', 'public', ...
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Town of Los Altos Hills v. Adobe Creek Properties, Inc.
...only such use is not primarily for gain' only applied to spectator sports and not to the proposed development. (Mooreland v. Young (1956) 197 Va. 771, 91 S.E.2d 438.) The facts in this case demonstrate that there is a rational relationship in excluding commercial recreational areas, while p......
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Board of Sup'rs of Fairfax County v. DeGroff Enterprises, Inc.
...in Fairfax County v. Columbia Pike, Ltd., 213 Va. 437, 192 S.E.2d 778 (1972), we followed our earlier holding in Mooreland v. Young, 197 Va. 771, 91 S.E.2d 438 (1956), that the zoning enabling act does not authorize the governing body of a county to control compensation for the use of lands......
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Patton v. City of Galax
...usage, the setting in which such words are employed, and the general structure of the ordinance as a whole." Mooreland v. Young, 197 Va. 771, 775, 91 S.E.2d 438, 441 (1956); see also Lawrence Transfer & Storage Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 229 Va. 568, 571, 331 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1985); ......
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McEwan v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax Va.
...and the general structure of the ordinance as a whole." Patton v. City of Galax, 269 Va. 219, 229-30 (2005) (quoting Mooreland v. Young, 197 Va. 771, 775 (1956)). To give a fair and reasonable construction to the Zoning Ordinance, each sentence must be read as having operative meaning. Monu......