Town of Los Altos Hills v. Adobe Creek Properties, Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 May 1973
• Citation: 32 Cal.App.3d 488,108 Cal.Rptr. 271
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: TOWN OF LOS ALTOS HILLS, a municipal corporation, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. ADOBE CREEK PROPERTIES, INC., et al., Defendants and Appellants. David BELLUCCI and Beverly A. Bellucci, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. TOWN OF LOS ALTOS HILLS, a municipal corporation, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 30116.

Page 271

108 Cal.Rptr. 271

32 Cal.App.3d 488

TOWN OF LOS ALTOS HILLS, a municipal corporation, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. ADOBE CREEK PROPERTIES, INC., et al., Defendants and Appellants.

David BELLUCCI and Beverly A. Bellucci, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. TOWN OF LOS ALTOS HILLS, a municipal corporation, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 30116.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

May 18, 1973.

Hearing Denied July 12, 1973.

Anthony A. Lagorio, Los Altos, for appellants.

Johnston, Miller & Giannini, San Jose, for respondent Town of Los Altos Hills.

SIMS, Associate Justice.

David Bellucci and Beverly A. Bellucci, the plaintiffs in an action for declaratory relief against the respondent Town of Los Altos Hills, an incorporated municipality, and the defendants, along with appellant Adobe Creek Properties, Inc., in an action commenced by that city's complaint for injunction, declaratory relief and abatement of zoning violations, have appealed, with their codefendant, from a judgment and decree made and entered following the stipulated consolidation and the trial of the two actions.

In the first action the Belluccis sought (1) a declaration of the proper meaning and construction of the provisions of the defendant city's zoning ordinance which classified their use of their property as a nonconforming use subject to the prohibitions, limitations and conditions of the zoning ordinance; (2) a declaration that the zoning ordinance is unconstitutional and void in its application to their property (a) in that it has no reasonable relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, (b) in that it deprives them of their property without due process of law, (c) in that it is discriminatory, arbitrary and unreasonable, and (d) in that the amortization period which requires that all nonconforming uses shall be permanently discontinued not later than January 27, 1976 is arbitrarily and unreasonably short as applied to them; and (3) a permanent injunction restraining the city and the named members of the city council (as to whom the action was dismissed in the pretrial conference order) from enforcing the ordinance against the plaintiffs insofar as it purports to classify their use of their property as a nonconforming use.

In the second action the city (which also purported to join the State of California as a party plaintiff) sought to enjoin eight designated uses ¹ of the property on the basis of the allegations of the first two causes of action in its complaint, which respectively alleged (1) that such uses are business operations and uses in violation of the city's zoning ordinances, the first of which was passed and adopted on January 28, 1956, and all of which zoned the property for single family residential use and prohibited such uses; and (2) that such uses are changes, enlargements, alterations and expansions of acknowledged nonconforming uses extant when the zoning was established, and as such violated the zoning ordinances. In a third cause of action the city sought an order and decree to abate the prohibited uses as a nuisance; and, in a fourth cause of action, for declaratory relief, it sought a declaration establishing and delineating the uses which predated and those which postdated the enactment of the provisions of the zoning ordinances.

The pretrial order sets forth in detail the contentions of the city, which filed a pretrial statement, and includes, as well as the issues raised by its complaint, its further contention that the amortization period of 20 years for nonconforming uses is adequate, reasonable and constitutional and that the court should declare that the basic nonconforming use of the property for public picnic grounds which was in effect in 1956 must be discontinued on or before January 27, 1956. The Belluccis' several contentions that the zoning is generally unconstitutional were encompassed by the statement that there was an improper classification between profit and nonprofit recreational activities.

Following trial and extensive briefing the court rendered its decision which was served upon the parties. No findings having been requested (Cal.Rules of Court, rule 232(h)) a judgment and decree was signed, filed and entered. The judgment declares: '1. The Zoning Ordinances of the TOWN OF LOS ALTOS HILLS, and without limitation but rather by way of more specific reference, the present Ordinance No. 78, in prohibiting the operation of recreational facilities on a profit-making basis while at the same time permitting the operation of recreational facilities on a non-profit basis pursuant to a Use Permit, in a residential zoning district, do not constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law nor do they deny equal protection of the laws, and the same are valid and constitutional as applied to the real property hereafter described and as applied to the defendants. ( ) 2. The comprehensive zoning plan as set forth in the Zoning Ordinances of the TOWN OF LOS ALTOS HILLS which eliminates virtually all commercial uses of property within the city does not constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws and the same are neither invalid nor unconstitutional as applied to the real property hereafter described and as applied to the defendants.' A third paragraph upholds the amortization provision of the ordinance. A fourth paragraph lists nine uses being conducted on the property. Commercial in nature, which the court found to be nonconforming uses not permitted by the regulations of the zoning ordinances, but permissible as nonconforming uses under the terms of the ordinance. ² A fifth paragraph lists commercial uses which were not in existence at the effective date of the zoning ordinances. ³ The court found that those uses were a prohibited extension of pre-existing nonconforming uses. A sixth paragraph enjoins the appellants from causing, permitting or carrying on the property, the uses set forth in paragraph 5, or any uses, other than those set forth in paragraph 4, which are not permitted by the zoning ordinances. Paragraph seven orders the discontinuance of the uses set forth in paragraph 4 by January 27, 1976.

Although appellants appealed from the whole of the judgment their sole contentions on appeal are (1) that the prohibition of the operation of recreational facilities on a profit making basis, while at the same time permitting the operation of similar facilities on a nonprofit basis, denies due process and equal protection of the laws; and (2) that a system of exclusionary zoning which eliminates all, or virtually all, commercial use of property within a particular city constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws. In the absence of any attack on the other provisions of the judgment, it must be assumed that the court properly determined the scope of the permitted nonconforming uses, and properly upheld the provisions of the ordinance which provided for the discontinuance of such uses on the expiration of the 20-year period. (See National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey (1970) 1 Cal.3d 875, 879, and 882--883, 83 Cal.Rptr. 577, 464 P.2d 33, Sullivan, J. dissenting on the facts, appeal dismissed (1970) 398 U.S. 946, 90 S.Ct. 1869, 26 L.Ed.2d 286; Bohannan v. City of San Diego (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 416, 425--426, 106 Cal.Rptr. 333; City of Los Angeles v. Gage (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 442, 454--461, 274 P.2d 34; 1 Anderson, American Law of Zoning (1968) §§ 6.64--6.70, pp. 445--8A McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed. 1965 rev.) § 25.190, pp. 37--38; and 2 Yokley, Zoning Laws and Practice (3d ed. 1967) § 16--14, p. 282 et seq.)

It is concluded that the zoning ordinances of the city do not deny equal protection of the laws because they eliminate virtually all commercial use of property within the city, and that they do not deny due process of law or equal protection of the laws because they prohibit use for commercial recreational facilities and permit use for nonprofit recreational facilities. The judgment must be affirmed.

The property which is the subject of this litigation was at one time a family estate, consisting of some 90 acres of grounds on which the owners had constructed the original residence, swimming pools, guest houses, and a tennis court. The property had been converted to a commercial public picnic grounds called Adobe Creek Lodge long prior to the city's incorporation and first zoning ordinance. It was improved with an open-air dance pavillion, barbecue pits, picnic tables and a snack bar, and occasionally weddings and other private parties were catered there. It may be concluded that the property was devoted to the uses similar to those which the trial court permitted to continue as nonconforming uses existing at the time of the adoption of the zoning ordinances (see fn. 2 above).

On January 27, 1956 the Town of Los Altos Hills was incorporated as a general law city. It is located in northwest Santa Clara County, southwesterly of the City of Palo Alto and directly west of the Town of Los Altos. The easterly portion is characterized by gently rolling hills. To the west the terrain becomes more precipitous but almost all of it is characterized by natural vegetative cover including many fine oak trees. At the time of incorporation it encompassed 5,325 acres, including on its southerly side the 90 acres owned by plaintiff's predecessor in title. This property fronts on the north on Moody Road which runs along Adobe Creek, and which in 1959 was designated as a collector road in the general circulation plan for the city.

At the time of trial, September 29, 1970, the city's planning director testified that the city embraced eight and one-half square miles, and had a population of approximately 6,800. It is encircled by Palo Alto on almost three sides, northeast, north and west. On the east it is contiguous with Los Altos, and there is some unincorporated area on the east and...