Moores v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Co.
| Decision Date | 14 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 19-cv-02410-KLM |
| Parties | MICHAEL MOORES, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KRISTEN L. MIX
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Determination of Law and Partial Summary Judgment [#28]1 (the "Motion"). Plaintiff filed a Response [#31] in opposition to the Motion [#28], and Defendant filed a Reply [#34]. The Court has reviewed the briefs, the entire case file, and the applicable law, and is sufficiently advised in the premises. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion [#28] is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.2
On February 24, 2017, Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident with non-party Kirsten Vigil ("Vigil"). Def.'s Ex. A, Aug. 8, 2017 Compl. Against Vigil in 2017CV31767 [#28-1] ¶ 4; Def.'s Ex. B, Am. Answer to Compl. Against Vigil [#28-2] ¶ 4. Plaintiff contends Ms. Vigil was at fault. Am. Compl. [#6] ¶ 14. As a result of the accident, Plaintiff claims he suffered injuries. Id. ¶ 13.
At the time of the accident, Ms. Vigil was insured by a liability policy issued by Progressive Insurance ("Progressive") providing liability benefits of $25,000 per person, $50,000 per accident. Def.'s Ex. D, Vigil's Initial Disclosures [#28-4] at 6. Plaintiff also had underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage through Defendant State Farm. Am. Compl. [#6] ¶ 18; Answer [#11] ¶ 7. The relevant policy language for Plaintiff's UIM coverage is as follows:
Def.'s Ex. F, Pl.'s Policy [#28-6] at 20-21 (emphasis in original).
On March 29, 2017, Plaintiff requested policy documents and any applicable rejection forms from Defendant. Pl.'s Ex. 2, Letter from Franklin D. Azar & Associates, P.C. [#31-2]. Defendant's records state that Defendant faxed Plaintiff's "selection/rejection" forms to him on April 4, 2017. Def.'s Ex. J, Claim File [#34-1] at 14 ().
Plaintiff filed suit against Ms. Vigil on August 8, 2017. Def.'s Ex. A [#28-1] at 1. Instead of proceeding to trial, Plaintiff settled his lawsuit against Ms. Vigil, and the case against her was dismissed. Def.'s Ex. G, Settlement Agreement [#28-7]; Def.'s Ex. H, Stipulated Dismissal [#28-8]. Progressive paid $75,000 to settle the lawsuit against its insured, Ms. Vigil. Def.'s Ex. G [#28-7]; Def.'s Ex. I, Check from Progressive [#28-9]. This payment was issued on May 17, 2018. Def.'s Ex. I [#28-9].
Meanwhile, Plaintiff made second and third requests for policy documents and any applicable rejection forms from Defendant on March 22, 2018, and on May 24, 2018. Pl.'s Ex. 3, Letter from Franklin D. Azar & Associates, P.C. [#31-3]. Defendant's records state that underinsured coverage was extended to Plaintiff on May 24, 2018. Def.'s Ex. J [#34-1] at 8-9. On June 13, 2018, Defendant sent a letter to Plaintiff's counsel acknowledgingthat Defendant had agreed to extend underinsured coverage to Plaintiff. Pl.'s Ex. 1, Letter from Def. [#31-1].
In the this lawsuit, Plaintiff seeks damages and asserts the following claims: (1) breach of contract, (2) first party statutory claim under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1116, and (3) bad faith. Am. Compl. [#6] ¶¶ 27-43. In the present Motion [#28], Defendant invokes Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 in order to obtain a determination of law in its favor on one issue, as follows: "that where the tortfeasor's liability insurer paid more than its limits, Plaintiff Michael Moores is only entitled to collect UIM benefits to the extent the damages he sustained exceed the amount actually paid by the tortfeasor's liability insurer." See Motion [#28] at 1.
Defendant's only direct reference to this rule is as follows: " Motion [#28] at 4. While this may be true, Rule 50(a)(2) must be interpreted in the context of the entire rule. See Fogle v. Palomino, No. 14-cv-00880-KLM, 2016 WL 9045844, at *3 (D. Colo. June 6, 2016). Rule 50(a)(1) states: "If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on the issue, the court may: (A) resolve the issue against the party; and (B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claimor defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue."
In Bio Med Technologies Corporation v. Sorin CRM USA, Inc., No. 14-cv-0154-WJM-CBS, 2016 WL 1161848, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 24, 2016), the Court stated:
As a procedural matter, Plaintiff's [Rule 50] Motion is utterly perplexing. The plain language of Rule 50(a) permits judgment as a matter of law "[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial," and notes that a motion under that rule "may be made at any time before the case is submitted to the jury." As such, this is patently not a Rule 50(a) motion, and Plaintiff made no Rule 50(a) motion at trial.
Here, no issue has been fully heard during a jury trial because there has been no jury trial yet. Thus, a Rule 50 motion at this stage of the litigation is procedurally improper and must be denied.
Accordingly, to the extent Defendant seeks relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, the Motion [#28] is denied.
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 is to assess whether trial is necessary. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment shall be granted if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the issue in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 277U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing substantive law. Id.
The burden is on the movant to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670-71 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). When the movant does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, the "movant may make its prima facie demonstration [of the absence of a genuine issue of material fact] simply by pointing out to the court a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim." Id. at 671. If the movant carries the initial burden of making a prima facie showing of a lack of evidence, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to put forth sufficient evidence for each essential element of his claim such that a reasonable jury could find in his favor. See Anderson, 277 U.S. at 248; Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). The nonmovant must go beyond the allegations and denials of his pleadings and provide admissible evidence, which the Court views in the light most favorable to him. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Panis v. Mission Hills Bank, N.A., 60 F.3d 1486, 1490 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Conclusory statements based merely on conjecture, speculation, or subjective belief are not competent summary judgment evidence. Bones v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 2004). The nonmoving party's evidence must be more than "mere reargument of [his] case or a denial of an opponent's allegation" or it will be disregarded. See 10B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2738 (4th ed. 2017).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court may consider only admissible evidence. See Johnson v. Weld County, Colo., 594 F.3d 1202, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 2010). The factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Concrete Works, Inc., v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1517 (10th Cir. 1994). At the summary judgment stage of litigation, a plaintiff's version of the facts must find support in the record. Thomson v. Salt Lake County, 584 F.3d 1304, 1312 (10th Cir. 2009). "When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Thomson, 584 F.3d at 1312.
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