Moorhouse v. City of Wichita

• Decision Date: 15 March 1996
• Docket Number: No. 73436,73436
• Citation: 259 Kan. 570,913 P.2d 172
• Parties: Paula MOORHOUSE, Appellant, v. CITY OF WICHITA, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 172

913 P.2d 172

259 Kan. 570

Paula MOORHOUSE, Appellant, v. CITY OF WICHITA, et al., Appellees.

No. 73436.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

March 15, 1996.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Standing is a question of whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy as to warrant invocation of jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his or her behalf. A party must have a sufficient stake in the outcome of an otherwise justiciable controversy in order to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.

2. A court has a duty only to decide actual controversies and will not give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions. A case will be dismissed as moot when it clearly and convincingly appears that the actual controversy has ceased and any judgment rendered in the case will be an idle act insofar as the rights involved in the action are concerned.

3. Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

4. A public employee who over a period of years contributes a portion of his or her salary to a retirement fund created by legislative enactment, who has membership in the plan, and who performs substantial services for the employer acquires a right or interest in the plan which cannot be whisked away by the stroke of the legislative or executive pen, whether the employee's contribution is voluntary or mandatory.

Appeal from Sedgwick district court; Paul Buchanan, judge. Opinion filed March 15, 1996. Affirmed.

Angela L. Rud, of Martin, Pringle, Oliver, Wallace & Swartz, L.L.P., Wichita, argued the cause, and Terry J. Torline, of the same firm, was with her on the briefs, for appellant.

Michael D. Pepoon, Assistant County Counselor, argued the cause and was on the brief, for appellee Board of County Commissioners of Sedgwick County.

Kelly J. Rundell, Senior Assistant City Attorney, argued the cause, and Gary E. Rebenstorf, City Attorney, was with him on the brief, for appellee City of Wichita.

LOCKETT, Justice:

Employee brought this action against the City of Wichita and Sedgwick County. Employee claimed that a joint ordinance/resolution of the City and the County which transferred her employment from the City to the County resulted in a breach of her employment contract and a substantial reduction of her vested city retirement benefits and was unconstitutional; she requested specific performance. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City and the County. Employee appeals. The case was transferred to this court pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(c).

Plaintiff Paula Moorhouse was employed by the consolidated City of Wichita and Sedgwick County Emergency Communications Department (ECD) for approximately 18 years. The consolidated ECD was operated by the City of Wichita. Moorhouse was an at-will City employee. Moorhouse's salary as a City employee was $13.66 per hour. She was a vested participant in the Wichita Employees Retirement System Plan No. 1 (WER Plan or Plan) and had accumulated over $20,000 in the Plan. Under the WER Plan, Moorhouse was eligible to retire with full benefits after 30 years of service, or on September 1, 2005. Her estimated pension benefit, if she continued in her position with ECD with expected pay increases, would be $2,051.90 per month. In 1994 employees contributed 6.4% and the City contributed 9.5% to the Plan.

The City and the County adopted a joint ordinance/resolution under which operation of the consolidated ECD was transferred to Sedgwick County effective January 1, 1994. On that date Moorhouse became a County employee, though her job duties remained the same. Also on that date her participation in the WER Plan ceased and she began participation in the Kansas Public Employees Retirement System (KPERS). Under KPERS, an employee's interest vests in 10 years. The employee contributes 4%, and the employer rate is 2.1%, plus annual interest payments of 4%. Moorhouse's prior participation and benefits under the WER Plan would not be transferred to KPERS. Moorhouse would not be eligible under KPERS to retire until age 55, in the year 2011, and she would receive 30% less benefits.

Based on her reduced retirement benefits upon transfer to the County, Moorhouse filed this action against the City of Wichita and Sedgwick County on March 10, 1994. Moorhouse sought an order of mandamus directing the City and County to retain her as a City employee and ordering that the City fulfill its contractual obligation to her under the pension plan and to afford such other fringe benefits available to her as a City employee.

Sometime after January 1, 1994, Moorhouse became aware of another City ordinance under which City employees who had been transferred under a joint department to Sedgwick County were reinstated in the WER Plan if the employee returned to City employment within 6 months of the date of the transfer. Based on this ordinance, Moorhouse terminated her employment with the ECD on June 30, 1994, and resumed employment with the City as a clerk typist in the Police Records Department at $9.68 per hour. On July 30, 1994, Moorhouse's new position was reclassified at a salary of $10.10 per hour. Because her salary as a clerk typist was less than her prior City salary, Moorhouse's actual contributions to the WER Plan were reduced, and her projected retirement benefits were similarly reduced. Her projected retirement benefits, if she remained employed in that position with normal pay increases, would be $1,441.76 per month, a reduction of $610.14 per month in expected benefits than had she remained a City ECD employee under the WER Plan. Based on Moorhouse's life expectancy of 73 years, the reduction of benefits would total $175,720.32.

Both the City and the County filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and because mandamus and specific performance were not appropriate remedies. The district court granted the motions to dismiss the mandamus action and denied the motions to dismiss the specific performance claim. Moorhouse was allowed to file an amended petition.

An amended petition was filed. In the amended petition Moorhouse claimed that (1) the City breached a "contract" under which she agreed to perform labor and services for the City in the ECD; (2) the County, by assuming full responsibility for the ECD, assumed liability to provide her with benefits equal to her benefits under the City plan; and (3) the joint ordinance/resolution to transfer the ECD to the County was an unconstitutional impairment of her vested retirement benefits under the City plan. Moorhouse prayed:

"A. For an order of specific performance requiring the City or County to continue to treat plaintiff as a City employee for retirement plan purposes or provide equivalent benefits to plaintiff "B. In the alternative, for judgment against defendant City and/or County in an amount in excess of $50,000.00;

"C. For an order declaring the joint resolution of the City and County described herein to be unconstitutional and invalid to the extent it impairs plaintiff's contract rights;

"D. For an order allowing plaintiff recovery of her costs herein expended and for such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just, fair and equitable."

The City and the County both moved for summary judgment, arguing: (1) Moorhouse was now employed by the City and therefore the case was moot, and (2) computation of the monetary damages sought as an alternative to specific performance were now impossible.

Moorhouse responded that her new position with the City was at a lower salary; therefore, even though she was now a City employee she had suffered substantial losses to her retirement benefits. She contended she took the new position with the City to mitigate her damages, not because she no longer wanted to work in the ECD. Moorhouse pointed out to the judge that she sought relief because she is not now entitled to "equivalent benefits" under the WER Plan. Moorhouse also asserted that summary judgment was not proper because discovery was incomplete. She contended further discovery would show that the City and the County did not reach an agreement prior to January 1, 1994, as to how her and other employees' retirement benefits would be treated after the transfer and would reveal that the County contributed a lower percentage to retirement benefits under KPERS than the City contributed under the WER Plan. Finally, Moorhouse argued that having the joint ordinance declared unconstitutional was not moot, although she was now an employee of the City.

The court noted Moorhouse was now a City employee participating in the City WER Plan. The court concluded that because Moorhouse was not an ECD employee, she did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the joint ordinance/resolution transferring operation of the ECD from the City to the County. The court determined that Moorhouse's amended petition did not state a cause of action and granted the City's and the County's motions for summary judgment. Moorhouse appeals, claiming: (1) she had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the joint ordinance/resolution and (2) the trial court erred in granting judgment to the City and the County.

STANDING

Standing is a question of whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy as to warrant invocation of jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his or her behalf. A party must have a sufficient stake in the outcome of an otherwise justiciable controversy in order to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy. Harrison v. Long, 241 Kan. 174, 176, 734 P.2d 1155 (1987); see Joe Self Chevrolet, Inc. v. Board of Sedgwick County...