Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Iowa Unemployment Compensation Commission
| Decision Date | 18 March 1941 |
| Docket Number | 45290. |
| Citation | 296 N.W. 791,230 Iowa 123 |
| Parties | MOORMAN MFG. CO. v. IOWA UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Black Hawk County; Ralph W. Hasner Judge.
Action involves a claim of Edmund J. Carroll who seeks unemployment compensation payments under the provisions of the Iowa Unemployment Compensation Law. The Unemployment Compensation Commission, on appeal to that body, from a decision of the Appeal Tribunal allowing the claim, sustained the decision. On a further appeal to the district court the decision of the commission was approved and decree entered holding that claimant was entitled to unemployment compensation. Moorman Manufacturing Company, the claimed employer, appeals. The facts are set forth in the opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Wilson & Schmiedeskamp, of Quincy, Ill., Miller, Huebner & Miller of Des Moines, and Harris & Van Metre, of Waterloo, for appellant.
J. Charles Crawley and Homer M. Lyons, both of Des Moines, and George Finch, of Sioux City, for appellees.
The question for decision in this litigation is whether the Iowa Unemployment Compensation Law, Code 1939, § 1551.07 et seq., is applicable to the claim of one Edmund J. Carroll, who it is asserted is an employee of the Moorman Manufacturing Company, plaintiff-appellant herein.
For purposes of brevity the Moorman Manufacturing Company will hereafter be referred to as the company; Edmund J. Carroll, the claimant, will be referred to as the claimant; and the Iowa Unemployment Compensation Commission will be termed the Commission. The Iowa Unemployment Compensation Law will be referred to as the statute.
The factual situation that is the basis of this litigation is briefly summarized in the decision of the Commission, who by reason of an appeal to that body affirmed a prior ruling of the Appeal Tribunal, which held that claimant was an employee of the company. These findings of fact, incorporated in the commission's decision, some of which appellant claimed are unsupported under the evidence, are as follows:
" Claimant entered into a written agreement with the respondent company on about July 12, 1937, to sell its products to farmers on a commission basis. He was to solicit orders in certain specified territory, which was limited to the extent described in the contract. He was given instructions on how to approach a sale in a most effective manner, by attending sales meetings and by direct instructions of the sale supervisor who covered the territory which he was to serve. These instructions included performing various functions such as, delousing and worming poultry, spraying poultry houses and barns, and in general performing a great deal of so-called ‘ free service’ . Orders procured would be sent to the company and if approved by them would be shipped on open account. The contract was for a period of only 6 months duration. While not a part of the written contract it was brought out during the hearing that claimant was required to purchase certain items supplied to him by the company at their discretion. Also, he was required to file a work report indicating for each week the number of hours worked, the number of orders taken, the amount of weekly sales in money for the elapsed period, the identity of the products sold, and such other remarks as might be deemed of interest to either party.
These reports were filed on a regular United States postcard addressed to the company headquarters and bore the instructions His manager or supervisor would make surprise visits at the home of the salesmen or ‘ dealers' at various times of the day or week to see that they were at work. Claimant used his own means of conveyance and paid his own traveling expenses. To induce greater effort, the company would at times offer bonuses; some of them the claimant procured, including a haberdashery outfit, a suit of clothes, some dishes, and a turkey for Christmas. Claimant would use his own judgment how and when to work and was paid a remuneration only in the form of commission on the merchandise for which he took orders. Claimant could have other and additional employment if he should so desire. Claimant quit about February 22, 1938, by handing in his resignation.
Basis of Law upon which decision is made:
Section 19(g) states: ‘ Except as otherwise provided in this subsection G, " employment" means service, including service in interstate commerce, performed for wages or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied.’ Section 1551.25, subd. G, par. 1 of 1939 Code.
Section 19(m) states: " ‘ Wages" means all renumeration payable for personal services, including commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all remuneration payable in any medium other than cash.’ * * * Section 1551.25, subd. M of 1939 Code.
Section 19(g) (6) states: ‘ Services performed by an individual for wages shall be deemed to be employment subject to this Act unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the commission that (a) such individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the performance of such services, both under his contract of service and in fact.’ Section 1551.25, subd. G, par. 6.
While the written contract indicates that no control was had by the employer over the manner in which claimant performed his services, it was freely admitted by the employee that directions were given him continuously on what to do in order to procure orders for the merchandise. Also, the immediate supervisor of claimant's efforts would in fact see to it that claimant was on the job every available hour he may have had. This is further indicated by the report claimant was required to file each week, with the admonition printed thereon: ‘ Your commission checks will be held until all weekly reports are received.’
In view of these conditions it cannot be said that claimant was free from control or direction ‘ in fact’ .
Claimant's earnings depended upon the commissions he would receive in connection with the orders he would take for respondent ‘ employer's' merchandise, but such commissions have been clearly defined as wages under section 19(m) of the Iowa Unemployment Compensation Law.
Decision:
Claimant having performed service ‘ in employment as defined’ for an ‘ employer so defined’ is entitled to benefits if otherwise eligible, in the amount and to the extent as indicated by his earnings, including those he earned as commissions and bonuses on orders taken for merchandise for respondent employer. Respondent employer is required to file a report of earnings of claimant during the period he rendered personal services ‘ in employment’ and pay contributions thereon in accordance with the provisions of the Iowa Unemployment Law."
Inasmuch as the questions herein involve legislation that has not heretofore been considered by this court, it is advisable that we herein set forth further portions of the statute which are applicable and which have not heretofore been mentioned in the commission's finding of fact. All statutes mentioned in the commission's finding of fact and in this opinion were in effect at the times involved in this litigation.
Section 1551.08 of the 1939 Code of Iowa sets forth the declaration of state public policy in connection with unemployment compensation legislation and is in part as follows: " * * * The legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good, and the general welfare of the citizens of this state require the enactment of this measure, under the police powers of the state, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own."
Section 1551.12, subd. I, which relates to the procedure in connection with a court review is in part as follows: " * * * In the absence of fraud any finding of fact by the commission, after notice and hearing as herein provided, shall be binding upon the court on appeal, when supported by substantial and competent evidence. * * *"
The statutory direction in connection with an appeal is as follows:
Inasmuch as there is some variance in the holdings of the several state courts in connection with the question as to what constitutes employment and service it might be well to state that the original unemployment compensation law, as originally introduced in the Forty-sixth General Assembly, Extraordinary Session, provided two additional provisions as to what constitute service. They were referred to as subsections (b) and (c). It might be stated that in the original act these three subsections were each dependent upon the other and in its entirety was as follows:
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