Moorman v. Bentley, 86-1113

Decision Date20 June 1986
Docket NumberNo. 86-1113,86-1113
Citation11 Fla. L. Weekly 1400,490 So.2d 186
Parties11 Fla. L. Weekly 1400 James Marion MOORMAN, Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Petitioner, v. The Honorable E. Randolph BENTLEY, Circuit Judge, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Respondent.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

James Marion Moorman, pro se.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and William I. Munsey, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This is a petition for writ of certiorari initiated by the Public Defender of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, who seeks to quash an order entered by respondent appointing the public defender as counsel in an indirect criminal contempt proceeding. The issue presented is whether there exists statutory authority for the public defender to represent indigent persons in such proceedings.

The alleged contemner was arrested for violating a protective injunction issued by the respondent. After making a finding of indigency, respondent appointed the public defender to represent him at a show cause hearing. The public defender's motion to withdraw as counsel was denied, prompting this petition for certiorari.

It is not disputed that persons charged with indirect criminal contempt have a constitutional right to counsel. See, e.g., Aaron v. State, 284 So.2d 673 (Fla.1973). However, petitioner argues that this does not necessarily equate appointment of a public defender. The office of public defender is totally a creature of the state constitution and of statute, not of common law. State ex rel. Smith v. Brummer, 443 So.2d 957 (Fla.1984). The applicable statute, section 27.51, Florida Statutes (1985), does not provide blanket authority for the public defender to represent all indigent persons in all types of criminal actions. Behr v. Gardner, 442 So.2d 980 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Rather, the statute provides:

(1) The public defender shall represent, without additional compensation, any person who is determined by the court to be indigent as provided in s. 27.52 and who is:

(a) Under arrest for, or is charged with, a felony;

(b) Under arrest for, or is charged with, a misdemeanor, a violation of chapter 316 which is punishable by imprisonment, or a violation of a municipal or county ordinance in the county court, unless the court, prior to trial, files in the cause a statement in writing that the defendant will not be imprisoned if he is convicted;

(c) Alleged to be a delinquent child pursuant to a petition filed before a circuit court; or

(d) Sought by petition filed in such court to be involuntarily hospitalized as a mentally ill or mentally retarded person.

Since the statute does not mention contempt of court, petitioner urges that the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies to bar his appointment in criminal contempt proceedings.

We disagree. We believe that criminal contempt bears sufficient indicia of a criminal offense that it may be classified as such. Aaron v. State. Criminal contempt is intended to punish specific, articulable conduct. It is punishable by incarceration. Standards for the imposition of such punishment are included in the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, the same due process rights that adhere to an ordinary criminal prosecution generally are available to the alleged contemner. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968). As we stated in Mann v. State, 476 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985):

In spite of the uncertainty which may have existed at an earlier time, it is well settled that criminal contempt is a crime.

476 So.2d at 1374.

While the contempt power of Florida...

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8 cases
  • City of Fort Lauderdale v. Mattlin, 89-1295
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 29 Agosto 1990
    ...DUI, formerly considered an infraction, is treated as a crime even if excluded from the definition of "misdemeanor"); Moorman v. Bentley, 490 So.2d 186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (criminal contempt); Thompson v. Office of Public Defender of Ninth Judicial Circuit In and For Orange County, 387 So.2d......
  • Schaab v. State Of Fla.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 21 Abril 2010
    ...determine all questions of law and fact.” No statute defines the crime of contempt or establishes the punishment. Moorman v. Bentley, 490 So.2d 186, 187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). “[T]he power of courts to punish for contempt was recognized at common Id. (citation omitted). Where there is no exist......
  • Blalock v. Rice, 97-01578
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 10 Septiembre 1997
    ...of up to $1000. The maximum fine that can be imposed is $500. See §§ 38.22, 775.02, Fla. Stat. (1995); see also Moorman v. Bentley, 490 So.2d 186, 187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). Furthermore, a person found guilty of indirect criminal contempt may not be sentenced to more than six months without th......
  • Washington v. Burk, 96-1404
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 3 Enero 1997
    ...law that indirect criminal contempt is a criminal proceeding. See Gidden v. State, 613 So.2d 457, 460 (Fla.1993); Moorman v. Bentley, 490 So.2d 186, 187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). It should make no difference whether such a proceeding is initiated by indictment, information, citation, notice to ap......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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