Moquin v. Bergeron
| Decision Date | 11 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4D21-27 |
| Parties | Yves MOQUIN, Appellant, v. Sylvie BERGERON, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robin Bresky and Randall Burks of Bresky Law, Boca Raton, for appellant.
Eddie Stephens and Gina M. Szapucki of Ward, Damon, Posner, Pheterson & Bleau, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Forst, J. Appellant Yves Moquin ("Former Husband") appeals from an order and a final judgment of dissolution of marriage that found the proceeds from the sale of two marital residences were subject to equitable distribution under Chapter 61, Florida Statutes (2019). On appeal, Former Husband principally argues the trial court erred in: (1) misinterpreting Quebec (Canada) law when considering his Quebecois prenuptial agreement with Appellee Sylvie Bergeron ("Former Wife"); (2) making—or failing to make—several findings under section 61.075; (3) finding Former Wife conditionally entitled to alimony and attorney's fees; and (4) failing to make sufficient findings as to the parties’ then-minor child under section 61.13.
We agree with Former Husband that the trial court erred in applying Florida's equitable distribution statute when equitably distributing proceeds from the sale of two marital residences under section 61.075, despite the existence of a Quebecois prenuptial agreement that clearly and unambiguously stated Quebec law applied to the distribution of the couple's property. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to distribute the proceeds solely to Former Husband as his separate property.
We decline to disturb the trial court's findings with respect to alimony and attorney's fees. On remand, in light of the above-noted reversal of the distribution of proceeds issue, the trial court shall reconsider whether an award of alimony and/or attorney's fees to Former Wife is appropriate. Finally, because the parties’ child is no longer a minor, any purported failure to make sufficient findings under section 61.13 is now moot. See Gamache v. Gamache , 14 So. 3d 1236, 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ().
Background
Former Husband married Former Wife in Quebec on July 25, 1992. Before the parties were married, they signed a July 17, 1992 marriage contract ("the Marriage Contract"). The Marriage Contract provided as follows:1
Under the parties’ election of the separate property regime, "each spouse ha[d] the administration, enjoyment and free disposal of all his or her property." Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art 486 (Can.). It was undisputed the parties maintained separate accounts and assets throughout their marriage.
In 2009, the parties—along with a daughter born in 2002—became permanent Florida residents. Former Husband purchased a family home in Ocean Ridge ("the Ocean Ridge Residence") using his separate assets. The family lived in the Ocean Ridge Residence until July 2017, when they moved into two neighboring Palm Beach Gardens condominium units (collectively, "the Palm Beach Gardens Condominium").2 The Palm Beach Gardens Condominium was titled solely in the name of Former Husband's trust, and Former Wife later acknowledged she had not contributed any monies to the purchase.
Subsequently, in early 2019, Former Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage and other relief. Former Wife's petition requested: (1) a parenting plan including equal timesharing; (2) child support pursuant to section 61.30, Florida Statutes (2019) ; (3) equitable distribution of marital assets under section 61.075, Florida Statutes (2019) ; (4) "all forms of alimony including, but not limited to, temporary, permanent periodic, rehabilitative, durational, bridge-the-gap, and lump sum alimony;" and (5) "temporary and permanent exclusive use, possession, title, and occupancy of the marital home in Ocean Ridge ... or the [Palm Beach Gardens Condominium] marital home ...." Former Husband listed the Palm Beach Gardens Condominium for sale; he had earlier listed the Ocean Ridge Residence as well.3
In response to Former Wife's petition, Former Husband filed an amended answer and counterpetition. In his amended answer, Former Husband denied the parties had "acquired various marital assets and incurred liabilities in various titles, jointly and singularly." Moreover, Former Husband raised the parties’ July 17, 1992 Marriage Contract as an affirmative defense, arguing the contract "should govern the identification and classification of all non-marital properties of the parties and the distribution of the marital assets ...." Similarly, Former Husband's counterpetition requested his "separate property ... be set aside and awarded solely to [him] pursuant to the terms of the Marriage Contract ...."
Former Wife filed an amended reply and answer to Former Husband's counterpetition. In short, Former Wife denied the Marriage Contract controlled. She asserted, because the parties were domiciled in Florida, Florida law—or more precisely, Chapter 61—applied to the distribution of the parties’ assets. In the alternative, Former Wife argued, even if the trial court opted to apply the Civil Code of Quebec, "the full Civil Code should apply—including Quebec's family patrimony law, which would dictate much the same result as Chapter 61."
Due to the parties’ disagreement as to the proper law to apply, Former Husband filed a "Motion to Enforce and/or Interpret Choice of Law Provision in Parties’ Marriage Contract" ("Motion to Enforce"). Former Husband requested the trial court "enforce the parties’ Marriage Contract and apply the Civil Code of the Province of Quebec to determine the distribution of all property." Specifically, Former Husband alleged that under Article I of the Marriage Contract, the parties "adopted the Matrimonial Regime of Separation as to Property, as established by the Civil Code of the Province of Quebec." Pursuant to the separation as to property regime, Former Husband asserted "the parties agreed ... all property would remain separate upon dissolution of the marriage, including property acquired during the marriage ... [and] agreed to be governed by the Civil Code of the Province of Quebec, regardless of where they lived in the future."
Citing to Florida law establishing that a court is required to enforce a choice-of-law provision in a prenuptial agreement unless it contravenes public policy, Former Husband argued, because the Marriage Contract did not contravene public policy and because the parties "kept separate assets and continually maintained separate accounts throughout the course of their marriage," he should "be awarded all property in his name alone and/or in trust for his benefit," including the Ocean Ridge Residence and Palm Beach Gardens Condominium. Moreover, Former Husband contended that "for the Rules of Family Patrimony to apply, the parties must be domiciled in Quebec at the time of the dissolution of the marriage." (boldface in original).
While Former Wife had previously argued the family patrimony articles should apply if proceeding under Quebec law, Former Wife subsequently obtained an expert who opined the family patrimony articles would not apply based upon Article 3089 of the Civil Code of Quebec—which provides that the effects of marriage (which includes the family patrimony articles) are governed by the law of the domicile of the spouses. Consequently, the parties filed a Joint Pretrial Stipulation, agreeing "the Family Patrimony Articles of the Civil Code of Quebec do not apply to the partition of property for spouses who do not reside in Quebec at the time of dissolution of marriage" and the family patrimony articles did "not apply to the parties herein who have been residing in Florida since 2007." The parties also agreed the Marriage Contract was valid and enforceable and, upon moving to Florida, Former Husband "acquired several pieces of real property, all of which were titled in his name or the Yves Moquin Revocable Trust."
Following the Joint Pretrial Stipulation, the parties filed competing memoranda concerning Former Husband's Motion to Enforce. Notwithstanding the mutually agreed upon inapplicability of the family patrimony articles, Former Wife pointed to Article 3089 of the Civil Code of Quebec to support her position that the portions of Florida law which approximate the family patrimony articles would apply. She argued "the Florida Court must look to Article 3089 of the Civil Code of Quebec and apply Florida law to determine how to divide the remaining effects of marriage."
At the hearing on Former Husband's Motion to Enforce, the parties’ Quebecois experts testified, reiterating the positions contained within the parties’ memoranda. Notably, however, Former Wife's expert testified that when analyzing Article 3089, "Florida has to decide if there are Effects of Marriage that govern these parties ... [such as] ‘imperative laws’ ... which apply to the parties, notwithstanding their matrimonial regime."
Thereafter, the trial court entered an Order on Former Husband's Motion to Enforce. The trial court found "no doubt that the provisions of the [Marriage Contract] must be interpreted under Quebec law." The trial court also took note of the parties’ agreement that "the effects of marriage, along with the Family Patrimony [Articles], do not apply with full force since the parties no longer reside in Quebec."
While the trial court agreed that the family patrimony articles did not apply, the court stated the issue at hand was "whether Article 3089 authorizes ... any court in a jurisdiction other than Quebec, to utilize its own laws—insofar as they are ... reasonably similar—to protect the effects of...
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