Mora v. Arpaio
| Decision Date | 25 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-09-1719-PHX-DGC,CV-09-1719-PHX-DGC |
| Parties | Julian Mora; and Julio Mora, Plaintiffs, v. Joseph M. Arpaio, Sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona, in his individual and official capacities; Captain Ray Jones; Lieutenant Joe Sousa; Sergeant George Acritelli; Sergeant Guadalupe Rios; Officer Guillermo Montano; and John Does I through III, in their individual capacities; and Maricopa County, Arizona, a body politic, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
This case arises from a workplace immigration raid conducted by the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office ("MCSO"). Julian Mora has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for more than 30 years, and his son, Julio Mora, is a United States citizen. Julian was an employee of Handyman Maintenance Inc. ("HMI"), a landscaping business located in South Phoenix. On the morning of February 11, 2009, Julian drove his pickup truck to work. He was accompanied by Julio, who intended to seek a job at HMI. As they neared the HMI worksite, the Moras were stopped by two MCSO deputies. The deputies ordered the Moras out of the truck, handcuffed them, and transported them to the HMI worksite where a large-scale immigration raid by MCSO was underway. The Moras were made to stand in line with other HMI employees fornearly three hours, were questioned about their identities and immigration status once they reached the front of the line, and were released only after it was determined that they had committed no identity theft or forgery offense and were lawfully present in the United States.
The Moras filed suit in August 2009. Doc. 1. The action is brought against Maricopa County, Sheriff Joseph Arpaio, the two unknown John Doe Deputies who initially stopped Plaintiffs, a John Doe Officer who participated in the detention and questioning of Julio Mora at HMI, and certain identified MCSO personnel involved in the operation: Captain Ray Jones, Lieutenant Joe Sousa, Sergeants George Acritelli and Guadalupe Rios, and Officer Guillermo Montano. The second amended complaint asserts federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violations of the Arizona Constitution, and various tort claims. Doc. 59. Specifically, the complaint asserts eight claims: violations of the Fourth Amendment and Article 2, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution against all Defendants (counts one and three), violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 2, Section 13 of the Arizona Constitution against all Defendants except Officer Montano (counts two and four), false arrest and imprisonment against the County, the Sheriff, the John Doe Deputies, and Officer Montano (count five), assault and battery against the County, the Sheriff, and the John Doe Deputies (counts six and seven), and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the County, the Sheriff, and Officer Montano (count eight). Id.
The parties have filed motions for partial summary judgment. Docs. 144, 147. The motions are fully briefed. Docs. 155, 160, 161, 163, 170. For reasons stated below, the motions will be granted in part and denied in part.1
A party seeking summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informingthe district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit will preclude the entry of summary judgment, and the disputed evidence must be "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Plaintiffs seek summary judgment as to the County's liability on the claim under § 1983 for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment (count one), and the state law claims for violation Article 2, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution, false arrest and imprisonment, assault, and battery (counts three, five, six, and seven). Plaintiffs' motion will be granted with respect to part of count one.
In the § 1983 claim asserted in count one, Plaintiffs seek to hold the County liable for deprivations of their constitutional rights under the theory of municipal liability set forth in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Doc. 147 at 8. Under Monell, municipal liability can result from the policy, practice, or custom of the County itself or its final policymaker. 436 U.S. at 694. There must be an underlying constitutional violation in order for the County to be found liable under § 1983, see Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010), but the violation need not be ascribed to a specific County official. See Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1186 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002); Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1151 (9th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiffs argue that MCSO officers violated their Fourth Amendment right to befree from unreasonable search and seizure in three ways: the initial stop of their vehicle, their subsequent arrests, and their continued detention at HMI. Doc. 147 at 12-21. Plaintiffs further argue that the County is liable for those constitutional violations because they occurred as a result of the policies, practices, and customs promulgated and ratified by Sheriff Arpaio, the County's final policymaker for law enforcement matters. Id. at 21-25. The Court will address the claimed constitutional violations separately before turning to the issue of the County's liability under § 1983.
"'The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights.'" Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). To establish a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must show the deprivation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or statutory law and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See id. In this case, there is no dispute that Defendants acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. See id. (); Flanders v. Maricopa County, 54 P.3d 837 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) ().
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures" by the government, and "'its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.'" Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1020 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). For a law enforcement officer "'to initiate an investigatory stop of a motorist, there must at least exist reasonable suspicion that the motorist is engaging in illegal activity.'" Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). While the level of suspicion required for a traffic stop is less demanding than that for probable cause, it is "more than an 'inchoate andunparticularized suspicion or hunch.'" United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). Reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop exists only where the officer has "'specific, articulable facts which, together with objective and reasonable inferences, form the basis for suspecting that the particular person detained is engaged in criminal activity.'" Liberal, 632 F.3d at 1077 (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs have presented undisputed evidence showing the following.2 HMI is located on the northwest corner of 19th Avenue and Lower Buckeye Road, with Hilton Avenue to the north. Doc. 148 ¶3. On the morning in question, shortly before 6:00 a.m., Julian drove his Ford pickup truck east on Hilton Avenue and turned right, heading south on 19th Avenue. Id. ¶ 5. There was normal traffic flow on 19th Avenue, and Julian had no problem turning onto the street from Hilton Avenue. Id. ¶7. When Plaintiffs were about 100 meters north of HMI, they were suddenly stopped by the John Doe Deputies-one of the officers' vehicles cutting in front of Plaintiffs' truck and the other blocking the truck from behind. Id. ¶ 5. Julian had committed no traffic violation, and neither Plaintiff was ever charged with a crime. Id. ¶6. Nor, prior to the operation at HMI, had MCSO identified Julian's truck as belonging to or associated with any suspect. Id.¶ 48. In short, the undisputed evidence shows that when the John Doe Deputies stopped Plaintiffs, they had no suspicion, reasonable or otherwise, that Plaintiffs were in violation of the traffic laws or engaged in criminal activity.
The County asserts that Plaintiffs were stopped "inside the perimeter of operations" set up by MCSO (Docs. 161 at 4, 162 ¶9), but the cited evidence fails to support this assertion. Lieutenant Souza testified only that he saw a truck being pulledover some 25-50 yards from the HMI worksite. Doc. 162-2 at 14-15. He did not testify that the truck belonged to Plaintiffs, and even his distance estimate was a "total guess" given that it was still dark out when he saw the vehicle being pulled over. Id. at 14.
The County notes that MCSO posse member Fred Dawert recalls a son asking if he could take his father to work at HMI, and then obtaining permission to allow a truck driven by the father to pass through the security perimeter and travel down 19th Avenue toward HMI. Doc. 162 6-7. But the County presents no evidence from which a jury reasonably could...
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