Mora v. Baker Commodities, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 May 1989
• Docket Number: No. B032912,B032912
• Citation: 258 Cal.Rptr. 669,210 Cal.App.3d 771
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Martin MORA and Martha Mora, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BAKER COMMODITIES, INC., Defendant and Respondent. Civ.

Page 669

258 Cal.Rptr. 669

210 Cal.App.3d 771

Martin MORA and Martha Mora, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BAKER COMMODITIES, INC., Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. No. B032912.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

May 17, 1989.

Gage, Mazursky, Schwartz, Angelo & Kussman and Christopher E. Angelo and Steven B. Stevens, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and appellants

Yusim, Stein & Hanger and Robert E. Levine, Encino, for defendant and respondent.

ASHBY, Associate Justice.

Appellant Martin Mora appeals from the entry of summary judgment in favor of respondent Baker Commodities, Inc. ¹ We reverse with directions.

STATEMENT OF CASE

The underlying suit arose after appellant was seriously injured when a vessel containing ammonia gas exploded. The vessel was part of a refrigeration system located on the roof of property owned by respondent and leased to appellant's employer.

The property was being used as a meat packing plant.

Appellant's complaint asserted nine causes of action and named numerous defendants, including the manufacturer, component part manufacturer, installer, supplier of the vessel, appellant's employer (Stockton Corporation), and respondent as the owner and lessor of the property. Respondent brought a summary judgment motion alleging it was not liable for appellant's injuries. The basis of the motion was the assertion that as a commercial lessor respondent was not liable for injuries sustained by third persons while on premises leased to respondent's commercial tenant. The trial court granted the motion and entered summary judgment in favor of respondent. On appeal the only issues raised relate to strict liability and negligence. We find that appellant has no cause of action in strict liability but there are triable issues of fact on the negligence cause of action.

FACTS

Star Packing Company, Inc. (Star) owned real property located at 4100 East Bandini Blvd., Los Angeles, California. On December 31, 1975, Star leased the property and equipment thereon for five years to Serv-U Meat Packing Co. (Serv-U) for the purposes of killing animals and processing meat products.

In June 1980, respondent purchased the industrial property from Star and was assigned all interest in the lease with Serv-U.

On December 30, 1980, respondent and Serv-U negotiated and executed a twenty-six (26)-page, sixty (60)-month lease. The lease designated as the "premises" of the lease the real property located at 4100 East Bandini Boulevard and items listed as "personal property," including the vessel which exploded. The vessel, which was insulated, was described by one expert as four feet by six feet and by another as "a cylindrical vat with 'dish' type ends, approximately three feet in diameter and four feet tall." The evidence is contradictory as to whether the vessel was secured to the roof by bolts, stood on angle-iron legs, or if its legs, not secured by bolts, stood on stabilizing plates. However, there was no disagreement that the vessel, made in the 1920's or 1930's, was part of a large refrigerator system specifically designed for the building. The system was located on the roof and included vats, pumps, evaporators, accumulators, blowers and seven vessels which held ammonia gas, including the one which exploded. One blower had an estimated capacity of 10 tons, the steel and concrete cradle was 36 feet by 18 feet and one evaporator had a 40-ton capacity. All parts of the system were connected through the building and through the roof by pipes and wiring.

The December 30, 1980, lease specified that the premises was to be used to slaughter animals and process meat, required the tenant to maintain property and bodily injury insurance naming respondent as an additional insured, reserved the right of respondent to enter the premises to inspect and make repairs, and allowed the tenant to install and remove its own "trade fixtures." In addition, the lease required the tenant to maintain and repair the real property as well as any item designated as "personal property."

The tenant (Serv-U) subsequently subleased the premises to a subtenant, who on May 14, 1984, subleased the property to appellant's employer, Stockton. Respondent agreed to the sublease with Stockton which obligated Stockton to perform all obligations of the December 30, 1980, lease. All subtenants utilized the property as a meat packing plant.

Besides leasing the property, respondent also operated a meat rendering business. A meat renderer collects the inedible meat by-products and processes them for fertilizer and dog food. Respondent's employees entered the premises several times a day to retrieve the inedible meat portions collected in a large receptacle.

On July 14, 1984, appellant was on the roof of the building when the vessel exploded releasing approximately 1800 gallons of ammonia gas into the air and causing severe This matter comes to us after respondent's summary judgment motion was granted and judgment was entered in favor of respondent. In reviewing the summary judgment our responsibility is to determine if "all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Burton v. Security Pacific Nat. Bank (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 972, 976, 243 Cal.Rptr. 277; AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064-1065, 225 Cal.Rptr. 203.)

                injuries to appellant. 2  To inspect the vessels after the accident they were x-rayed. 3  The inspection revealed that the vessel exploded when a weld gave way.  There was no evidence that at any time prior to the accident respondent inspected the real property or the vessel
                

STRICT LIABILITY

Appellant first contends respondent is strictly liable for appellant's injuries because respondent owned the real property upon which appellant was injured. We disagree.

In Becker v. IRM Corp. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 454, 213 Cal.Rptr. 213, 698 P.2d 116, the Supreme Court expanded the applicability of strict liability as enunciated in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 and held that a lessor of residential property "is strictly liable in tort for injuries resulting from a latent defect in the premises when the defect existed at the time the premises were let...." (Becker v. IRM Corp., supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 464, 213 Cal.Rptr. 213, 698 P.2d 116.) The discussion of strict liability in Becker was based on the implied warranty of habitability and "the need to insure safe, adequate housing for modern, urban residential tenants, who like ordinary consumers, are powerless to protect themselves." (Muro v. Superior Court (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1089, 1096, 229 Cal.Rptr. 383.) However, renting "[h]ousing is an entirely different type of real estate activity" (id. at p. 1098, 229 Cal.Rptr. 383) than leasing commercial property. The concept of strict liability is not applied to the lessors of commercial or industrial properties. (Id.)

Appellant suggests strict liability is an appropriate cause of action because the vessel which exploded was "personal" rather than real property. ⁴ We need not draw the distinction suggested by appellant. For purposes of discussion, we assume the vessel which exploded was not affixed nor intended to be annexed to the roof and was technically "personal property." This, however, does not control the issue as to whether respondent, as the owner and lessor of the vessel, can be held strictly liable.

In Price v. Shell Oil Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 245, 85 Cal.Rptr. 178, 466 P.2d 722, relied upon by appellant, the court held that commercial bailors and lessors of personal property, such as those leasing trucks with movable ladders, could be held strictly liable because, similar to manufacturers, distributors, and retailers, they were in the business of leasing property, and they placed the defective item on the market

                and in the stream of commerce knowing it was to be used by the public without inspection for defects.  (See also Fakhoury v. Magner (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 58, 101 Cal.Rptr. 473.)   Here, however, the vessel which exploded was not placed on the market and into the stream of commerce.  Respondent, an industrial landlord, was not engaged in the business of leasing personal property to the public.  Rather, the vessel was part of an enormous refrigeration system on the roof of industrial real property.  The system, designed for the building, provided the refrigeration necessary for the functioning of the food processing plant.  The vessel in question, as part of the refrigeration system, was an integral part of the commercial building.  Whether or not the vessel was "personal" or "real" property, the concept of strict liability is not applicable since it does not apply to commercial real property
                

NEGLIGENCE

Appellant contends summary judgment was inappropriate as to the negligence cause of action because respondent did not demonstrate that judgment was required as a matter of law. We agree.

At common law the duties of landowners and occupiers were based upon artificially classifying the plaintiff as either a trespasser, licensee, or invitee. The lease was seen as transferring the rights and all obligations based upon ownership of the property to the tenant for the length of the leasehold. (Becker v. IRM Corp., supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 461, 213 Cal.Rptr. 213, 698 P.2d 116; 64 A.L.R.3d 339, Dangerous Conditions of Rented Premises.) The general rule developed that a landlord was not responsible for injuries from dangerous conditions on the property which occurred after the tenant took possession even if the defect may have been discoverable. (Wylie v. Gresch (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 412, 417, 236 Cal.Rptr. 552; Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 510, 118 Cal.Rptr. 741.) Dissatisfaction with the common law arbitrary classifications, the harsh results which left...